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FOREWORD
What follows is another attempt to explicate the
treacherous notion of social change.

This is a specific

type of change which rests on several assumptions that some
students are not willing to accept.
thing changes.

In broad terms, every

The sociologist comes to his study of social

interaction with this major assumption.

But he must make a

leap from this assumption to the next; and that is;
things change more than others

some

(cryptically, some things

change and some things don't . . . sometimes).

From these

assumptions he then arrives at the point where sociology is
the study of social similiarities and social differences.^
That change is problematic to the sociologist is
axiomatic.
problematic.

But in like manner, no change and order are also
Such are our difficulties.

F. S. C. Northrop's

essential premise that inquiry starts with a problem and not
with a method is the model for the inquiry to follow.
Following Northrop further, I accept his distinctions between
problems of fact and problems of value as well as the funda
mental differences between factual theories and normative
theories.^

I will not be so bold as to say I have reduced

normativity to facticity by the methodology employed— but
that I have tried to get at the problem in spite of
N o r t h r op's logic.
iii

Accepting Horowitz's comment that we live:
. . . in an age in which instrumental theories of
knowledge, indeterminist attitudes in the physical
sciences, voluntarist notions of historical change,
pluralistic theories of culture, and existentialist
accounts of the human abyss have become standard
currency in western intellectual exchange. . . ,3
Then I have chosen the problem of socio-political order and
change— more specifically, the topic of national "form"
(ideology) and the political men who act within it and on it.
Thus, at once, the grand problem takes in the problems of
fact and of value in addition to factual theory and normative
theory.

For reasons of parsimony, my perspective is from

that of a political sociology.

The perspective of my

political sociology includes the analysis of the reciprocal
relations between the political and the social— entailing
the coercive and the public.4

Such a definition of intel

lectual perspective allows the study of a wide range of
actions.

If we proceed by the process of exclusion, then we

must get things manageable before we can get things meaning
ful.
Most globally, I am concerned with social inequalities
among men and how these inequalities are mediated

(or even

obliterated) through the possibility of planned nonviolent
social change.

The emergence of this possibility, at least

as far as the sociology of knowledge is concerned, is
directly related to the two different kinds of revolution
which affect our social structural-order as well as social
thought.

These are the industrial revolution and the French

revolution which are currently viewed as two distinct but
linked processes or trends— industrialization and democratiz
ation

(or egalitarianization).

The possibility of planning

in the area of social change is being tried at all levels of
government.

The current international ideology or social

policy is for 'developed' countries to assist 'under
developed' or Third World countries, and national domestic
policy includes programs to 'raise the level of living' of
some or all of the peoples of a given country.

Such social

planning may be a special case of the phenomena that make up
"social movements."^
The United States Federal legislative or Congressional
system provides a good socio-political matrix to study the
effects of industrialization and egalitarianization on the
possibility of a social movement made up of international
and national social planning.

The Social Security Act of

1935— its 33 years of socio-political history— gives us an
empirical wedge, as it were, into the meaning of inequality
as it has been mediated through legislation.

As in all law,

this law is bounded by time, place, and circumstance and has
been scrutinized accordingly.

When general inferences can

be drawn, they are drawn boldly for all my readers— esti
mating the degree of scientific or aesthetic credibility
being a function of their sceptical and critical vision.

FOOTNOTES
FOREWORD
^"Kurt H. Wolff (ed.) , The Sociology of Georg Sinunel
(Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1950), p. 30.
^F. S. C. Northrop, The Logic of the Sciences and the
Humanities (New York:
The Macmillan Company, 1947), pp. ixx; 17-34.
^Irving Louis Horowitz, Radicalism and the Revolt
Against Reason (New York: The Humanities Press, 1961),
pp. 9-10.
^W. G. Runciman, Social Science and Political Theory
(Cambridge: University Press, 1963), pp. 41-42.
^Alvin Boskoff, "Social Change: Major Problems in
the Emergence of Theoretical and Research Foci," Modern
Sociological Theory in Continuity and Change. eds. Howard
Becker and Alvin Boskoff (New York: The Dryden Press,
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ABSTRACT
A sociological perspective is offered for the Social
Security Act of 1935 and its amendments by an analysis of
political party platform planks

(1932-1964) and legislative

roll calls directly related to the Act (1935-1968).

The

quest for 'social security1 is viewed in theory as an inter
national social movement which has both less organized and
more organized components— political parties being the more
organized of this movement.

Within the general framework of

social change, political parties deal with an attempt to
change or stop change in the power or income distribution of
a given domain, and as such, are essential to the discussion
of'social security' in the United States.

Platform planks

and legislative roll calls are used as empirical indicators
of party tendencies and longitudinal analyses are made for
five political administrations which created and amended this
Act.
Platform planks were selected and analyzed according
to social security content (old-age insurance, unemployment
compensation, relief-assistance, and health insurance).
Legislative roll calls were selected on the basis of their
direct relationship to the Act— 39 from the House of Repre
sentatives and 107 from the Senate— and analyzed according
xv

to party voting for and against social security.

In addition

to percentages for the 146 roll calls, the Rice Index of
Cohesion was used for all the roll calls individually.

Both

an Average Index and a Weighted Index of Cohesion were com
puted for each chamber in all five presidential periods and
compared.

it was found that when one went beyond the conven

tional use of simple averages, it was possible to speak not
only the extent of cohesion but also direction.
Political tendencies observed in the study included:
1.

Ideas on social security begin in the more 'radi

cal' party platform planks? then appear in the Democratic
platform? then are partially integrated into the Republican
platform.
2.

Both major parties accept the narrow scope of the

original Social Security Act and both seek to widen this
scope incrementally through a process of 'liberalization.'
3.

There is agreement between what the major parties

promise in their planks and what they deliver, although they
do not promise much.
4.

Both major parties give more than majority support

for the final 'clean' bills put before them by Congressional
Committees.
5.

Average party cohesion by presidential periods is

higher for House Democrats than for Senate Democrats? Repub
lican average cohesiveness varies inversely— when high in
the House is low in the Senate.
xvi

6.

Weighted party cohesion by presidential periods

reveals House Democrats to be more cohesive than Senate
Democrats.
7.

Weighted Republican cohesiveness is generally

lower than for the Democrats on social security legislation.
8.

Weighted Republican cohesiveness against social

security is registered in the Fair Deal years for both
chambers and in the Cold War and Great Society years for the
Senate chamber.
9.

Regional analysis of cohesiveness revealed no

observable tendencies.
The two major parties accepted the international idea
of social security in turn for the parliamentary right to
structure and limit that idea according to their perception
of the institutional history of the United States.

The

resulting program has been a bi-partisan coalition for the
least common denominator of change.

Significant social

security proposals of the 'third' parties are an important
source of both ideas and criticism but have been restructured
in a 'conservative' way resulting in complex tokenism and
postponement of needed social security legislation.

xvii

CHAPTER I
POLITICAL TENDENCIES AND SOCIAL SECURITY
IN SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE
Introductory
One way to ground form and reform is to do so in
terms of political relations on a given issue.

In this way

the discussion of social change as transformation can be
taken as an analytical combination of social processes and
social collectives.

This chapter will be an attempt to

define and relate political tendencies and social security
as instances of American form and the specific transforma
tion of reform.

The social problem context of concern (the

time, place and circumstance of the study) is shown to be
the crucial or axial discussion in relating processes to
collectives.

Following the discussion of political ten

dencies, there will be an elaboration of the social problem
context, the political context, and finally the hypothetical
assumptions of the study.
A General Statement on Political Tendencies
There is little clarity or accuracy to the concepts
which point to the phenomena ingredient in social change.
When such terms as process, drift, shift, trend, or tendency

are applied to social change, and they usually are with great
readiness but with much vagueness, they may or may not
encompass all levels and degrees of change.

Whether there

is change in parts or wholes of the social fabric, and whether
the change is in degree or kind is often left up to theoreti
cal position.-*-

The notion of process, which more or less

encompasses all the other terms as they are used in soci
ology today, is quite problematic.

Max Lerner maintains

that the history of the social process concept amounts to
the history of sociology
continual becoming.

itself.2

jt can be defined as a

Subsumed under the concept are terms

like drift, shift, trend and tendency.

Drift refers to some

thing driven or carried along in a current or by some natural
agency.

Shift means a shift in place or position; while

trend points to predominant tendencies and a general movement
in a specific direction.

Tendency has the general meaning

of an inherent impulse in a general direction that would
O
happen if there were nothing to prevent it.
When terms of becoming, movement, or change are
applied to social phenomena, they encompass almost all levels
and degrees of change imaginable.

One writer who has been

more explicit than others in this regard is political soci
ologist Rudolf Heberle who sees trends and tendencies as
processes in contrast to social collectives.

To him, social

trends and tendencies are merely the aggregate of many indi
vidual actions— such as urbanization and industrialization.^
When he discusses political trends or tendencies, which is

the kind of tendency under discussion, he is less explicit.
The reader must ask himself the question if political ten
dencies are an aggregate of many political actions?

(This

follows from his definition of social tendencies insofar as
political actions are subsumed under social.)

When dis

cussing political tendencies he almost equates such ten
dencies with sectional or regional divisions or 'climates'
of opinion which seems to contradict the idea that a ten
dency is an aggregate of individual actions.^

In short, the

distinction that trends and tendencies deal with individual
actions and movements deal with collective actions get vague
in Heberle's general discussion on social movements.

We

thus get no clear idea of what a political process, trend,
or tendency i s .
Perry Howard, a student of Heberle, sees political
tendencies as cleavages and translations into voting
'patterns' of nonpolitical populations.

Like Heberle, his

tendencies may follow ecological patterns.^

In political

science, process, trend and tendency also have reference to
movement and change where process laws are seen as repeated
patterns of change and political process is

'procedure^

In this work, there is a combination of meanings by
political sociologists and political scientists.

Political

tendencies shall refer to directions of general behavior on
the part of political men.

More specifically, political

tendencies shall mean what the political parties qua parties,
did in their party platforms and legislative performance in

Congress over time.

Such tendencies will be excerpted from

legislative behavior on socio-economic security legislation.
(This retains the idea of voting patterns as tendencies for
Howard, but as we said above, will analyze voting patterns
among political men rather than among non-political men.)®
The Social Problem Context of Concern
The literature of scholarship is not always clear as
to just exactly how and why certain groups and strata,
individuals and collectives define some part or whole of
their social situation as problematic.

Jessie Bernard, for

a recent sociological example, says that the concept of
'social problem'

emerged at the end of the eighteenth and

beginning of the nineteenth centuries as a result of four
factors:

(1) the stresses that the new urban industrial

order was creating,*

(2) a growing humanitarianism;

(3)

scientific ideology; and (4) the middle-class reformer
attitude.

9

Also, what is a problem for some group xs not

for another depending on protecting vested interest, etc.’*-®
Recurrent social problems of recent times have been
sions' and 'wars.'

'depres

Both problems present insecurity in some

or all of the population.

How the insecurity of depression

is perceived politically, and what is done politically is
our discussion to follow.

Social problems must be defined

here as a challenge to the polity and the economy as they
are perceived as forms; or in sociological terms— a challenge
to social order.

The period between the two world wars in

the United States is generally considered to be a time when
there was serious challenge to all that was part of the
Great American dream and its particular political and
economic forms

(at least quite a few millions of people were

thrust into "insecurity" through no fault of their o w n ) .
The social problem aggregation is called the Great
Depression of 1929-1939, or as T. H. Marshall refers to this
time and circumstance,

"The Inter-War Y e a r s . F o r

pur

poses of graphic clarity, Figure 1 gives our theoretical
assumption on social change with the added explication of
our time, place and circumstance:
Social Change
Processes
Trends and Tendencies
Social Classes
Parties
Pressure Groups
Status Groups
Ethnic Groups

Industrialization
Urbanization
Secularization
Democratization
Politicalization
Trans formations

\
Social Problems
Insecurity
Challenge to the form as
perceived as defined by
group or groups: War,
Depression, Civil Disorder,
etc.) (by the collective.)

Social Responses
Quest for Security (plans,
legislation, etc.):
Reaction, Relief, Recovery,
Reconstruction, Rebellion,
Reform, Revolution as logical
possibilities for the col
lective . I

THE GREAT DEPRESSION

THE NEW DEAL

FIGURE 1
SOCIOLOGICAL PICTURE OF THE INTER-WAR YEARS

6
Various types of change or transformation might be
said to be related to the degree of insecurity felt by the
individuals and groups which make up a society.

In other

terms, social insecurity, either individually or collectively,
leads to social action, and such action leads to social
change which varies from degree to kind and from parts to
wholes.

Karl Mannheim, for example, develops different

forms of insecurity in terms of whether or not it is
organized or unorganized insecurity.
ized insecurity

T h e .stage of unorgan

(unemployment being the main symptom in the

twentieth century) leads to psychological and emotional
experimentation as well as sociological conditions in which
ideologies are unmasked and the validity of established
principles and values come to be doubted:
This is the moment of skepticism, hard for the indi
vidual yet productive for science, as it destroys
the petrified habits of thought of the past.
In this
general experimentation, the individual who cannot
reorganize himself may perish, but for the social
body it means the possibility of a selection of new
models of behavior and of new representative
dominant types.3-2
Through stages, the collectivity goes from unorganized to
organized insecurity— through gesture, utopia, and militarist
pattern.3-3

social control comes about as the society tries

to limit the variability of situations, because as Mannheim
asserts, society cannot tolerate the unpredictable in the
long run.

It uses every means in its power to ensure that

its economic and political foundations are as firm as pos
sible.-^

Thus the impetus to change something to some extent

occurs to individuals, groups, and in general the collec
tivities of a society.

Of the degrees and levels of change

open to a society when it faces insecurity, we will limit
ourselves to the discussion of reform b e l o w . ^
The Inter-War Years
There is an on-going debate among historians as to
whether or not the Great Depression of 1929 is a "watershed11
in history or not.

Kirkendall asks the question if this

depression was in fact another watershed or turning point in
American history and concludes that such an interpretation
should be avoided because the Great Depression and the New
Deal had both continuity and change within

them.

The question of whether or not the Great Depression
is axial is not one to be answered here.
economic

(perhaps political-economic)

certain identified social problems.

It was a so-called

trend that led to
From these emergent

problems came several different modes of collective action
with attendant socio-political problems and tendencies.

In

short, it must be kept in historical context— there were
similarities to previous economic crises but there were also
differences.

The same goes for the responses to the Great

Depression.
Romasco's The Poverty of Abundance, as an example,
deals with several consequences of the depression during the
Hoover Administration.I7

He maintains that the depression

was a new problem and the poverty associated with it was

also new because in the past very little positive action had
been taken to overcome a national economic crisis.

To busi

ness leaders the depression was a natural phenomenon; the
people were urged to continue to work hard.

Romasco says

this poverty was the result of an unmanageable surplus with
underconsumption.

The capitalist system of laissez-faire

was not on trial so much as the men in power— both public
and private— including the presidency.^8

Romasco asserts

that it was unemployment which hit Americans most forcefully
The problem of unemployment in all its forms—
seasonal, technological, cyclical— was not new
on the American scene.
In one aspect or another
it was a perennial concern. Now, however, it was
present in all three of its forms combined so that
its impact was more extensive, severe, and press
ing than ever before.19
Traditional defenses against unemployment were already
developed; private industry, labor unions, and charity with
cities and States backing them up.

Hoover said the defenses

were sufficient as bread lines and soup kitchens began to be
formed and social workers began to articulate for the
u n e m p l o y e d .

20

cities turned to the States and the States

turned to the Federal government.
The war metaphor appeared under Hoover as "A War
against Depression" according to Romasco.

The 20's were the

New Era and Hoover called his slogan the New Day vowing that
poverty would be wiped from the land.

Hoover's greatest

achievement, says Romasco, was his use of the national
government to deal with the violent fluctuations of the
economy when he set up the Reconstruction Finance
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Corporation in January 1932.^1
Transformation, social change, and reform begins
somewhere analytically and the question is where we shall
'break history into its joints 1 to get at reform.

The issue

of reform in the United States is being commented on exten
sively. 22

Answers to the questions of what was reformed,

who did the reforming, and how reform took place as well as
when the reform started and ended seems still to be a matter
of one's discipline and periodization scheme.

Of all the

approaches, Greer's seems most appropriate since he views
social reform as a movement which has some pattern since the
close of the Civil War.

His definitional statement says that

social action in all forms is constantly taking place;
therefore changes take place:
. . . institutions must be adjusted to protect the
individual and society. Affected groups organize
to meet the problem; they seek relief through
direct action or legislation.
The resultant adapta
tion is called social reform, and the efforts to
achieve it are social reform movements.23
Greer tries to establish the pattern of reform in America
since 1865.

He says that economic distress gave rise to

most of the reform movements although prosperity may be a
factor also.

He maintains there has been a shift in the

nature of reform objectives since 1865.

Earlier movements

were utopian, the later ones being more practical.
of the broad efforts led to this stance.

Failure

The form or makeup

went from diverse groups to limited integrated membership.
Finally, early reform movements were largely ignorant of
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methods and could not use legislation or the existent poli
tical parties for their goals.24

These inter-war years

showed a considerable amount of sophistication on the part
of groups in the use of political parties and legislation;
therefore, the political context of these years follows.
The Political Context
The so-called Roaring Twenties led to the Sobering
Thirties.

The roar was overridden by the sobriety of the

depression.

The Republican Party lost power and the new

Democratic president told the nation what many already knew:
that one-third of the nation was ill-fed, ill-housed, and
ill-clothed.

Of course, some had to be told this news and

others did not.

During the summer of 1932, most everyone

began to view times as bad ones, even though some became
profiteers.
The Democratic Party told the people that it could
get the system going again.
to prime the pump of U. S.
capitalist system.

Roosevelt's New Deal attempted
'form'; that is, to shore up the

One critic, Thomas, in his survey of the

New Deal in early 1934 says:
You can't prime the capitalist pump, because it is
rapidly wearing out.
Socialization and planned
production for use, not a reformist stabilization
or attempted stabilization is the solution.25
This interventionary priming took on many labels of change,
such as reconstruction, relief, recovery, and reform.^6
various recovery and relief programs were

The

'emergency' mea

sures and in a way, short-term dramatic political responses
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to the deteriorated state of economic affairs.

The First

New Deal, as it has come to be called, dealt with recovery
and relief.

The Second New Deal purportedly dealt with

'reconstruction' and 'reform.
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One law which grew out of

'*'

this latter "deal" was the Social Security Act of 1935.^®
All laws and legislative history is intricate and
interwoven.

The history of the Social Security Act of 1935

can start most any place— in Elizabeth's England, Bismarck's
Germany, or Roosevelt's America.

In any case it is the

culmination, at least in the United States, or a lot of
soul-searching on how to handle

'poverty' in general, and

dependency and economic insecurity in the specific.

It was

the first package deal given to the economically disen
franchised of several categories.

As mentioned above, the

20's and 30's threw capitalism and the political parties
operating within it into a grand dilemma.

The dilemma was

how to use the existing socio-economic and socio-political
forms to move from mass insecurity to mass security.

The

Social Security Act is a positive instance of rights
guaranteed by the constitution

(as a social platform) and

delivered or articulated by the existing political parties
in the United States from 1935 to the present.

Such a

package deal did not come automatically, however.

Its justi

fication comes from the broadly interpreted statement in the
Constitution pertaining to the obligation of the government
in power to promote the general welfare.

The law was

sustained by the U. S. Supreme Court on these grounds when
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its constitutionality was questioned.

More will be said on

this in Chapter IV when The Roosevelt New Deal and War Deal
Years are discussed.
There has been a hint above that the Depression of
1929 hit the Republican Party hard.

Hoover was unable to

'rethink' the situation when natural recovery did not occur.
There was some degree of social unrest which was channeled
into the elections of 1930 and 1932 and the Democratic Party
made gains.

There was at least some awareness

that economic crisis must be stemmed before it
tical crisis.

of the fact
became poli

Recovery and relief was provided by the newly

elected government.

But Roosevelt in his special message of

June 8, 1934, put forward the thesis that reconstruction and
O Q

recovery must go hand xn hand. ^
It is obvious that Americans "recovered" from the
depression; that is, it passed from the American experience.
Also, that "relief" in its many forms was provided through
out the crisis.

The Federal government had to

'take the

bull by the h o r n s ' so to speak and play a much larger leader
ship role than before the depression.

It had to opt for the

"analogue of war" as William Leuchtenberg calls it.

Mobili

zation during war time provided the model for mobilization
during depression time.30

The myths such as the best govern

ment is the one which governs least, and if we

pursue busi

ness as usual, everything will work out naturally, do not
work during war time.

The First World War called to

question these two myths.

It is generally believed that
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there was

'recovery' through government intervention into

the economy.

Alas, the alternative hypothesis of non

intervention, that is, there would have been 'recovery' if
we let nature

(or economic laws, etc.) take its course was

not tested; therefore, we do not know its validity.
fact is group action, government, did not wait.

The

Perhaps

there is a law that says that bread lines and soup kitchens
could lead to barricades.

What this means in less spec

tacular language is 'reconstruction,' 'recovery,' 'relief,'
and 'reform' often forestall

'revolution. '3

The legislative and social history of the Social
Security Act and its amendments to date may provide an index
as to how the 30's were

'reconstructed' and the social and

economic security of the people

'reformed' since that time.

Perhaps the role of the national political body in the
guarantees which were setup will be clarified in the analysis
to follow.

Policy was formulated, programs were put into

action, and millions were effected by the Act.
All that remains before the methodology of the study
is presented in an overview of the general political picture
of the U. S. Congress since the depression on the basis of
party membership; and a few comments on the development and
formative years of the Social Security Act.
The general legislative picture over the 33 years of
this study vascillated between Democrats and Republicans—
not necessarily coinciding with the President's Party in
control of the Executive Branch.

Figures 2 and 3 show that
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the Democrats gained seats in both houses in the 1930 elec
tion, and continued to gain them up until 1936; then losing
seats up until 1946; maintained relative stability until
1956 and then up through 1964; after 1964 certain strengths
for the Republican Party begin to appear— almost as if a new
cycle is to begin where Republicans will gain majorities in
both houses in 1972 or 1974.
Against this legislative membership by party goes the
history of the Social Security Act.

That it was a Democratic

Party accomplishment, if that is what it is, goes without
much saying.

Edwin Witte, an important figure in the

framing of the Act has summarized the actions leading to the
development of the act, as a memorandum on the history of
the Committee on Economic

S e c u r i t y .

^2

He shows the develop

ment of the act as being directly along the lines of
President Franklin D. Roosevelt's philosophy but a function
of differing points of view.

Arthur Altmeyer, in his book,

The Formative Years of Social Security, takes us beyond the
development of the act itself up to 1954.*^

Both Witte and

Altmeyer direct their attention to the political matters
underlying this piece of legislation.
provide specific comments which will be
historical chapters to follow.

Witte and Altmeyer
'broken out' in the

For historical perspective

selected provisions of other laws relating to the Social
Security Act are given in Appendix C.

Appendix D is a list

of public laws amending the Social Security Act.

These two

tables contain the laws relating and amending the act over
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the 33 years of its history.
Summary and Hypothetical Considerations
In the period beginning between the two world wars
and extending up to the present, the United States took on
two descriptive, imprecise labels of the affluent society
and the welfare state.

These slogans were arrived at, at

least in part, by political programs which took on slogans
like the New Deal, Fair Deal, New Frontier and the Great
Society.

Comments continue to be put forth regarding the

accuracy of such labels and slogans as time puts them into
better perspective.

It is safe to assume at this point that

the time between the wars— especially the 30 's— had both
similarities and differences to previous decades.

Insofar

as the Great Depression years were similar, we refer to them
as the

'old order' or the

this study, the 'form.''

'old regime' or in the manner of
Insofar as there appear to be dif

ferences are the result of collective social action in the
form of legislation framed to bring about a certain kind of
change— they can be referred to as 'reform.'

The 3 0 's were

similar to previous decades insofar as legislators had to
respond to the executive branch of the Federal government
during insecurity of the First World War period.
different insofar as the

They were

'war' model and metaphor were

applied to the peacetime insecurity of First World Depression
which followed the First World War.

The model and metaphor

was applied by the Executive branch and the legislators
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responded.

War was declared on depression, as it were, and

descriptive terms for the nature of the tactics and strategy
ranged from relief to recovery to reconstruction to reform.
(This is not to say that

'reform' legislation was something

new to the American politician.

Populism and Progressivism

added to the 'form' and 'reform' of the nation form about
1890 to the 1930's.)

As international insecurity increased

in the late 3 0 's, domestic insecurity 'decreased.'

The

Second World War was followed by ^recessions rather than
depressions— which descriptively points to a lower level of
insecurity.

The Cold War of the late 4 0 's, 5 0 's, and 60's

resulted in continuous debate over guns versus butter, or
more currently, missiles versus margarine, or said in less
dramatic terms, what will get top priority:
international

'insecurity' or domestic

abatement of

'insecurity'?

(The

period under study ends with a "War on Poverty" which as is
noted above began with a "War on Depression.")
Just as there is difficulty in establishing periods
for 'reform' in the United States, it is problematic to say
when a concern for 'poverty, ' unemployment,
social security occurred.

'•'■‘nomic and

The shift in thinking from private

to public concern, the shift from small political units to
larger ones

(county concern to State and national concern)

has been occurring at least since the beginning of the
nineteenth century.

Appendix A summarizes the shift in

terms of thought concerning the 'poor' in the nineteenth
century.

In general, the shift can be centered around the

French and Industrial Revolutions and the effects of these
two continuous events on social relations, prevailing con
ceptual attitudes, responsibilities and causes, and the
so-called 'cures' proposed by different social groups and
units.

Samuel Mencher,

for example, in a book on economic

security policy in Britain and the United States, shows the
growth of 'welfare policy' from the sixteenth century in
terms of the shift from status to contract relations.34
Roy Lubove's work, The Struggle for Social Security;

1900-

1935 concerns itself with the evolution of the social
security concept, as such, up to the New Deal.

The work

puts voluntarism into a better perspective for the student
of social security.

Of importance to this study is his

exposure of what we could call the Rubinow-Epstein criticism
of the Social Security Act of 1935.

This criticism says

that income was not redistributed and there was no health
provision.35
Having discussed our time, place and circumstance as
well as the political context of the Social Security Act as
an instance of social policy, hypothetical assumptions can
now be considered.

Social security in the United States may

be taken as part of an international social movement on the
part of national governments to guarantee its citizens some
measure of economic security.

The role of political parties

in this world-wide movement is considered central.

What the

American parties say they will do in their platforms and
what they actually do over time may give us insight into the
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type of social movement that the Social Security Act has
been said to perpetrate.

Assuming there was a shift in

governmental responsibility for social security after the
Great Depression, we may inquire into the role of the
parties in this shift.

If we can expose political tenden

cies underlying party actions on social security legisla
tion, insight into American socio-political form and reform
may occur.
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FOOTNOTES
CHAPTER I
This means that one's theoretical position about the
nature of social relations can and does effect the theoreti
cian's position on change. What is reform at one level of
change may be reaction at another level. More specifically,
if one is a conflict oriented sociologist, change refers to
changes in stratification; whereas, to the consensus soci
ologist change in o n e 's income may constitute significant
change. For the differences between conflict and consensus
sociology positioning on the issue of poverty-reduction see
Robert M. Kloss, "The Concept of 'Poverty' in Sociology: A
Profile of Poverty in East Baton Rouge Parish, Louisiana"
(unpublished Master's thesis, Louisiana State University,
Baton Rouge, 1967).
2Max Lerner, "Social Process," Encyclopedia of the
Social Sciences, eds., Edwin R. A. Seligman and Alvin
Johnson, Vol. XIV (New York: MacMillan Company, 1951), pp.
148-51.
3Henry P. Fairchild (ed.), Dictionary of Sociology
(New York: Philosophical Library, 1944), pp. 295-318.
^Rudolf Heberle, Social Movements: An Introduction
to Political Sociology (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts,
Inc., 1951), pp. 8-9.
5Ibid., p. 219.
^Perry H. Howard, Political Tendencies in Louisiana
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1957).
7Russell L. Langworthy, "Process," A Dictionary of
Social Sciences, eds., Julius Gould and William L. Kolb
(New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1965), pp. 538-40.
®For this distinction see Irving Louis Horowitz,
"Introduction," to Arnold Rose, The Power Structure (New
York:
Oxford University Press, 1967), p. x.
9Jessie Bernard, Special Problems at Mid-Century:
Role Status and Stress in a Context of Abundance (New York:
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1937), pp. 93-98. How this
fourth factor, the middle-class reformer attitude, arose is
not clear. There are various levels of explanation which
are immediately suggestive.
At the level of philosophical
development, we could say that these new definitions of the
situation on the part of the middle class was their adoption

22
of reason as their critical slogan.
See Herbert Marcuse,
Reason and Revolution (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1960),
p. 253. For a historical treatment see Howard Becker and
Harry Elmer Barnes, "The Quest for Secular Salvation:
Social Reform in Relation to the Sociological Impulse,"
Social Thought from Lore to Science (New York: Dover Pub
lications, Inc., 1961), Vol. II, pp. 595-636.
■^Elites in a population may consider something a
social problem to them— but to nonelites there may not even
be an awareness of the problem.
Similarly, professional
groups may consider government intervention into medicine
as a problem— but nonprofessionals may think quite dif
ferently.
■^T. H. Marshall, Social Policy
University Library, 1965).

(London:

Hutchinson

l^Karl Mannheim, Man and Society in an Age of Recon
struction (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1940),
pp. 125-30.
13Ibid., pp. 135-43.
•^ I b i d ., p. 302.
■^Reform has been confused with other labels such as
relief, recovery, reconstruction, even reaction. More will
be said about these labels as the study progresses.
•^Richard S. Kirkendall, "The Great Depression:
Another Watershed in American History?" Change and Con
tinuity in Twentieth-Century America, edited by John
Braeman, Robert H. Bremner, and Everett Walters (New York:
Harper and Row, Publishers, 1966), pp. 145-89.
York:

•^Albert U. Romasco, The Poverty of Abundance
The Oxford University Press, 1965).

(New

^8Ibid., pp. 1-9.
l9Ibid., p. 126.
Romasco quotes Stuart Chase as
saying:
"After mechanized warfare the bitterest thing in
modern life is unemployment. Wars come and go. Unemployment
goes on in season and out," p. 125.
29Ibid., pp. 150-59.
21ibid., pp. 202-34.
22Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform: From Bryan
to F.D.R. (New York: Vintage Books, 1955).
Clark A.
Chambers, Seedtime of Reform: American Social Service and
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Social Action, 1918-1933 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan
Press, 1963); Otis L. Graham, An Encore for Reform; The Old
Progressives and the New Deal (New York:
Oxford University
Press, 1967); Thomas H. Greer, American Social Reform Move
ments:
Their Patterns Since 1865 (New York: Prentice-Hall,
Inc., 1949).
A bibliography on social reform, social
reform movements, etc. would constitute a monograph by it
self and this just for the American experience.
23Greer, pp. cit., p. 4.
24Ibid., pp. 274-77.
23Norman Thomas, "Surveying the New Deal," The World
Tomorrow, XVII (January 18, 1934), 37-38.
2^These labels became common during the 1930's . For
an example of their usage see William E. Leuchtenberg,
Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal (New York:
Harper
and Row, Publishers, 1963).
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Raymond Moley, The First New Deal (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1966).
Roosevelt's attempts
at reform or reconstruction led to the development of a
'conservative coalition' as a sort of counter-tendency.
See
James T. Patterson, Congressional Conservatism and the New
De a l : The Growth of the Conservative Coalition in Congress,
1933-1939 (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1967).
28Arthur J. Altmeyer says that 'social security' in
the 1 9 3 0 's in the United States described a 'specific
government program to protect and promote the economic and
social well-being of workers and their families.
They did
not use the term to connote a fundamental reconstruction of
economic and social institutions.' He goes on to note that
statesmen throughout the world used the terra to express the
ideal objective of a government to assure the 'good life' in
all its phases for all its citizens— a meaning even broader
than the 'welfare state.1 He admits that throughout the
rest of the world, 'social security' is used in the expan
sive sense, whereas in the U. S. it is used in the restric
tive sense by referring to the old-age insurance as written
into the Social Security Act of 1935.
See his The Formative
Years of Social Security (Madison: University of Wisconsin
Press, 1966), p. 5.
2^Ibid.. pp. 8-9.
3^Leuchtenberg, "The New Deal and the Analogue of
War," in Braeman, et a l ., pp. 81-143.
31Heberle, op,, cit., p. 4.
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Edwin E. Witte, The Development of the Social
Security Act (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press,
1963).
^^A ltm ey er,

lo c . c i t .

•^Samuel Mencher, Poor Law to Poverty Program:
Economic Security Policy in Britain and the United States
(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1 9 6 7 ) .
•^Roy Lubove, The Struggle for Social Security:
Harvard University Press,

1 9 0 0 - 1 9 3 5 (Cambridge, Mass.:
1968), p p . 175-80.

CHAPTER II
THE SOCIO-POLITICAL INDICATORS
INTRODUCTORY
Before expanding the study design, a few remarks are
in order concerning h o w the methodological move from the
discussion of political tendencies to the socio-political
indicators can be accomplished conceptually.

For this move,

we shall again turn to Heberle and his ideas on the com
ponents of a social movement.

For him there are three

basic parts and these are adapted and diagrammed in Figure
4 below.

Heberle is concerned with the relationship between

social classes, parties, and movements.

The figure shows

the ways in which this relationship can be viewed as causal;
e . g ., conflict between socio-economic classes may lead to
conflict between parties— or correlational; e . g .. where you
find movements, you also find parties and classes.

The

development of such a set of relationships proceeds from an
assertion made by Heberle that social movements are made up
of both organized and unorganized groups.
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Socio-economic
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FIGURE 4
MOVEMENT, PARTY AND CLASS RELATIONSHIP

Political parties, according to Heberle, are an
example of organized groups dealing with an attempt to
change or stop change either in the power or income distribution of a given domain.

Social classes may be defined as

they are related to economic production and

c o n s u m p t i o n .^

This study focuses on the political parties side of
Figure 4 above.

Moreover, we will accept the Heberle defini

tion of party for the analysis.

Given such a definition,

the selective concern of the analysis will be the constitu
tive idea of party platform plank and party roll-call
voting behavior on the issue of social security.

The

analysis is longitudinal.
Now, Heberle1s definition of political party as an
organized group which attempts to change or stop change in
power and income distribution may be considered to be
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directly related to the degree to which the political party,
qua party, is unified in its tactics and strategy as well as
its constitutive ideas.

If what they attempt to accomplish

(as stated, for example, in the party platform plank on
social security)
cohesion

can be compared with the degree of party

(let us say on their observable legislative roll-

call behavior on the issue of social security), inferences
can be drawn to both political tendency and social movement
aspects of the quest for social security in America.

The

specific procedure follows according to a study design in
four parts:

time span, objects of analysis, methods of

analysis, and units of analysis.^
Time Span
The general time period covered in this work ranges
from the beginning of the New Deal under President Franklin
Delano Roosevelt through the end of the Great Society leader
ship of President Lyndon Baines Johnson.

The thirty-three

years of political history can be broken up in smaller time
units according to the five presidents who held the power of
the office:
1933

to

to 1 9 5 2 ;

(1) The New Deal

1945;
(3)

( 2 ) The

The Cold War

(Franklin D. Roosevelt)

Fair Deal (Harry S . Truman) from 1 9 4 5
Years (labeled this for lack of a

program slogan during Dwight D. Eisenhower's tenure)
1953

from

from

to

1960;

( 4 ) The

New Frontier

1 9 6 1 to

1963?

and (5)

The Great Society (Lyndon B. Johnson)

from 1 9 6 3 to 1 9 6 8 .

(John F. Kennedy)

These five periods are explicated in

from
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Chapters III through VII below.

Chapter VIII summarizes the

results of the five sub-periods and generalizations for the
thirty-three years are presented.
Objects of Analysis
C
Social indicators3 are many, so many, in fact, that
only the most basic indicators have been developed.

Socio

political indicators used in this study can be arrayed
according to the level of indication.

What is meant by this

is that, for example, the Social Security Act may be con
sidered an indicator of the consideration and care given to
the "weakest members"
society.

(or the "insecure") of the American

The political party platform

(social security

planks) and legislative roll calls by party on social
security are political indications of party concern for
social security.

So, in the general sense the object of

analysis is social security in the United States; but in the
more specific sense the objects of analysis are political
party conduct or behavior in platform statements and roll
calls in the House of Representatives and the Senate.
Methods and Units of Analysis
Just as socio-political indicators can be considered
or viewed at different levels, so can the methods of
analysis.

The meaning here is that, for example, the method

chosen for selection of the topic of social security was not
accomplished by some random sampling of socio-political con
cern.

The method chosen for the American concern for social
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security is in terms of its political context.

Within such

a broad context, political party platform planks and rollcalls were felt to be adequate, although certainly not
exclusive or exhaustive indicators of the political contest
of concern for social security.

Thus, having made this

choice of indicators, a comparative content analysis of the
political party platform planks is applied.

Then party per

centages and the Rice Index of Cohesion are applied to the
social security roll-calls selected.
a.

Political party platforms and social security

planks.— Insofar as political parties continue to be the
vehicle of legitimate expression and action, the struggle
for power among them is important.

This struggle takes many

forms— one of which is the party platform.

These platforms

may be used as a socio-political indicator of both intra
party conflict and consensus as well as inter-party conflict
and consensus.

The significance of party platforms as indi

cators is polemical and some comment is in order.

Walter

Weyl says of them:
The broad outlines of the democracy's industrial
program, so far as they have reached the general
consciousness, are to be found in the promises and
declamations of the platforms of our political
parties.
These platforms are for the most part
insincere, but it is exactly their insincerity
which gives them their evidential value. A platform
does not show what the politician wants, but does
show what that astute person believes that the
people want.6
Porter and Johnson carefully say:

"They are often

silent on matters of vital concern to the nation, not binding
on the candidates, and forgotten by the party leaders."?
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Going on, the charges are made that there is little dif
ference between Republican and Democratic Party platforms,
that they are mere 'catch-alls, ' and that planks are often
repudiated or ignored.

Despite all this, many individuals

become greatly concerned over them, and party platforms may
be said to fulfill the following functions on the American
political scene according to Porter and Johnson:
1. Platforms are the official party principles and
policies.
2.
their

Platforms pay homage to
ideas into the planks.

those able to incorporate

3.
Platforms often reflect
political trends such
that new economic, social and political movements
may be observed.
4. Minor party platform declarations are occasion
ally adopted by major parties at a later date.
5. Platforms cite weaknesses in the programs of
the opposing parties.
6.
Platforms serve as a criterion ofparty success
and failure.
7. The platform of the party in power frequently
illustrates the desires, achievements and thoughts of
the president.
8. Platforms are used as propaganda for party
activities.
9. Platforms serve as a catalyst for party factions
and voters represented by these factions.
10. Platforms are instruments of parties attempting
to gain control of the government.
11. Platforms are an indication of the predominant
forces in operation during any election year, thus
one barometer of opinion in American political history.
12. Upon examination, many party pledges are often
carried out, refuting arguments against platforms.8
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Accepting the above limitations and functions, we shall

'rip'

out, as it were, the planks dealing with social security for
those parties which ran presidential candidates for our time
span.

We will compare and contrast them for the ten presi

dential or platform years from 1932 to 1968.

These planks

will then be compared with the legislative outcome or pe r 
formance.

To the latter we can turn.

b.

Legislative roll-calls and social security.—

Political parties in both houses of the American Congress
attempt to 'ground' their good intentions, political debts,
and general political responsibility in their varied
activities.
voting.

One way in which they make decisions is in

There are three categories of voting:

or secret voting;

(1) closed

(2) semi-open or anonymous voting; and

(3) open or public voting.

The most common type of public

voting is the roll call and it is this form which serves as
one of our indicators.9

Methodologically,

legislative roll

calls have several advantages and limitations which are sum
marized below:
Advantages
1. Legislators are members of the political elite
and to study their behavior is to study behavior related
to policy formulation.
2. Voting is an index of behavior of individuals
in political roles.
3. Roll-call voting makes empirical analysis com
paratively easier (roll-call votes are both hard and
public data).
4.

Roll-call voting provides the means for describing
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and measuring variations in the voting behavior of
(a) individual legislators; (b) groups of legis
lators; and (c) among the roll calls themselves.
Disadvantages
1. Roll call analysis techniques do not explain
to the researcher the patterns he may discern in
voting. They help to discern and measure patterns
of variation, but do not explain or account for
these variations.
2. Inference from information about voting
behavior to the behavior of legislators in other
phases of the legislative process must be made with
caution.10
Taking the above advantages and disadvantages as they come,
roll calls were selected on the issue of social security.
The specific procedure for the selection follows.
From a total list of all the roll calls brought to
both houses of Congress from 1935 to 1968, 146 roll calls
were selected on the basis that they relate to the central
issue of social security.

The several measures of social

security in the broad sense that are tengentially related
were not considered.

These include railroad retirement bene'

fits and the social security measures voted on in behalf of
the armed forces and government employees— which all deal
with specific populations.

The thousands of roll calls thus

narrowed down to just those dealing with the Social Security
Act and its major amendments over its 33-year history.

This

is not to say that there are no minor amendments in other
bills, as riders for example, which do not affect social
security policy and programming; rather it is to say that to
include other related legislation not dealing specifically

33
with social security would 'contaminate' the sample to such
an extent that there would be too many issues to consider.
Said another way, there is a greater degree of certainty
that what these Senators and Congressmen were voting on over
these years was the issue of social security rather than
something else.

If there is one constant that has to be

assumed in the study, it is this.
The list of particular roll calls on the Social
Security Act of 1935 and its major amendments to 1968 was
drawn from a consideration of several s o u r c e s . ^

The roll

calls include all the amendments from the floor, final pas
sage, and the conference report on the original bill and all
subsequent amendments to it.

The 146 roll calls— 107 for

the Senate and 39 for the House— are listed in Appendices E
and F.

Specific analyses by period are to be seen in the

five chapters to follow.

It should be noted that there are

other ways that decisions are made on social security besides
the public roll call.

For example, a very important piece of

legislation came to the floor and was passed with no record
of how individual members voted:

that was the Social

Security Amendments of 1946.
After the selection was made on the issue criterion
of social security in terms of the one law, frequencies and
percentages were run on each roll call, each cluster of roll
calls in each presidential period, and for the total roll
calls by chamber .

^

The Inter-University Consortium for

Political Research provided the data and code b o o k s . ^

The
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major variables included time period, chamber, party and
region.
Assuming that roll calls are advantageous to the
study of political tendencies, there are numerous ways or
methods in which these roll calls can be analyzed and a
given study executed.

After considering the heated debate

surrounding roll call analysis, it was decided to limit the
index or measure applied to the data to the Rice Index of
Cohesion.1^

This Index was first proposed by Stuart A. Rice

and focuses on the concept of party cohesion as it could be
detected in categorically defined subgroups within a legis
lature.

-*-5

Cohesion is the extent to which the distribution

of votes on a roll call deviates from the distribution that
would be expected if all influences operated in a random
fashion.
zero

Minimum cohesion is assigned an index value of

(votes on an issue are split 5 0 - 5 0

for and against);

and, maximum cohesion is the case where all members vote on
the same side of an issue which is complete cohesion and has
an index value of 1 0 0 . A Rice Index was computed for each
of the 1 4 6 roll calls; for the set of roll calls by chamber
in each period; and for all the roll calls in each chamber;
as well as by regional breakdown for the latter two c a s e s . ^
Comparisons were then made for trends over the five periods
by party, chamber and region.

Intra-party and inter-party

cohesiveness on the issue of social security can then be
discerned over time and can hopefully permit inferences as
far as political tendencies are concerned.
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One final remark is required before moving on to the
historical analyses and results.

This is to reiterate that

this study differs from most other studies which use roll
calls as part of their analysis.

Political scientists of

the 'behavioristic' persuasion concentrate mostly on indi
vidual congresses and usually just one chamber with outcomes
that seem to be dealing with methodological problems at the
expense of historical and theoretical problems.

Historians,

on the other extreme, apply this analytic technique in a
longitudinal manner thus overcoming the ahistoricity of the
political scientists.

By analyzing one specific issue over

many years on the socio-political indicators of political
party platform planks and roll calls, it is hoped that a
broader political sociology perspective can be gained in
both theoretical and methodological areas.
SUMMARY
The socio-political indicators of social relations are
important to the political sociologist— especially in a
longitudinal study such as this one.

A study design skeleton

was presented containing the objects, methods and units of
analysis as well as the time span covered.

"Planks” from

political party platforms and legislative roll-calls were
viewed as indicators in terms of their advantages and dis
advantages to the researcher.

How the policy, planks and

roll-calls were selected and categorized was put into
methodological perspective.
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On the basis of the general theoretical discussion in
Chapter I and the specific methodological remarks in this
chapter, the processes of inclusion and exclusion should be
clear enough for the study to turn to the five historical
chapters

(Chapters III through VII).

Chapter VIII will con

stitute the summary of the theoretical, methodological and
historical analyses.
Methodological Note
As Hayward Alker concisely points out

(Mathematics

and Politics) there is a long history of attempts to bring
order to political activity through the use of mathematics.
The same applies to economics and to sociology.

The dilemma

comes about when the researcher must pit varying degrees of
order, consistency, reproducibility, neatness and consistency
against the severe problems of inference and the informative
value.
What shall be the methodological decision amidst the
dilemma for the discussion of political tendencies and social
security?

In regards political party platform planks. as

indicators, the technique of content analysis in the broad
historical sense offers high informative value but rather low
precision as well as the usual inferential problems.

Legis

lative roll call behavior, as pointed out above, gives us
the observable facts that can be manipulated to a certain
extent with the possibility of establishing verifiable rela
tionships or tendencies.

Comparing what the parties said
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they were going to do, and what they did as a party presents
the problem of general comparability without even getting to
the possibility of some mathematical applications.

Yet we

must accept the severities and consider the possibility of
high informative value as well as accurate, consistent
measurement.20
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FOOTNOTES
CHAPTER II
"^Rudolf Heberle, Social Movements: An Introduction
to Political Sociology (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts,
Inc., 1951), pp. 150-91.
^Ibid., p. 152. He says:
“Conflicts between politi
cal parties which are apparently caused by disagreement on
problems of constitutional law or on political theory are
most likely in reality conflicts over the redistribution of
political power between social classes.
Conflicts between
political parties over principles of taxation, wage policy,
labor legislation, foreign trade, social security (under
lined provided), and other public policies and expenditures
are really conflicts between classes over the redistribution
of societal income."
3Ibid., pp. 152-57.
^ h e notion of a 1study design skeleton' was taken
from Aage Richard Clausen,"Policy Dimensions in Congres
sional Roll Calls: A Longitudinal Analysis" (unpublished
Doctoral dissertation, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor,
1964), pp. 22-23.
3The choice of "indicator" as a concept is preferred
over the idea of "variable." This is more in keeping with
the current state of quantification in the social sciences,
at least to this writer.
For a statement on indicators,
see Social Indicators. edited by Raymond A. Bauer (Cambridge,
Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1955).
^Walter Weyl, The New Democracy: An Essay on Certain
Political and Economic Tendencies in the United States (New
York: Harper and Row "torchbook," 1964), p. 277.
7Kirk H. Porter, and Donald B. Johnson, National
Party Platforms: 1840-1964 (Urbana: University of Illinois
Press, 1966), p. vi.
8ibid., pp. vi-vii.
9Lee F. Anderson, Meredith W. Watts, Jr., and Allen R.
Wilcox, Legislative Roll-Call Analysis (Evanston, Illinois:
Northwestern University Press, 1966), pp. 3-4.
10Ibid.. pp. 7-11.
There are many studies and critical
remarks of this technique. A partial list can be found in
the selected bibliography under articles.
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^ L a w s Related to Social Security and Unemployment
Compensation. compiled by Gilman G. Udell,
u. S. Government
Printing Office, 1967. Compilation of the Social Security
Laws, House of Representatives, 90th Congress, 2nd Session,
Document Number 266. U. S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, 1968.
2 Volumes.
Congressional Quarterly
Service including the Conoressional Quarterly Almanac, Vol
umes I-XXIV (Washington, D. C.: Congressional Quarterly,
Inc.). Arthur J. Altmeyer, The Formative Years of Social
Security (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1968).
Gilbert Y. Steiner, Social Insecurity: The Politics of
Welfare (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1966).
l^The direction of a roll call is important in any
analysis but presents some rather severe methodological
problems. How will the analyst decide what the direction of
a given vote is? In this case, the decision was made to
consider 'yeas' either for or against social security. A
'yea' for social security is a vote for the maximum estab
lishment, expansion and/or extension of income, services, or
participation to more citizens.
A 'yea' against social
security would be the opposite.
(Maximum establishment
means that when two bills are being considered at the same
time, the one that is most for expansion and extension of
benefits is chosen.)
On this criterion, 29 votes have been
redirected or switched so that the direction of the vote is
uniform throughout the study; that is, everytime a 'yea' is
tabulated in the computer it is for social security. A
list of these switched votes is included in Appendix G.
Finally, the direction of a vote does not necessarily re
flect the President's position on a given bill; e.g.. the
President may be against the expansion of social security.
13iphe congressional roll call data utilized in this
study were made available by the Inter-University Consortium
for Political Research.
The data were supplied in partially
proofed form and the Consortium bears no responsibility for
either the analysis or interpretations presented here.
l^See Stuart A. Rice, Quantitative Methods in Poli
tics (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1928). This measure of
cohesion was chosen because it is the best known and most
widely used.
In addition to this general criterion for
selection as a possible tool in this study, it was con
sidered to be the most parsimonious insofar as it allows
inferences about party behavior to get at political ten
dencies.
(Other measures or techniques are, of course, open
to the researcher:
for some of the possibilities see
Anderson, 0£. cit., pp. 29-58.)
Because roll call analysis
itself has some inferential restrictions, it was felt that
other measures— included those which are more complex and
thus demand further restrictions— would be out of the
context of rigor.
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Insofar as this study is concerned with party as a
meaningful category, the Rice Index facilitates the descrip
tion of legislative behavior at the roll call voting stage.
Its peculiar characteristic is that it measures cohesion as
a function of aggregate group action on single roll calls.
See Anderson, op.. cit., pp. 32, 43.
•^This index is computed as follows: the number of
'yeas' and 'nays' are converted into percentages of the
total number of legislators voting. The Rice Index is an
expression of the absolute differences between these two
percentages.
For example: Democrats voted 48 for and eight
against a measure (total, 56):
Democrats:
Percent for
= 48/56
Percent Against
= 8/56 x
Rice Index
= 85.7 -

x
100 = 8 5 . 7
100 = 14.3
14.3 = 71.4

See Rice, 0£. cit., pp. 207-27, and Anderson, ojd. c i t ., p. 33.
A critical issue that presents itself within the context of
rigor mentioned above is that of the isomorphism between our
observations and the measurements of the Rice Index— this
issue is that of the theories associated with the level of
measurement of our index.
If we consider our Index on the
basis of its use of 'yeas' and 'nays' then it is at the
classificatory or nominal level; but when we combine these
responses into percentages then we are operating at the
interval level.
See Sidney Siegel, Nonparametric Statistics
for the Behavioral Sciences (New York: McGraw-Hill Book
Company, Inc., 1956), pp. 21-30.
l^No statistical test of significance has been devised
to determine if the probability of group cohesion may be due
to chance. Anderson, loc. c i t ., suggests supplementary data
and/or many roll calls.
We have tried to do both in this
study by using political party platform planks and having 146
roll calls.
18

See Thomas B. Patterson, Sectional Stress and Party
Strength (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1967);
James T. Patterson, Congressional Conservatism and the New
D e a l : The Growth of the Conservative Coalition in Congress,
1933-1939 (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1967);
Joel H. Silbey, The Shrine of P a r t y : Congressional Voting
Behavior 1841-1852 (Pittsburgh:
University of Pittsburgh
Press, 1967); also, Clausen, l o c . cit.
l9Hayward R. Alker, Mathematics and Politics (New
York: The Macmillan Co., 1965).
See especially the chapter
on politics and its measurement, pp. 13-28.
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The issue of data which gives high probability
values but low informative content is discussed by Erik
Allardt, "Aggregate Analysis: The Problem of its Informa
tive Value," Research Report N: 72, 1966.
Institute of
Sociology, University of Helsinki, Finland.

CHAPTER III
THE NEW DEAL AND WAR DEAL YEARS
Introductory
The scholarly analyses for this period of American
history (1932 to 1945) are already extensive and growing.
The period covers the responses on the part of the United
States to a world depression and a warId war.

If there is

one thing agreed upon by the scholars of the period it is
that Franklin Delano Roosevelt, thrice elected president,
responded to these two tremendous social problems with great
urgency.
When the U. S. economy had its great fall in 1929,
the Republican Party and its backers were taken at a loss on
how to pick it up again.

In short, their perception of the

problem and the social policy instituted to solve it were
short of the mark— thus they came under attack through the
vehicles of the Communist, Socialist, and Democratic parties,
as well as labor and intellectuals.^

True to the two-party

tradition, the Democrats picked up seats in both the House
and the Senate in the election of 1930.

After they got

their presidential candidate elected in 1932, a program and
a schedule evolved in an attempt to 'prime the economic
pump.1

Democratic majorities were seated in both Houses of
42
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the Congress after the election of 1932.

The New Deal was

born during these hard times through the effective relation
ship between the Democratically controlled Executive and
Legislative branches of the government.
The New Deal was called a pragmatic blending of the
previous political slogans offered by Teddy Roosevelt
Square Deal) and Woodrow Wilson's

(New Freedom).^

(the

This is

not to say that the New Deal, as it has come to be known, is
a blending of these two prior presidents' policies.

Its

degree of pragmatism, experimentalism, and sheer political
exigency and compromise are still "up for grabs"? moreover,
the continuity with, and divergence from, the past is an
O
issue still being clarified.
That the perception of social
problems

(in this case depression) and their solutions are

rooted in the past is a sociological truism.

What is of

concern and therefore controversy is the depth and spread of
the roots.

Said another way, how great was the challenge

and how sharp was the response on the part of the Democratic
Party and its supporters?
Leuchtenburg,

from a historical perspective,

says:

No event in the twentieth century has had so great
an impact on American society as the Great Depression.
It struck precisely at the point when the old order
of individualism and business leadership was scoring
its greatest successes . . . some critics thought the
New Deal was impairing traditional American values,
while others believed that the administration was not
going far enough. Yet even the critics could agree
that the changes wrought in the 30' s— the growth of
power of the national government, the advance toward
a welfare state, the unionization of industrial
America, the subsidization of the American farmer,
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the Supreme Court 'revolution,' the upheaval in
political alignments— make the decade one of the
most significant periods in American history.4
The New Deal has several components which evolved labeled as
relief, recovery, or to some, reconstruction and reform.
These labels refer to legislative action that became law.
It is not our task to delve into these programs— the tempo
rary recovery and relief programs of the "First New Deal"
and the "One-hundred Days."®

They may be considered to be

short-lived policy-wise, accomplishing their task.

Once the

capitalist pump was primed— which means that national confi
dence was being restored in economic relations— longer range
policy could be considered.
recovery and reconstruction.
message to Congress:

Roosevelt's idea was to combine
He said in his June 8, 1934

"It is childish to speak of recovery

first and reconstruction afterward.

In the very nature of

the processes of recovery we must avoid the destructive
influence of the past."®

Roosevelt, as we shall see, tried

to push such an idea— but as this tendency toward recon
struction and reform began to take shape, certain countertendencies began to occur .

'

The decision of Roosevelt in 1934 to create a Com
mittee on Economic Security was one significant instance of
his wish to
saw it.

'reconstruct' the American economic system as he

From this committee came the Administration's

legislative proposal which culminated in the Social Security
Act of 1935, which purportedly had both
ventive' or 'reconstructive' aspects.®

'relief' and 'pre
The President
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instructed that the committee shall study problems related
to the economic security of individuals and report its
recommendations no later than December 1, 1934 concerning
proposals which in its judgment will promote greater economic
security.^
The report of this committee was transmitted to the
President on January 17, 1935.-*-0
recommendations dealing with:
unemployment compensation;
for children;

It contained seven major

(1) employment assurance;

(3) old-age security;

(4) security

(5) risks arising out of ill health;

residual relief; and (7) administration.

(2)

(6)

At the same time a

draft for the economic security bill was sent to the Presi
dent.^-^*

From these two documents the president sent a

special message to both Houses on January 17, 1935, calling
for prompt enactment.

*1p

The usual legislatxve process was

then followed and it became law on August 14, 1935.

in

the course of this process there was opposition to the
original proposal resulting in a new or

'clean' bill which

shifted its title from economic security to social
security.14
The report of this committee needs to be commented
upon before the several political and legislative tendencies
are analyzed.

This is so because it contains some state

ments which have been signally neglected by scholars and
politicans of American social security policy.

For example,

under the fourth recommendation above it states that:
It must not for a moment be forgotten that the core
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of any social plan must be for the child. Every
proposition we make must adhere to this core.
Old-age pensions are in a real sense measures in
behalf of children. They shift the retroactive
burdens to shoulders which can bear them with less
human cost, and young parents thus released can
put at the disposal of the new member of society
those family resources he must be permitted to
enjoy if he is to become a strong person, unburdensome to the State. Health measures that protect
his family from sickness and remove the menacing
apprehension of debt, always present in the mind of
the breadwinner, are child-welfare measures.
Like
wise, unemployment compensation is a measure in
behalf of children in that it protects the home.
Most important of all, public job assurance which
can hold the family together is a measure for
children in that it assures them a childhood rather
than the premature strains of the would-be child
breadwinner.15
A second example is the fifth recommendation cited above con
cerning risks arising out of ill health:
Insurance against the costs of sickness is neither
new nor novel.
In the United States we have had a
long experience with sickness insurance both on a
non-profit and commercial basis.
Both forms have
been inadequate in respect to the protection they
furnish, and the latter— commercial insurance— has
in addition been too expensive for people of small
means.
Voluntary insurance holds no promise of
being much more effective in the near future than
it has been in the past. Our only form of compulsory
insurance has been that which is provided against
industrial accidents and occupational diseases under
the workmen's compensation laws. In contrast other
countries have had experience with compulsory health
or sickness insurance applied to over a hundred
million persons over a period of more than fifty
years. Nearly every large and industrial country of
the world except the United States has applied the
principle of insurance to the economic risks of
illness.15
That the core of the social security measure put forth by
this committee were based on measures in behalf of the child
has been lost in the historical shuffle.

On the matter of

health risks, it seems that this particular recommendation
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was lost in the political hassle surrounding the original
act.

17

it was not until thirty years later

(see Chapter VI)

that these suggestions came to some fruition after many
years of parliamentarianism.

It is also notable that even

though the report mentioned the success with which other
countries had with health or sickness insurance, they did
not include any statistics in the Report Supplement to this
effect.

Elaboration statistics are provided, however,

for

unemployment compensation and old-age pensions.^8
Political Considerations
The legislative history of this initial blanket plan
for socio-economic security is fairly clear from the politi
cal point of view.

To radicals of the time it went nowhere,

to liberals it was good, and to conservatives it went too
far.

It was neither a change in degree or kind, nor in the

part or whole of the existing institutional arrangements for
the communist and socialist frame of mind? for the 'liberal'
Democratic Party and its supporters it was a change in degree
and a change in part of the existing system; for the Republi
can Party with its status quo or reactionary supporters it
was a dramatic change in the whole and in kind to the point
of being unconstitutional and even Hitlerian.
Recalling the discussion on the political context in
Chapter I above, we see a dramatic shift in Senate and House
membership with the Democrats clearly in power— both in the
executive and legislative branches— in the Spring and Summer
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of 1935.

Table I shows the figures:

TABLE I
PARTY REPRESENTATION IN THE NEW DEAL
AND WAR DEAL YEARS*

Year

Democrats
House Sen.

Increments
House Sen.

Republicans
House Sen.

Other
House Sen.

1928

163

39

-32

8

267

56

1

1

1930

216

47

+53

+ 8

218

48

1

1

1932

313

59

+97

+12

117

36

5

1

1934

322

69

+ 9

+10

103

25

10

2

1936

333

75

+11

+ 6

89

17

13

4

1938

262

69

-71

- 6

169

23

4

4

1940

243

66

+ 5

- 3

162

28

6

2

1942

57

-45

- 9

209

38

4

1

1944

57

+21

0

190

38

2

1

*See Appendix B.

Thus in the lengthy legislative process which preceeds the
making of law in the United States, the Democrats were in
control in the mid-thirties.

Beginning in 1930, they gained

53 seats in the House and 8 in the Senate— within a few
seats of a slim majority.

In 1932 they got their majority

in both cases, picking up as additional 97 seats in the
House and 12 in the Senate.
and 10 in the senate.

In 1934, 9 seats in the Hoxise

Roosevelt had a party in his command.
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One example of what he did with such an environment is
exemplified by the omnibus Social Security Act of 1935.
Social Security Platform Planks
Looking at the social security platform planks in
terms of parties, they can be arrayed from the more radical
positions to the center or liberal positions and finally to
the right or conservative positions in terms of the American
form.

(As seen in the tabular summary in Figure 5 below, we

have considered four major areas under social security:
old-age insurance, unemployment insurance, assistance, and
health insurance in terms of the political parties who ran
presidential candidates and published platforms.

For full

explication see Appendix G.)^
On the 'radical' extreme we find the Socialist
Laborites who claimed throughout these years that capitalism
was failing and that any reform granted by this system is
really disguised reaction.

No specific mention is made of

social security in the earlier years.

In 1944 they said

that what the New Deal failed to do to get the country going
was accomplished by the war.

They do mention the extension

of social security after the war as an appeasement move on
the part of the capitalist class.
The Communist Party platform advocated unemployment
and social insurance for all from 1928 onward.

In 1936 they

became critical of the New Deal for not going far enough and
in 1940 said that the Wall Street economic royalists want
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1940*

1944*

Com., Soc,
DEM., REP,
Union

Com., Soc.,
DEM., REP.

Proh.

REP.
REP.
DEM.

DEM.

DEM., REP.

REP.

F-L
Soc.

Com., Soc,

DEM.
Com., Soc.

1932*
Old-Age
Insurance
Local
State
FederalState
National

1936*

REP.
DEM.
F-L, Com.,
Soc.

Unemployment
Insurance
Local
State
Federalstate
National
AssistanceRelief
Local
State
FederalState
National
Health
Insurance
Private
PrivatePublic
National

REP.
REP.
REP.
Soc.

Com.

(?)

Com., Soc,

Soc.

REP.

REP.

DEM.
Soc

REP.

*See Appendix G
Key:

Com.
Soc.
F-L
DEM.
REP.
Proh.

=
=
=
=
=
=

Communist
Socialist
Farmer-Labor
Democratic
Republican
Prohibition
FIGURE 5

POLITICAL PARTY "SOCIAL SECURITY" PLANKS
DURING THE NEW DEAL AND WAR DEAL
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war and are subordinating domestic programs to it.

The

Socialist Party planks of the New Deal and War Deal period
are the prototype for the Democratic Patty in later y e a r s .
In 1932, they call for everything which was forwarded in the
report to the President by the Committee on Economic
Security which was mentioned above.

In 1936 the Socialist

platform lumped Old Deal failings of 1928 with New Deal
failings of 1932.

The social security plank called for more

Federal appropriations for the unemployed; a Federal system
of pensions for all over 60 as well as a program for medical
care as a social duty and not as charity.

In 1940 the

Socialists say that the best of the New Deal was taken or
co-opted from them.

What the New Deal did accomplish, said

the Socialists, was never accepted by the Democratic Party
and those accomplishments are now being abandoned for war
economics.

In 1944 the Socialist Party mentions for the

first time on the part of any party that economic security
must be provided with liberty.

They call for democracy and

not bureaucracy in planning for plenty.
Maintaining the unemployed at subsistence levels is
the economic program of the New Deal.

The Democratic Party

in its platform of 1932, ironically, had very little to say
about socio-economic security, per se, except that they
advocated old-age and unemployment insurance under State
laws.

(Part of this advocation was fulfilled in that the

unemployment insurance component of the Social Security Act
was to come under State jurisdiction and control.)

In 1936,
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however, this party pointed with pride to the social security
package advanced by them in 1935.

(The Communist

Socialist planks of earlier times were
by the Democrats in regards to certain
security.

and

'co-opted' so to speak,
aspects of social

This lack of mention of social security by the

Democrats in 1932 reinforces the position that there was a
considerable amount of political pressure and experimenta
tion once the New Deal got going.)
health insurance in the platform.

No mention is made of
In 1940, war planks are

dominant, but there is a call for more adequate and uniform
benefits in both unemployment and old-age insurance.

The

war continues to preoccupy the party in power in 1944-but it
does point to the fact that it saved the American system of
free enterprise both after depression and during war.
is no specific social security plank.

There

The Union Party social

security plank called for security in the broad sense of the
aged.

The Republican Party, in a 'conservative' posture,

rested on American traditions and principles of government
in 1932 by leaving 'relief' to the States and smaller politi
cal units.

In 1936, they calimed to be the first party to

declare for old-age pensions; but shift to 'government' in
general as being responsible for handicaps
and unemployment.

(advanced ag-e)

They react to the Democratic New Deal as

endangering social security; but, seem to accept the social
security package deal of the Democrats and merely differ on
particulars which, as we shall see, is the rule for the
next 30 years.

Perhaps this is a function of the two-party
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system and its legislative outcome which has a tendency to
the

'middle.'

In 1940 they gave special attention to the

fact that the New Deal has undermined the public's confidence
in private insurance institutions.

In the war year of 1944,

the Republicans, in contrast to the Democrats, have a long
social security plank concerned with the extension of unem
ployment and old-age insurance, the return of the U. S.
Employment Service to the States, which were federalized
during the war, and their plans to conduct a careful study
of existing assistance programs.

(The last point is the

first mention of the assistance part of the Social Security
Act of 1935 by any party— that this part of the Act should
be studied, is also a Republican first.)
Social Security Roll Calls
During the New Deal and War Deal years of Roosevelt
there was the initial framing and passage of the Social
Security Act in 1935 and one major amendment in 1939.

The

outcome of the many bills proposed, hearings held, com
mittee decisions made, was three roll calls in the House and
12 roll calls in the Senate for the entire 12 years of legis20

lation. w

The roll calls are shown in Tables II and III

giving the Congress, Bill number, date of the roll call, and
a brief description.
The final roll calls listed in these tables reflect
the last logical stage in the American legislative process.
The many decisions that have to be made regarding social

TABLE II
HOUSE SOCIAL SECURITY ROLL CALLS OF THE NEW DEAL AND WAR DEAL

74
74
76

Roll
Call
1
2
3

Bill

Date

Description

HR 7260
HR 7260
HR 6635

4-19-35
4-19-35
6-10-39

Treadway Motion:
S. S. Act of 1935
Passage: S. S. Act of 1935
Passage: S. S. Act Amendment of 1939

TABLE III
SENATE SOCIAL SECURITY ROLL CALLS OF THE NEW DEAL AND WAR DEAL
gr<

Roll
Call

74
74
74
74
76
76
76
76
76
76
76
76

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

Bill
HR
HR
HR
HR
HR
HR
HR
HR
HR
HR
HR
HR

7260
7260
7260
7260
6635
6635
6635
6635
6635
6635
6635
6635

Date
6-19-35
6-19-35
6-19-35
6-19-35
7-11-39
7-11-39
7-11-39
7-12-39
7-12-39
7-13-39
7-13-39
7-13-39

Description
Clark Amendment:
S. S. Act of 1935
Borah Amendment:
S. S. Act of 1935
Hastings Amendment:
S. S. Act of 1935
Passage:
S. S. Act of 1935
Civil Service Amendment:
S. S. Act of
Appropriations:
S. S. Act of 1939
Appropriations:
S. S. Act of 1939
Connelly Amendment:
S. S. Act of 1939
Lee Amendment:
S. S. Act of 1939
Downey Motion:
S. S. Act of 1939
Johnson Amendment:
S. S. Act of 1939
Passage:
S. S. Act of 1939

Cn
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policy were, to be sure, all presented, debated and compro
mised.

The compromises began in the political platform com

mittee, in the many bills presented, in the Congressional
hearings, in the House Ways and Means Committee and Senate
Finance Committee and ended in the various floor amendments
and conference report exchanges between the two chambers.
(This is to be the case for all the following amendments
through 1 9 6 8 . ) ^
The three House roll call votes have been analyzed by
computing frequencies and percentages.

The Rice Index of

Cohesion was used to measure the extent of party cohesion
according to party and region for the period.

It will be

recalled that the Rice Index of Cohesion measures cohesion
in categorically defined subgroups within a legislature—
cohesion being the extent to which the distribution of votes
on a roll call deviates from the distribution that would be
expected if all influences operated in a random fashion.
Minimum cohesion is assigned as index value of zero and
maximum cohesion a value of 100.

The percentage of congress

men for and against the social security measure on the floor
and the Rice Index of Cohesion value are presented in Tables
IV and V.
On roll call number one, sizable majorities of both
parties oppose each other.

Some 84 percent of the Democrats

are for social security as against the Republicans 2.1 per
cent.

Testing these percentages in terms of party cohesion

shows the Republicans to be much more cohesive as a party.
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TABLE IV
PARTY VOTING PERCENTAGES AND RICE INDICES IN THE
HOUSE FOR THE NEW DEAL AND W A R DEAL YEARS
Roll
Call

Demo.
For

1

84.2

2
3

Percentage
Against

Rice
Index

Rep.
For

15.8

68.5

2.1

97.9

95.8

95.7

4.3

91.4

80.2

19.8

60.4

100.0

0.0
Average
Weighted

100.0
86.6
85.5*

98.7

1.3
Average
Weighted

97.4
84.6
33.5

Percentages Rice
Against
Index

*See Appendix H.

TABLE V
PARTY VOTING PERCENTAGES AND RICE INDICES IN THE
SENATE FOR THE NEW DEAL AND W A R DEAL YEARS
Roll
Call

Demo.
For

Percentage Rice
Index
Against

Rep.
For

Percentage
Against

Rice
Index

1

47.1

52.9

5.9

14.3

85.7

71.4

2

80.6

19.4

61.3

63.2

36.8

26.3

3

95.2

4.8

90.3

36.8

63.2

26.3

4

95.5

4.5

91.0

76.2

23.8

52.4

5

96.2

3.8

92.3

100.0

0.0

100.0

6

87.0

13.0

74.1

47.1

52.9

5.9

7

97.8

2.2

95.6

82.4

17.6

64.7

8

69.8

30.2

39.7

9.1

90.9

81.8

9

27.3

72.7

45.5

5.3

94.7

89.5

10

86.0

14.0

72.0

21.1

78.9

57.9

11

36.0

64.0

28.0

100.0

0.0

100.0

12

95.1

4.9
90.2
Average
65.5
Weighted 52.1

63.2

36.8
26.3
Average
58.5
Weighted 1.3
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(Note:

Rep. Allen Treadway, Republican of Mass., motioned

to recommit HR 7260, strike out the old-age insurance system
and raise charity payments thus a "yea" for the measure
would be against social security.)^3

on the passage vote of

the original bill, roll call number 2, both Democrats and
Republicans favored passage.

Some 95 percent of the Demo

crats and 80 percent of the Republicans being in favor of
the Act.

Looking at these percentages in depth for party

cohesiveness, it is seen that more of these Democrats voting
were for the bill as measured by the Rice Index of Cohesion
of 91.4.

This means that there is cohesion within the party.

The Republicans also were somewhat cohesive— thus indicating
agreement between parties as well as within parties.

The

significance of these indexes on roll calls 1 and 2 is that
Republicans were more cohesive as a party on the recommital
motion than on passage.
Democrats.

The opposite is the case for the

On roll call number three, the passage of the

Social Security Amendments of 1939, yields almost maximum
percentages and cohesiveness for both parties.

One might

infer that these amendments had the lowest amount of change
or reform ingredient in them.

More will be said about this

in the next section on performance where planks are compared
with the roll calls.
Shifting over to the Senate Chamber there are a total
of 12 roll calls.

Table VI gives the percentage of Senators

voting for and against social security on all the roll calls
during the New Deal and War Deal years.

Rice Indices for
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TABLE VI
HOUSE AND SENATE AVERAGE COHESION BY PARTY AND REGION
FOR THE NEW DEAL AND WAR DEAL YEARS

Region

Democratic Average
Cohe sivenes s
Senate
House

Republican Average
Cohesiveness
House
Senate

N ew England

89.7

90.3

89.7

63.2

Mid-Atlantic

93.6

75.0

71.7

87.5

East-North
Central

89.3

81.6

88.7

88.9

West-North
Central

84.0

65.3

91.1

60.6

South

91.4

71.2

0.0

0.0

Border

89.9

64.4

100.0

0.0

Mountain

66.7

61.2

33.3

66.7

Pacific

56.7

88.9

100.0

75.0

86.6

65.5

84.6

58.5

Other
The Nation
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each vote as well as an Average and Weighted Rice index is
also shown.

Roll call number 4, the passage of the Social

Security bill in the Senate, shows a percentage difference
with 95 percent of the Democrats and 52 percent of the Repub
licans voting for the measure.
the percentages:

Applying the Rice Index to

score of 91 versus 52.

Both indexes regis

tering a considerable amount of agreement between parties.
Regarding the bill

(HR 6675) to amend the Social Secu

rity Act by the 76th Senate there were eight roll calls
call numbers 5-12).

(roll

The vote on passage, roll call number 12,

as in the passage of the original act in 1935, shows a major
ity of both parties for the measure.

The Democrats and Repub

licans both having relatively high indices, but not as high
in the House.

The same applies for the Average Rice index

and the Weighted Rice Index, meaning that there is less co
hesiveness in the Senate than in the House on social security
legislation for the period under discussion.
Percentages and Indices of Cohesion were computed for
regions of the country as set up by the Inter-University
Consortium for Political Research.

Table VI shows the

cohesiveness measure for the House and Senate by region for
the period.

For the House, both parties showed cohesion on

a regional basis with the Border and Pacific Republicans
being more cohesive.

The Mountain Democrats were more co

hesive than the Republicans from this region.

For the Senate,

the New England region shows the greatest difference between
parties.

Some difference prevails in the Mid-Atlantic and
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Pacific regions where the Republicans show greater intra
party unity in the former whereas the Democrats show it in
the latter.
Social Security Performance
How did the majority Democrats and the minority Repub
licans perform in terms of their promises made in these
crisis years?

Franklin Delano Roosevelt knew his politics

and his possibilities as evidenced by his popularity and
staying power in office.
ship to his Congresses.

Of concern to us is his relation
How was Roosevelt to grant the

promises of his party's platform of 1932?

Roosevelt's new

73rd Congress of 1933 has been dubbed a 'tractable' one.
From an evenly divided lame duck session of anger, turbulence,
and ineffectiveness came a willing, voluminous and productive
1933 session leading to Roosevelt's "100 Days."

Majority

Democrats and minority Republicans were split.2^

The

Democrats came up with an overwhelming victory in 1934 which
was only the second time in American history that an Adminis
tration increased its strength in an off-year election.2^
Supreme Court decisions against Roosevelt's New Deal followed
in the Spring of 1935.

This was in turn followed by the

Second New Deal in the long, hot summer of 1935.27

(It must

be interjected here that outside of the historians arguments
over the differences between the first and second New Deals,
the second one led to the collapse of further deals of any
kind.)

James Patterson in his discussion of conservatism in
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the New Deal says that the record shows Roosevelt's opposi
tion gaining in strength;
In the last analysis the fundamental reason for the
growth of Congressional conservatism in 1935 was not
presidential failure but the instinctive feeling
among basically conservative congressmen that the New
Deal had gone far enough— or too far. These men had
not become more conservative; from the start they
had supported the New Deal because it had seemed a
conservative way to deal with a revolutionary impasse.
But once the emergency seemed to be diminishing, they
began to express their thought openly.28
Out of this came the Social Security Act of 1935.

One

might say that the outcome or performance when compared to
the platform plank is one of great accomplishment.

It was a

piece of seemingly long-range legislation which may have
been spurred by two "Movements"

(or "panaceas" as one admin

istrator says) which came about after the 1932 platform and
the first New Deal.

These were the Townsend Movement and

Huey Long's "Share the Wealth" M o v e m e n t . T h u s

the Demo

cratic Party was under pressure to come up with a compre
hensive program of pension and relief.

Hearings and roll

calls show the pressures operating in the legislative process
leading to the passage of the Act in 1935.30
Nine of the ten programs in the Act called for FederalState partnership and were a tremendous effort to use the
Federal system to

a d v a n t a g e . 21

Arthur Altmeyer says:

"The

President's desire to rely upon the States as much as po s 
sible was based on his lifelong belief in our federal form,
rather than a national form, of government."22

From the

majority Congress, from the pressures of outside 'movements,'

and from the President's Federal-State philosophy— what was
the result of all the parliamentarianism during the Roose
velt period?

Did Roosevelt set up some kind of image that

the American Congress with its two parties were truly imple
menting the constitutive ideas of an international social
security movement?

In the broad sense, an omnibus social

security measure got passed and amended once from 1932 to
1945— from the 73rd to the 79th Congresses.

What did each

one of them do to alter conditions for the American people
on the street?
Many commentators, including Roosevelt himself,

felt

the Social Security Act to be extremely important and even
the cornerstone of the whole New Deal.

Why was this

believed to be so at that time and why is it still the case
after 33 years of historical retrospect?

The result was a

kind of catch-all law which brought together three areas of
income support policy:
ance;

(1) old-age and surviver's insur

(2) unemployment compensation; and (3) assistance or

charity programs to the blind, dependent children and oldagers plus several minor Titles.

In this great political

compromise, bare subsistence levels of income support were
provided for those covered by the law.

The amounts autho

rized then and in following years did not and do not raise
the people out of poverty and deprivation!

Perhaps the

point was and still is as Barnes comments:
More important than any relief aid— indeed more
important than the Social Security Act— has been
the social philosophy which the New Deal introduced:
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that the government will not stand idly by and allow
the poor to starve and rot. Public responsibility
for a minimum of public weal was probably the most
important single contribution made to American life
by the Roosevelt Administration. No longer would it
be more difficult to secure public aid for a man
than a mule.33
This is in keeping with what Roosevelt said himself as he
signed the Act on August 14, 1935.

It bears quoting:

This social security measure gives at least some
protection to 30 millions of our citizens who will
reap direct benefits through it, though old-age
pensions and through increased services for the
protection of children and the prevention of ill
health.
We can never insure one hundred per cent of the
population against one hundred per cent of the
hazards and vissitudes of life, but we tried to
frame a law which will give some measure of protec
tion to the average citizen and to his family
against the loss of a job and against povertyridden old-age.
This law, too, represents a
cornerstone in a structure which is being built
but is by no means complete.
It is a structure
intended to lessen the force of possible future
depressions.
It will act as a protection to future
administrations against the necessity of going deeply
into debt to furnish relief for the needy.
The law
will flatten out the peaks and valleys of deflation
and of inflation.
It is, in short, a law that will
take care of human needs and at the same time pro
vide for the United States an economic structure of
vastly greater soundness. . . .
If the Senate and the House of Representatives in
this long and arduous session had done nothing more
than pass this bill, the session would be regarded
as historic for all time.34
In terms of the laissez-faire American traditions in which
Roosevelt grew up, this bill was indeed historic; that is,
when compared to itself, the American legislature passed a
good bill; when compared to other industrial nations and to
the many millions who did without it in the first third of
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this century, it was too little, too late.
The five "income replacement" programs
insurance, unemployment insurance,

(old-age

and three welfare cate

gories, Old-Age Assistance, Aid to the Blind, and Aid to
Dependent Children) of the Act brought national coordinated
order and minimal protection to the people who were driven
to the floor, as it were, of the distribution of goods and
services of the nation.

The Federal emergency relief pro

grams of the previous years grew into a "crazy quilt" in
terms of distributive mechanisms.
brought about a law to

Roosevelt's compromise

(1) protect only against major

hazards like old-age and unemployment ignoring things like
medical care;

(2) only a moderate, if that, level of bene

fits came about;

(3) direct administration and decisions

were left to the States

(as before the national economic

crisis) with the exception of old-age insurance; and

(4)

the only national program— old-age insurance— was selffinanced through regressive taxation falling on low-income
w o r k e r 's payrolls.

By not fiddling with the existing tax

structure and business taxes, the President's proposals, as
we saw in the roll call votes above, were met with very
little opposition during these hard times.35
The only amendment to this Act during this period was
in 1939.

Many proposed bills were piling up in the House

Ways and Means Committee and the Townsendites were still
clammering for their program to become law.

This amendment

did little but to extend slightly the various coverages.

It
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seems that the politicians, as well as their supporters,
were satisfied with the way in which the Social Security Act
came out.

The platform planks of the later years

(1940 and

1944) speak for themselves in terms of the actual political
party perception of the performance.

(For details see

Appendix G.)
Summary
This chapter has attempted to provide a historical
and sociological discussion of the New Deal and War Deal
from the standpoint of social security measures enacted.
Political party platform planks on social security were
analyzed for their social security content from the more
radical parties to the more conservative.

The Democratic

Party might be said to be the compromise party during the
crisis as they were able to at least give the appearance to
the radicals that something meaningful was being done to put
the country back on its feet and not go too far so that the
conservatives would go along.

It was pointed out, however,

that die conservative coalition won out, legislatively, as
the Second World War approached.
If we were to sum up the several tendencies and
changes wrought by the political parties in the socio
economic security posture of the nation, we would conclude
that the nation's social philosophy was shored up with a
kind of experimental optimism.

This optimism was a 'spin

o f f 1 from a belief that government and law can accomplish
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relief, recovery, reconstruction,

and reform.

We would con

clude that during this period— as a continuation of the
social crisis of World War One— the transition from a more
local responsibility to a more national responsibility
occurred rapidly.

This transition can best be summarized as

an increase in 'political scale.'

The tendency toward this

greater political scale showed itself in the Social Security
Act of 1935 in the Title on Old-Age and Disability Insurance.
The status quo or counter-tendency was the case in the other
nine titles of the Act which clung to a Federal-State
participation model with Federal controls.

The fact that

the national system of old-age security was self financed
through regressive payroll taxation makes it but a slight
advancement toward 'socialism.'

If this law was the corner

stone of the New Deal, as Roosevelt said it was, then we
must conclude that the Republican and Democratic parties
formed a coalition to do as little as possible in terms of
the international trend toward comprehensive social security
and as much as possible to keep the American idea of social
security intact.
If reform of any kind occurred, it meant economic
reform in the narrow

s e n s e .

^6

The businessman was shored up

just as much if not more than the poverty-ridden and stricken.
The Democratic Party showed— both in its platform planks and
parliamentarianism— that it could compromise the past with
the present and perhaps the future with a law such as the
Social Security Act of 1935.

In terms of social change,
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there was little institutional change or changes in existing
inequalities as a result of legislative action on social
security.

The inequalities that existed before the Great

Depression were not reduced during the New Deal part of our
period of study in this chapter.

Only during the "War Years"

or the War Deal did unemployment, as an example, become less
than an army.^7
The data above on platform planks and roll call per
formance shows the two major parties sticking fairly close
to their promises in the area of social security.

The

Democrats, when expedient to do so, drawing from the more
radical planks of the Communists and Socialists; and then the
Republicans drawing from the Democrats what will advance
them politically.

The Social Security Act seems to have

become the 'organizing principle' of all the parties once it
became law as indicated by the platforms.

(This we shall

see to be the case in the following four presidential
periods.)

After a great amount of parliamentarianism

characteristic of most laws made in America, the public
political decision in the form of the roll call showed high
support in both parties.
acted

The House Ways and Means Committee

as the 'gatekeeper1 between the hundreds of bills

submitted and the few which reach the floors of the two
chambers.
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FOOTNOTES
CHAPTER III
Extensive lists could be compiled for the autobio
graphical, biographical, political, historical, journalistic
and general literary sources on who and what was responsible
for the Great Depression of 1929-1939.
^The term New Deal was coined by the President,
Franklin Delano Roosevelt in his speech to the Democratic
national convention in June, 1932.
It was picked up by a
cartoonist and thenceforth became the slogan of the Roosevelt
program.
See William E. Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt
and the New D e a l ; 1932-1940 (New York; Harper and Row,
Publishers, 1963), p. 8.
O
,
,
This is precisely the historian's or the historical
sociologist's difficulty— where to break history or social
action into 'joints.1 For a summary of this period see
Chancre and Continuity in Twentieth Century America, edited
by John Braeman, Robert H. Bremner and Everett Walters (New
York; Harper and Row, Publishers, 1964).
^William E. Leuchtenburg, "Introduction," The New
D e a l ; A Documentary History, edited by William E. Leuchten
burg (Columbia;
University of South Carolina Press, 1968),
p. xiii.
5
The First New Deal and the One Hundred Days is sum
marized in Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New
Deal, loc. c i t ., where excellent bibliography is provided.
^As quoted by Arthur J. Altmeyer, The Formative Years
of Social Security (Madison; The University of Wisconsin
Press, 1968), p. 9.
^Although counter-tendencies are not the concern of
this study, they must not be considered to be of minor import.
It must be assumed that for every political tendency there
are one or more counter-tendencies; e . g ., revolution breeds
counter-revolution and reform breeds counter-reform.
8This is implied, for example, in Altmeyer's remarks
concerning the enactment of the Social Security Law. See
Altmeyer, ibid., pp. 3-42.
^Executive Order Number 6757, June 29, 1934 of Presi
dent Franklin D. Roosevelt.
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The letter of transmittal is dated January 15, 1935
but according to Edwin E. Witte, Executive Director of the
Committee, it was not filed in final form until January 17th.
See his Development of the Social Security Act (Madison:
University of Wisconsin Press, 1963), p. 75.
•^ R e p o r t to the President of the Committee on Eco
nomic Security. United States Government Printing Office,
Washington, D. C., 1935. For a running commentary on the
Report see Witte, loc. cit.
Altmeyer, op. ext.. p. 29; Witte, pp. c i t ., p. 75.
•^This is not to deal with the 'usual legislative
process' between intent and outcome lightly. The amount of
parliamentarianism involved is staggering but difficult to
rigorously analyze because so much of it is behind closed
doors in smoke-filled rooms and over the telephone.
l^itte,

ibid., pp. 96-97.

^ R e p o r t to the President of the Committee on Eco
nomic Security, pp. c i t .. p. 35.
l^I b i d .. p. 41. The report at this point states that
the Committee recognizes that the operation of any plan
depends on the "provision of sound relations between the
insured population and the professional practitioners or
institutions furnishing medical services under the plan.
We
have accordingly submitted this tentative plan to our
several professional advisory groups organized for this p u r 
pose. These advisory groups have requested an extension of
time for the further consideration of these tentative pr o 
posals." P. 41. Altmeyer, in the work cited above, however,
says that the Committee decided at the beginning that it
would not include any recommendations regarding health
insurance in its report to the President, but did include
statements to the effect of saying that insurance should be
applied to ill health (p. 27) . If one reads the Report he
will see why it raised such a furor by the American Medical
Association, particularly in its statement excluding com
mercial or other intermediary agents between the insured
population and the professional agencies which serve them.
Whatever happened to the report from the medical advisory
groups which was due on March 1, 1935, I have not been able
to trace. Altmeyer does say that the President asked the
Committee on Economic Security, in June, 1935, to submit its
health program which included health insurance. Does this
mean that the medical people did not give its recommenda
tions to the Committee on March 1st? Accordingly, says
Altmeyer, a report was submitted on June 15, 1935, while the
social security bill was pending. Despite the controversial
nature of compulsory health insurance, the report advises
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such a program. The outcome was to drop the health issue
and research it further (pp. 57-58). We can, perhaps, con
clude from this that it would have been a bad political move
to push this health insurance matter in 1935.
Said another
way, perhaps the lines of battle were drawn between Roose
velt's "brains-trusters" (Ph.D's, etc.) and the M.D.'s.
l^The problem of health risks in the American popula
tion is clouded.
The state of aggregate sickness and general
health in the American population as compared with other
industrial countries has not received adequate study.
It
might be said that medical care in America is considered a
privilege and not a right as in many other industrial
countries.
•^Report to the President, loc. c i t .
^ T h e source for political party platforms and social
security planks is Kirk H. Porter and Donald B. Johnson,
National Party Platforms; 1940-1964 (Urbana: University of
Illinois Press, 1966).
^°An elaboration of every roll call is beyond the
scope of this study as there are a total of 146 calls con
sidered. The Congress, Bill Number and Date and a brief
description is given for the interested reader to check into
the many sources. The Congressional Record is the best
source before 1945. This source can be supplemented by the
Congressional Quarterly Service after 1945.
21-The total sample of roll calls may be seen in
Appendices E and F.
^Altmeyer, loc. cit., provides a summary of the
government publications related to the Social Security Act.
^ T h e criteria for switching a vote is seen in Foot
note 12 at the end of Chapter II above, p. 39.
24rhe Consortium breakdown is as follows:
New England: Conn., Maine, Mass., N. H., R. I., Vt.
Mid-Atlantic: Del., N. J . , N. Y . , Pa.
East-North Central: 111., Ind., Mich., Ohio, Wise.
West-North Central: Iowa, Kan., Minn., Mo., Neb., N. Dak.,
S. Dak.
South: Va., Ala., Ark., Fla., Ga., La., Miss., N. C., S. C.,
Tex.
Border: Ky., Md., Okla., Tenn., W. Va.
Mountain: Ariz., Colo., Idaho, Mont., Nev., N. M . , Utah,
Wyo.
Pacific: Calif., Ore., Wash.
Other:
Alaska, Hawaii.
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James T. Patterson, Congressional Conservatism and
the New D e a l : The Growth of the Conservative Coalition in
Congress: 1933-1939 (Lexington:
University of Kentucky
Press, 1967), pp. 1-11.
26Ibid., p. 32.
2^Ibid., pp. 72-75.
Ibid., p . 75.
Altmeyer, o p . c i t .. p. 10.
•^ibid.

Altmeyer details some of these considerations.

3^-Ibid.. pp. 53-54.
■^Ibid., p. 11.
22Harry Elmer Barnes, Society in Transition
New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1952), p. 588.

(2nd ed.;

2^As reprinted in Leuchtenburg, The New D e a l :
Documentary History, o p . c i t ., pp. 324-25.

A

^ R o o s e v e l t and tax reform in the 1930's is a subject
all by itself because tax reform is at the very nerve of the
various inequalities and inequities in the American experi
ence. Patterson points out that this issue disturbed
Republicans and split Democratic ranks wide open.
In his
June 19, 1935 message Roosevelt called for sweeping tax
reforms— simultaneously with Huey P. Long's campaign for
sharing wealth, making men kings and redistributing income.
Patterson, ojd. cit., pp. 38-59.
■^Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New
D e a l , o p . c i t ., p. 339.
37lbid., pp. 346-47.
Leuchtenburg's final chapter,
"Roosevelt Reconstruction:
Retrospect," could be quoted in
its entirety here.
He says, for example:
"Under the New
Deal, new groups took their place in the sun.
It was not
merely that they received benefits they had not had before,
but that they were 'recognized' as having a place in the
commonwealth” ' (p. 332). His very last remarks come back to
the same observation:
"The New Deal achieved a more just
society by recognizing groups which were largely unrepre
sented— staple farmers, industrial workers, particular ethnic
groups, and the new intellectual-administrative class.
Yet
this was still a half-way revolution; it swelled the ranks
of the bourgeoisie but left many Americans— share-croppers,
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slum-dwellers, most Negroes— outside of the new equilibrium"
(p. 347). More will be said of the quality and quantity of
this enfranchisement in later chapters.

CHAPTER IV
THE FAIR DEAL YEARS
Introductory
The roaring twenties had its "Old Deal"; the sobering
thirties its "New Deal"; and the war-torn forties the "War
Deal."

The last half of the forties came up with the "Fair

Deal" of the man from Missouri, President Harry S. Truman.
Inheriting all these deals, along with many of the problems
glossed over by these slogans, President Truman had the
immediate problem of ending the war and preparing the public
for demobilization and relative peace-time.

In contrast to

the New Deal, not much has been written yet about the domes
tic policies of the Fair Deal.

The period covers approxi

mately seven years— 1945-1952— and, in general, the national
responses to demobilization at home

(reconversion) and

reconstruction of Europe and the Orient.

The effect of

particular responses is still reverberating through all the
American institutions.
The matter of demobilization or reconversion was
thought about before the war ended as planners and policy
makers were looking ahead to handle the problems and
potentials of post-war life.

For example, Roosevelt, in his

budget message to the Congress on January 10, 1944, wished
73
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to extend social security benefits to veterans and others.
Also, in his State of the Union Message he included what he
called a "Second Bill of Rights."

This policy statement may

be called the keynote of Roosevelt's postwar plans to raise
the American standard of living.1

Such was the role and

style of politics that Truman inherited to handle the major
postwar problem of employment and unemployment.

President

Roosevelt died on April 12, 1945; the war in Europe ended on
May 8, 1945; and on May

2 8 ,

1945 President Truman sent a

special message to Congress pointing out the failure of the
unemployment insurance system in both coverage and benefits.
On September 6, 1945

(marking the beginning of the Fair

Deal) he repeated remarks about the inadequacy of unemploy
ment insurance along with his intent to extend, expand, and
improve social security.

On November 19, 1945 he outlined

his idea of a national health program.

What follows in this

chapter may be considered a response to these few ideas in
the years to follow.
The Fair Deal was more

(or less) of the New Deal as

far as social security was concerned.
period indicate this to be the case.

The platforms of the
Insofar as the Demo

cratic Party failed to continue the New Deal after the war,
it can be asserted that the Republicans tried to dismantle
that part of the New Deal philosophy not to their liking.
Third parties seem to be less of a force on domestic policy
after the war than before it.

The question asked for the

earlier period applies here for this period:

how great was
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the challenge and how sharp was the response on the part of
the legislature in regards social security?
Before outlining some political considerations, we
can, as an example of what was actually done during this
period, look at a report of the Senate Committee on Finance.
It was ordered on July 27, 1947 and transmitted by the
Advisory Council on Social Security to the Committee on
Finance on December 31, 1948.

It recommended that existing

gaps in old-age and survivor's insurance be filled to cover
more workers and give greater benefits to keep up with the
standard of living; recommended that there be a social
insurance method of handling disability; recommended in
creased benefits for the welfare categories such as federal
grants for General Assistance

(locally financed throughout

the nation) and extend medical care payments as well as
abolish residence requirements; and lastly, recommended that
unemployment insurance be extended and increased as well as
a plan for unemployment insurance supplement to handle
periods of severe unemployment.

Typical of the period,

action taken on these recommendations were delayed or
ignored.

As a matter of record, coverage was narrowed down

and the definition of 'employee' was scaled down.

This was

the result of the "terrible 80th Congress" so dubbed by
President Truman and a major issue in the 1948 campaign.^

Political Considerations
The legislative history of the omnibus Social Security
Act of 1935 and its one major amendment in 1939 discussed in
Chapter IV revealed a parliamentarianism more in thought
than in deed.

With the law on the books, amending it gets

intricate, it being very much a function of the party makeup
of the Congress and its committees, not to mention the involve
ment of an expanding Executive branch and social security
administrators.
Following the discussion of the political context
outlined in Chapter I, we see a different profile for the
middle-forties than was seen in the middle-thirties.

With

the elections of 1945, the Republicans gain control of both
Houses.

Table VII shows the figures for this tendency.

The

election of 1948 shows a reversal of what occurred in 1946
in both Houses.

In 1950 and 1952 the Democrats lose members

in the House whereas the Senate membership remains somewhat
stable.

Truman's Fair Deal program thus did not have the

same kind of Congressional makeup that Roosevelt enjoyed
during his New Deal.

As any analyst could predict this

caused President Truman some problems with his deal.
Social Security Platform Planks
Looking at the social security platform planks of
this period for the parties running presidential candidates,
it is observed that the Democratic Party Platform came under
attack in 1948 as several Southern States

'bolted' from the
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TABLE VII
PARTY REPRESENTATION IN THE FAIR DEAL YEARS*
Democrats-- — Increments
House Senate House Senate

Republicans
House Senate

Other
House Senate

1944

243

57

+21

0

190

38

2

1946

188

45

-55

-12

246

51

1

1948

263

54

+75

+ 9

171

42

1

1950

234

48

-29

- 6

199

47

2

1

1952

213

47

-21

- 1

221

48

1

1

1

*See Appendix B.

convention protesting the
platform.
Dixiecrats.

These

'strong' civil rights plank in the

'bolters were called States' Righters or

The Dixiecrats maintained "that a platform of

principles is a solemn covenant with the people and with the
members of the party.

..."

They felt that they were on

solid ground by splitting off on the issue of civil rights.
They pointed out that their wishes should be complied with
on the basis of past loyalty to the party as they (the South)
had furnished approximately 50 percent of the votes necessary
to nominate a president every four years for nearly a
century.^

Even the platform of the Democratic Party showed

disunity on the direction of domestic policy after the war.
Figure 6 summarizes the several party planks on the issues

1944*
Old-Age Insurance
Local
State
Federal-State
National

Unemployment Insurance
Local
State
Federal-State
National

1948*

Proh.

Com., DEM.
P r o g . , Proh
REP., Soc.

REP.

DEM.

Assistance-Relief
Local
State
Federal-State
National
Health Insurance
Private
Private-Public
National

Com., Prog.
S o c ., S-W.‘

Prog.,

Soc.

REP.
Prog.,
Soc.

DEM.

*See Appendix G.

s-w.

= Socialist-Workers

Com.
DEM.
REP.
Proh.
Prog.
C-N
Soc.

=
=
=
=
=

Communists
Democrats
Republicans
Prohibition
Progressive
= Christian-Nationalists
= Socialists

FIGURE 6
POLITICAL PARTY "SOCIAL SECURITY" PLANKS
DURING THE FAIR DEAL YEARS
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of social security during the Fair Deal years.
Reviewing these planks, all the parties seem to
accept the existing Social Security law as the basic plan
(the Socialist-Laborites continue to call the capitalist
reforms of the New Deal and Fair Deal as reactionary, how
ever) .

Moving from more 'radical' positions to the more

'conservative' shows the range of acceptance.

(See, Appendix

G for details.)
The more

'radical' 1948 platform of the Socialist-

Laborites still feels that capitalist reforms amount to
reaction.

War, fascism, and poverty amidst plenty

(this

latter phrase used here becomes popular by more liberal
politicians in the 1 9 6 0 's, as we shall see) are the evil
brood of capitalists and plutocrats.

The Communist Party

wishes to extend Federal minimum wage and social security
laws to agricultural workers, including seasonal and
migratory labor.

They throw their support behind the Pro

gressive Party in that they did not nominate a presidential
candidate.

The Progressive Party polled over one million

votes attacking big business, they say that since the was
"Never before have so few owned so much at the expense of so
many."4

They seek to make Roosevelt's Economic Bill of

Rights a reality to all claiming that the

'old' parties

refuse social security protection to millions and allow
meagre benefits to the rest.

Their extensive social security

plank attacks the current social security program as a b i 
partisan conspiracy.

They call for a national old-age
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pension system, maternity benefits and a national health
system for all.

The Socialists. in a more moderate state

ment as compared to the Progressives,

advocate the expansion

of the existing system through amendment; however, they
accuse the Democrats and Republicans of forming a reactionary
coalition insofar as social security is concerned.

They

call for a national contributary system of health insurance.
The Socialist-Workers in their social security plat
form plank is of note because they demand that an escalator
clause be tied to wages and included in social security with
unemployment insurance equal to trade union w a g e s .

Demo

crats wish to extend the Social Security law and favored the
enactment of a national health program in the

'hedged' form

calling for expanded medical research, medical education,
hospitals and clinics.

The Republican Party wish to extend

the old-age title of the Social Security Act and also men
tion Federal-State programming to improve hospital facili
ties and foster a healthy America.

The Prohibitionists want

to include all employed persons in the provisions of the
Social Security Act.

On the more conservative side of the

political continuum,

the Christian Nationalist Party plat

form of 1948 attacked Communists, Jews, Negroes, and aliens.
Their social security plank was very general in calling for
a simple but effective system similar to veterans' compensa
tions.

As in the thirties, one can see the germs of ideas

for the liberal posture in the more radical platforms as far
as social security is concerned.

A reversal of this is
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observed in that the Socialists say the same thing in their
1948 platform about voluntary insurance programs that the
President's Committee on Economic Security said back in
1935

(noted above on page 46).

Social Security Roll Calls
During the Fair Deal years of Truman there were five
amendments to the Social Security Act:
1950, and 1952.
1950.

1946, 1947, 1948,

All were minor except the legislation of

The 1946 amendment was by voice vote and called for

extension of social security coverage to veterans and others
as well as an increase in Federal sharing on the publicassistance programs.

The 1947 amendments dealt with con

tribution rates in the old-age title,

increased Federal share

in the assistance titles, and set up a Federal unemployment
account for the States.

The 1948 amendments excluded certain

workers and redefined 'employee' in the original act.
Social Security Amendments of 1950

The

(HR6000) constituted the

first major amendment since 1939 and according to adminis
trator Arthur Altmeyer,

'unquestionably represented a major

advance in the strengthening of our social security system.
The final public decisions on social security legislation
amounts to 11 roll calls in the House of Representatives and
7 roll calls in the Senate for the seven-year duration of
the Fair Deal years.
VIII and IX.

These roll calls are shown in Tables

TABLE VIII
HOUSE SOCIAL SECURITY ROLL CALLS OF THE FAIR DEAL
Roll
Call

Bill

Date

Description

80

4

HJ 296

2-27-48

Status Quo on Social Security

80

5

HJ 296

6-14-48

Status Quo on Social Security over Veto

81

6

HRes372

10- 4-49

HR6000 Resolution:

81

7

HRes372

10- 4-49

Resolution Agreement Amendments of 1950

81

8

HR6000

10- 5-49

Mason Motion

Amendments of 1950

81

9

HR6000

10- 5-49

Passage

Amendments of 1950

81

10

HR6000

8-16-50

Byrnes Recommital

Amendments of 1950

81

11

HR6000

8-16-50

Conference Report

Amendments of 1950

82

12

HR5118

10- 4-51

82

13

HR7800

5-19-52

Title II Amendment Motion of 1952

82

14

HR7800

6-17-52

Passage Title II Amendments of 1952

Amendments of 1950

Unemployment Condensation Amendments

oo
to

TABLE IX
SENATE SOCIAL SECURITY ROLL CALLS OF THE FAIR DEAL
Congress

Roll
Call

Bill

80

13

HJ 296

6- 4-48

McFarland Amendment:

Status Quo

80

14

HJ 296

6- 4-48

Passage

Status Quo

80

15

HJ 296

6-14-48

Passage over Veto

Status Quo

81

16

HR6000

6-20-50

Meyers Amendment:

81

17

HR6000

6-20-50

Knowland Amendment Amendments of 1950

81

18

HR6000

6-20-50

Long Amendment

Amendments of 1950

81

19

HR6000

6-20-50

Passage

Amendments of 1950

Date

Description

Amendments of 1950

00
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Tables X and XI give the party percentages for and
against the several measures along with indices of cohesion
for each and the average and weighted index for each Chamber.
The House Joint Resolution 296 of the 80th Congress

(House

Roll Calls 4 and 5 and Senate Roll Calls 13, 14, and 15) was
a vote to maintain the status quo in respect of certain
employment taxes and social security benefits pending action
by Congress on extended social security coverage.

The mea

sure was vetoed by President Truman and resubmitted to both
chambers and again passed by over the required two-thirds
majority.

In the House, Democrats were split almost down the

middle as the percentages show resulting in a very low index
of cohesion as a party.

But in the Senate Democrats were

against the resolution in passage but split when voting over
the Presidential veto.

Republicans were almost unanimous in

their agreement to maintain the status quo, thus showing high
percentages against social security with high indices of
cohesion as a party for the resolution votes.

The weighted

index reveals the extent of this in the negative index.
Votes 6 through 11 in the House and 16 through 19 in
the Senate refer to HR 6000:

Amendments of 1950.

Again,

we find the Democratic Party consistently more for social
security in the voting preceding the passage vote.

On the

roll calls for passage, both parties are very much for what
comes to the final vote.

Also, it is to be noted that the

Democratic Party has less average cohesion on social
security amendments for this period for both chambers.
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TABLE X
PARTY VOTING PERCENTAGES AND RICE INDICES IN THE
HOUSE FOR THE FAIR DEAL YEARS
D e m o . Percentage
For
Against

Rice
Index

R e p . Percentage
For
Against

Rice
Index

4

44.2

55.8

11.7

1.9

98.1

96.3

5

45.1

54.9

9.8

2.2

97.8

95.5

6

90.9

9.1

81.8

1.2

98.8

97.5

7

93.9

6.1

87.9

7.6

92.4

84.8

8

99.5

0.5

99.1

18.6

81.4

62.8

9

99.0

1.0

98.0

91.0

9.0

81.9

10

71.3

28.7

42.6

14.7

85.3

70.7

11

100.0

0.0

100.0

97.9

2.1

95.8

12

68.0

32.0

36.0

48.5

51.5

3.0

13

68.8

31.2

37.6

35.3

64.7

29.3

14

99.0

1.0

98.0

88.4

11.6

76.7

Average

63.9

Weighted 64.7*
*See Appendix H.

Average

72.9

Weighted -30.4
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TABLE XI
PARTY VOTING PERCENTAGES AND RICE INDICES IN THE
SENATE FOR THE FAIR DEAL YEARS
Roll
Call

Demo. Percentacre
Against
For

Rice
Index

Rep. Percentacre
For
Against

Rice
Index

13

2.3

9717

95.3

2.0

98.0

96.1

14

11.9

88.1

76.2

3.9

96.1

92.2

15

26.2

73.8

47.6

4.5

95.5

90.9

16

61.2

38.8

22.4

28.9

71.1

42.1

17

73.5

26.5

46.9

13.2

86.8

73.7

18

79.6

20.4

59.2

12.8

87.2

74.4

19

100.0

0.0

100.0

95.1

4.9

90.2

Average

79.9

Average
Weighted
*See Appendix H.

64.0
7.0*

Weighted -57.0
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As was done for the New Deal and War Deal Years, roll
call voting was broken down into the several regions as seen
in Table XII.

Cohesiveness by region reveals the House

Democrats to be most cohesive in the East-North-Central
States and least so in the South.

Democratic Senators are

most cohesive in the New England States and least in the
West-North-Central States.

Republicans show the most

cohesiveness in the Mountain States, and because there were
no Southern Senators who were Republican, register no
cohesion.

There lowest cohesion is registered in the Border

States.
Social Security Performance
When comparing party promises made in platforms with
party performance on final laws passed, we see that the
Democrats under the leadership of Truman attempted to extend
and expand the Social Security Act along New Deal lines.
This attempt was frustrated by the Republicans and Southern
Democrats.

Though the constitutionality of the Act was not

challenged as in the late 1930's, the amendment measures
which came out of the House Ways and Means Committee were
reactionary status quo measures by New Deal standards.

Other

measures were buried in this Committee and the Senate Finance
Committee, as well as the Senate Committee on Education and
Labor.
The Platform planks of 1948 show the anger by the Demo
cratic Party toward the Republicans' attack on social security
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TABLE XII
HOUSE AND SENATE AVERAGE COHESION BY PARTY AND
REGION FOR THE FAIR DEAL YEARS

Region

Democrat
Senate
House

Republican
House
Senate

New England

79.2

90.5

82.6

75.5

Mid-Atlantic

90.1

52.4

76.4

78.1

East-North-Central

99.5

71.4

70.4

91.8

West-North-Central

83.3

28.6

81.2

81.3

South

69.7

61.0

0.0

0.0

Border

74.6

74.0

64.8

42.9

Mountain

74.9

79.0

100.0

94.3

Pacific

90.0

100.0

72.1

57.1

Other

—

—

—

—

The Nation

63.9

64.0

72.9

79.9

(see Appendix G) and President Truman attacked "the terrible
80th Congress" in the campaign of 1948.

One issue behind

differences between the parties was over the 'end of the w a r . '
Employment and unemployment matters were federalized by
executive order during the war.

For example, governors and

unemployment compensation administrators said that the
Employment Service should be returned immediately to the
States after the war; whereas, Truman and the War Manpower
Commission said no— a need for federalized service was "just
as imperative in the change from war to peace as it had been
in changing from peace to war."8

Another issue which

reappeared after the war was the one over health insurance.
The "National Health Bill of 1945" calling for sweeping
reform in health matters went unreported by the Senate Com
mittee on Education and Labor.

President Truman pushed for

health insurance right after the war.

Senators Wagner and

Murray and Congressman Dingell began introducing bills to
ground, as it were, the President's wishes but all these
attempts were shunted by one means or another by Committee
p o w e r .7
Altmeyer considers the years from 1948 to 1952 as the
"crucial years" for the American social security system.8
Two political factors brought about a shift in social security
outcomes in 1948.

The first which is observed in Table VII

above is that the Democrats regained control in both chambers
in the elections of 1948; the second is the results of the
Senate report cited above

(page 75) calling for extensive
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Q

changes in the Social Security Act.
to H R 6000:

These two factors led

the Social Security Amendments of 1950.

There

was over- a year and a half of congressional consideration on
this amendment.

It extended coverage to about ten millions,

increased benefits, broadened Federal matching funds to the
States, created another welfare category

(Aid to Permanently

and Totally Disabled), and provided some money for medical
care for those on assistance.
The role of the American Medical Association, as a
professional association and pressure group, must be com
mented on because it is related to the performance of the
legislature on social security matters.

The AMA campaign

against compulsory health insurance programs reached its
peak in the 1948 to 1952 period as reaction to Truman's pro
posals. ^

Cries of socialized medicine were loud enough to

limit the President's proposals to Committee pidgeon-holes
and to leave out of the Amendment of 1950 the measure to
provide insurance benefits to the d i s a b l e d . H
The unemployment insurance title of the Social
Security Act went untouched during this period,

also.

The

assistance and relief titles fell short of the administrative
recommendations.
Summary
The Fair Deal years, although led by a Democratic
President, had to contend with a Republican controlled Con
gress after the war.

This led to Joint Resolutions to
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maintain status quo on social security.

These resolutions

resulted in two presidential vetoes which were voted over.
In the election of 1948, of which social security was a
major issue, the Democrats gained control and were able to
propose and pass a comprehensive bill

(Amendments of 1950)

despite opposition from Republicans and Southern Democrats
(Dixiecrats) .

But from the standpoint of President Truman

and his wish to continue the New Deal style with his Fair
Deal, the Social Security amendments were short of the mark
because of pressure groups— especially the American Medical
Association and allied pressure groups.

The Amendments of

1952 liberalized, to some extent, benefits, the retirement
test (allowing some earnings while drawing old-age benefits),
and Federal support of public assistance. . This bill brought
out the medical lobby against disability insurance.^
The data above on platform planks and roll call p e r 
formance shows both major parties accepting the old-age
insurance part of the Social Security Act as being the
definition of social security; the gradual improvement of
this title being an accepted mode.

The other titles like

unemployment insurance and assistance being unmentionable
items in their platform planks on social security.

Federal

money and State control over these unmentionable titles seems
to be the rule.

The issue of compulsory health insurance

pushed by the more

1radical' platforms in earlier years was

taken over by President Truman

(over and above statements

made in the Democratic Party platform in some cases) and

advanced by more

'liberal' senators and congressmen with the

effect of being delayed or shelved because of articulate and
powerful pressure groups.
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CHAPTER V
THE COLD WAR YEARS
Introductory
Thus far we have considered two periods in the his
tory of the Social Security Act which have been controlled,
at least in terms of political parties, by the Democrats.
With the 'reconversion' period over, the nation elected a
Republican President, the first in twenty years.

President

Eisenhower did not come to office under the pressure of a
world depression or a world war but as a popular war hero
during the time of relative prosperity with only
action' occurring in Korea.

'police

For lack of a better term we

can call these years the "Cold War Years" as the Republican
Administration under Eisenhower did not provide any slogan
for its programs.
These cold war years, especially in the first two
years, were "uncertain" as far as social security legislation
is concerned.^

With the Republicans now in control for the

first time since the enactment of the Social Security Law,
it was a time when a Republican Administration had to decide
to continue with the law or try to dismantle it.

The

acceptance of the basic principles by the Republican Party
94
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may be said to have occurred when the first major amendment
of the Social Security Act was advanced by them in 1954.
According to Altmeyer:
. . . the President's recommendations represented a
complete endorsement of the fundamental principles
upon which the social insurance and public assistance
provisions of the Social Security Act were based.
They also represented a continuation of the course of
development charted by the previous administration.
So it can be said that the Social Security Act for
the first time became a truly non-partisan feature
of our American way of life.2
One could advance several hypotheses for this endorse
ment of the Democratic Party's version of the Social Security
measures to date.

One is the point made that the

'clean'

bills on social security which came to the final vote were
acceptable to both parties— even the various wings within
both parties.

Another relates to the fact that it had

become an American expectation as millions were receiving
benefits and millions had already contributed to the old-age
part of the package.

In any case, the existing social

security legislation was acceptable to the Republican Party
and its supporters.

One could infer that this acceptance

(the course of social security) by the Republican Party is
because it is actually a conservative measure.

An indica

tion of the possibility of this is given by examining the
party platform planks of the more

'radical' parties? for

example, we recall the Socialist attack in 1948 accusing the
Democrats and Republicans of a reactionary coalition on
social security, also, the Progressive Party saying that the
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current social security program is a bipartisan conspiracy
(pp. 79-80 above).
So, the cornerstone or linch-pin of the New Deal of
twenty years earlier which was attacked by Republicans is
now accepted.

The way the Act gets amended during the Cold

War years might offer insight into the way American politi
cians in Congress performed.

With a Republican Administra

tion under President Eisenhower's leadership, the Act was
amended much like previous amendments with the Amendment of
1960 adding

a measure for delivering medical care to the

aged not on

assistance (Medical Aid to the Aged).

Political Considerations
Party makeup over the eight-year period is shown in
Table XIII.

When the Republicans took over in 1952, they

controlled both chambers of the legislature, but in succes
sive elections they lose seats.
any gains.

Only in 1960 do they make

In contrast to Truman, Eisenhower begins with a

Congress of his own party and then loses it as the years go
by.

What could he do with such a tendency as far as social

security is

concerned? With no serious depression orreces

sion facing

him in the earlier years it was, at least

as social security was concerned, business as usual.

as far
What

is meant by this is that there was no crisis for him to
either advance another dramatic omnibus bill

(like Roosevelt

did in the New Deal and Johnson did in the Great Society) or
to dramatically amend the Act.

In short, he had to be

cautious with his cold war Congress.
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TABLE XIII
PARTY REPRESENTATION IN THE COLD WAR YEARS*

1952

Democrats
House Senate
213
47

Increments
House Senate
-21
- 1

Republicans
House Senate
221
48

1954

232

48

+19

+ 1

203

47

1956

234

49

+ 2

+ 1

201

47

1958

283

66

+49

+17

154

34

I960

263

64

-20

- 2

174

36

Other
House Senate
1
1
1

*See Appendix B.

Social Security Platform Planks
Platform planks on social security continue to follow
past formats.

The more radical statements call for a

national emphasis and the more liberal or conservative com
ments call for a continuation of what is now on the books
with slight incremental revision.

Figure 7 shows the

acceptance by everyone of the old-age insurance title of the
original social security measures.

Only scattered mention

is made of the other major parts of the American social
security program in the party platforms.
A closer inspection of the platforms reveals a con
tinuation of previous statements on social security.

The

Socialist Labor Party seem to implicitly grant that the
Democrats and Republican parties have brought about reform
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1952*
Old-Age Insurance
Federal-State
National

Unemployment Insurance
State
Federal-State
National
Assistance-Relief
State
Federal-State
National (Allowances)
Health Insurance
Private
Private-Public
National

1955*

Prog., S-W.,
Soc. DEM.,
R E P ., P r o h .

S-W., Soc.,
REP., Proh.

DEM.
Prog.

DEM. REP.
S-W., Soc.

DEM.

DEM.

REP.
Prog., S-W.

S-W.

*See Appendix G.
S-W
Soc.
DEM.
REP.
Prog.
Proh.

=
=
=
=
=
=

Socialist-Workers
Socialists
Democrats
Republicans
Progressives
Prohibition

FIGURE 7
POLITICAL PARTY "SOCIAL SECURITY" PLANKS
DURING THE COLD WAR YEARS

DEM. ,

but maintain that to propose reform when social change is
called for prolongs Capitalism and Fascism:
to preserve."

(See Appendix G.)

"To reform is

They state in their 1956

platform that socialism is. the answer to all America's prob
lems.

Socialist Workers say in their 1952 promises that

T r u m a n 's Fair Deal has been put in moth balls and taken out
of storage for the 1952 campaign— the Republicans and Demo
crats will never enact a genuine public welfare program.
Their specific 1952 proposals call for 20 million low-cost
housing units? a national health service? adequate old-age
»

pension and college education for all youth.

Their state

ments in 1956 attack capitalism (suggesting that economic
crisis is the only alternative to war under it) and the
Democratic Party

(since the New Deal not one major social

reform has been introduced).
before.

They suggest the same as

The Progressive Party continues to want to make

Roosevelt's Economic Bill of Rights a reality.

Programs

include radically increased benefits equal to a minimum
decent standard of living? extending the Social Security Act
to all workers? family allowances for children because
virtually every industrial nation has such a program assuring
a basic minimum standard of living for children? and a
national health insurance because we are the only industrial
nation in the world without such a system.
Progressive Party candidate in 1956.

There was no

The Socialists in 1952

seem to see the major issue as one between socialism and
militarism and assert that American capitalism never
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recovered from the great collapse of the 30's as superficial
prosperity returned with a war economy.

Their social

security plank calls for extensions and increases as well as
a family allowance for all.

The Democratic Party still

points with pride to the last 20 years of success in rescuing
American business from collapse; wage-earners from mass
employment; and encouraging unionization.

Proposals during

this year advance extension and improvement of the Act and
end by encouraging private endeavors designed to complement
the present social security program.

In their long platform

of 1956 they again exalted the Democratic 84th Congress for
advancing two pioneering social security measures over the
bitter opposition of the Eisenhower administration.

They

plan to improve the old-age title of the Act and call for an
improved public assistance program— one of the few times the
assistance program has been mentioned thus far by any politi
cal party.

Republicans attack the Democrats in their plat

form of 1952 claiming that the idea of government by consent
has been destroyed by the last 20 years of Democratic Party
rule.

Inflation has cut into the Federal Old-age and Sur

vivors system say the Republicans and this must be stopped.
They call for amendment to the Old-age title as well as a
study of universal pay-as-we-go pension plans.

They are

opposed to Federal compulsory health insurance with ”its
crushing cost, wasteful inefficiency,

and debased standards

of medical care.’1 Celebrating its centennial as a party,
the Republicans cite Lincoln and Eisenhower as the preservers
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of the nation.

They list the accomplishment of their past

four years by saying that social security has been extended
to an additional 10 million workers and benefits raised for
six and one-half million and protection of unemployment
insurance extended to four million additional workers.

The

Prohibition Party deplores the current U. S. trend toward the
Socialist State but pledge to continue social security with
the proviso that abuses of its privileges and mal-administration be corrected.

The Christian-Nationalists assail

government expenditure and taxation of the Socialist planners
seeking to inject a Federal hand into private welfare

(see

Appendix G ) .
Security Roll Calls
The Cold War period under a Republican Administration
yielded amendments in 1954, 1955, 1956, 1957, 1958, and 1960.
The final roll calls on these are listed in Tables XIV and
XV.

There were ten roll calls in the House and twenty-two

roll calls in the Senate pertaining to social security (and
unemployment compensation).3

These roll calls include reso

lution, amendments, passage, and conference report votes on
social security for the period.
Roll call numbers 15 and 16 in the House led to pas
sage of the Social Security Amendments of 1954.

Numbers 17

and 18 refer to the extension of unemployment compensation
coverage.

The Senate passed these two measures by voice vote

and therefore we have no record of their performance.

There

TABLE XIV
HOUSE SOCIAL SECURITY ROLL CALLS OF THE COLD WAR YEARS
Congress

Roll
Call

Bill

Date

83

15

HRes 568

6- 1-54

Resolution for S. S. Amendments of 1954

83

16

HR

9366

6- 1-54

Passage:

83

17

HR

9709

7- 8-54

Forand Motion.

83

18

HR

9709

7- 8-54

Passage

84

19

HR

7225

7-18-55

Passage: Amendments of 1956

85

20

H R 12065

6- 1-58

Herlong Amendment.
sation

85

21

HR 12065

6- 1-58

Passage

85

22

HR 13549

7-31-58

Passage:

Amendments of 1958

86

23

HR 12580

6-23-60

Passage:

Amendments of 1960

86

24

HR 12580

6-23-60

Conference Report:

Description

S. S. Amendments of 1954
Unemployment Compensatioi

Unemployment Compen

Amendments of 1960

102

TABLE XV
SENATE SOCIAL SECURITY ROLL CALLS OF THE COLD WAR YEARS
Roll
Call

Bill

Date

84
84
84
84
84
84
85

20
21
22
23
24
25
26

HR 7225
HR 7225
HR 7225
HR 7225
HR 7225
HR 7225
HR12065

7-16^56
7-17-56
7-17-56
7-17-56
7-17-56
7-17-56
5-27-58

85

27

HR12065

5-28-58

85

28

HR12065

5-28-58

85

29

HR12065

5-28-58

85

30

HR12065

5-28-58

85

31

HR12065

5-28-58

85

32

HR12065

5-28-58

85
85

86

33
34
35

HR13549
HR13549
HR 5640

8-16-58
3-25-59

86

36

HR 5640

3-25-59

Description
Long Amendment:
Amendments of 1956
George Amendment:
Amendments of 1956
Pastore Amendment: Amendments of 1956
Kerr Amendment:
Amendments of 1956
Amendments of 1956
Douglas Amendment:
Passage:
Amendments of 1956
Kennedy Amendment: Temporary Unemployment Compensation
Kennedy Amendment: Temporary Unemploy
ment Compensation
Kennedy Amendment: Temporary Unemploy
ment Compensation
Long Amendment: Temporary Unemployment
Compensation
Knowland Amendment: Temporary Unemploy
ment Compensation
Cooper Amendment: Temporary Unemployment
Compensation
Passage: Temporary Unemployment Compen
sation
Yarborough Amendment: Amendments of 1958
Passage: Amendments of 1958
Extension (1960) Temporary Unemployment
Compensation
Extension (1959) Temporary Unemployment
Compension
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TABLE XV

(CONTINUED)

Congress

Roll
Call

86

37

HR12580

8-23-60

Javits Substitution:

Amendments of 1960

86

38

HR12580

8-23-60

Anderson Amendment:

Amendments of 1960

86

39

HR12580

8-23-60

Long Amendment:

Amendments of 1960

86

40

HR12580

8-23-60

Passage:

Amendments of 1960

86

41

HR12580

8-26-60

Conference Report Amendments of 1960

Bill

Date

Description
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was only one vote in the House on the Amendments of 1956
(this is because of the House Rule closing out amendments
from the floor and allowing only Ways and Means Committee
amendments); but, in the Senate this measure goes through
five votes before final passage.

HR 12065, the Temporary

Unemployment Compensation Act of 1958, relating to social
security, goes through two votes in the House and seven
votes in the Senate.

HR 5640 went through two votes in the

Senate and dealt with the extension of the above temporary
unemployment compensation.

The last roll call was HR 12580

or the Amendments of 1960 with two votes in the House and
five votes in the Senate.
Percentages of legislators for and against social
security and the Rice Indices for party cohesion on these
votes are given in Tables XVI and XVII.

Without detailed

each of the twenty-two roll calls on their registered per
centages and Rice indices, certain trends can be observed.
In the House only one vote for each party shows a higher
percentage against social security than for.

(Roll call 17

for the Democrats and roll call 20 for the Republicans.)
Average cohesion and weighted cohesion for both chambers
reveals differing tendencies from the two previous periods.
These data are discussed in Chapter VIII.
A regional breakdown of these roll calls was undertaken
with the results shown in Table XVIII.

Regional cohesiveness

by party for the House of Representatives is lowest for the
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TABLE XVI
PARTY VOTING PERCENTAGES AND RICE INDICES IN THE
HOUSE FOR THE COLD WAR YEARS
Democrat
Rice
Index

Republican
%
For
Against

Rice
Index

Roll
Call

For

Against

15

58.6

41.4

17.1

95.6

4.4

91.2

16

95.2

4.8

90.3

96.9

3.1

93.7

17

41.3

58.7

17.5

91.5

8.5

83.1

18

82.1

17.9

64.2

95.7

4.3

91.4

19

96.2

3.8

92.4

88.0

12.0

76.0

20

71.2

28.8

42.3

9.9

90.1

80.1

21

98.5

1.5

97.1

91.9

8.1

83.9

22

100.0

0.0

100.0

98.9

1.1

97.8

23

93.9

6.1

87.7

93.2

6.8

86.5

24

96.3

3.7

92.7

93.1

6.9

86.1

%

%

Average
Weighted
*See Appendix H.

60.1
6 8 .6*

%

Average

88.0

Weighted

69.9

TABLE XVII
PARTY VOTING PERCENTAGES AND RICE INDICES IN
THE SENATE FOR THE COLD W A R YEARS

Roll
Call

Democrat_____
%

For

%

Against

Republican
Rice
Index

%

%

For

Against

20

93.9

6.1

87.8

54.8

45.2

21

83.7

16.3

67.3

17.4

82.6

22

93.9

6.1

87.8

10.9

89.1

23

95.9

4.1

91.8

87.2

12.8

24

83.0

17.0

66.0

41.3

58.7

25

100.0

0.0

100.0

100.0

0.0

26

44.2

55.8

11.6

7.0

93.0

27

53.5

46.5

7.0

21.7

78.3

28

68.2

31.8

36.4

28.3

71.7

29

86.7

13.3

73.3

18.2

81.8

30

86.7

13.3

73.3

17.4

82.6

31

48.8

51.2

2.3

24.4

75.6

32

97.8

2.2

95.7

100.0

0.0

33

55.1

44.9

10.2

18.2

81.8

34

100.0

0.0

100.0

97.7

2.3

35

58.7

41.3

17.5

3.0

97.0

36

68.3

31.7

36.5

28.1

71.9

37

0.0

100.0

100.0

84.8

15.2

38

69.2

30.8

38.5

3.0

97.0

39

76.2

23.8

52.4

25.0

75.0

40

98.5

1.5

97.0

97.0

3.0

41

81.3

18.8

62.5

97.0

3.0

Average

59 4.8

Average

Weighted

48.0

Weighted
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TABLE XVIII
HOUSE AND SENATE AVERAGE COHESION BY PARTY AND
REGION FOR THE COLD WAR YEARS

Region
New England

Democrat
House
Senate

Republican
House
Senate

100.0

93.3

94.4

72.4

Mid-Atlantic

99.4

48.5

90.0

66.1

East-North-Central

99.0

78.4

85.3

79.6

West-North-Central

89.1

100.0

83.8

77.3

South

67.4 •

68.3

65.0

0.0

Border

82.0

75.0

100.0

74.7

Mountain

90.5

79.5

81.7

68.8

Pacific

100.0

98.2

83.7

68.2

Other

100.0

100.0

—

57.1

60.1

59.8

88.0

68.6

The Nation
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South

(as was the case in the Fair Deal) and highest in the

East and West.

The exception is in the Senate where those

Senators from the Border States are absolutely cohesive on
the roll calls considered.
Social Security Performance
If the New Deal saved capitalism and the Social
Security Act of 1935 was considered to be the cornerstone of
that Deal, the incoming Republican Administration would have
found it hard to dismantle the Act after it had been in
force for over 17 years.

In many ways they had helped shape

the Act itself as well as the amendments prior to coming to
power in 1953 as our voting data suggests.
Legislative performance by the Democratic and Repub
lican parties continued to be
promises.

'close1 to their platform

Both parties are promising to expand and extend

the social security of the people through the Social Security
Act.

Again, the legislation passed was of less controversial

nature in that no sweeping health measures were suggested by
the Eisenhower Administration.

Unemployment compensation

aspects of social security became somewhat of an issue in
the Senate because of the "recession" experienced in the
American economy in 1958.
Summary
The Cold War years, although led by a Republican
President, were dominated by a Democratic Congressional
majority from 1954 onward.

This Democratic majority
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contributed if not ensured that the Social Security Act would
continue to be amended and expanded 'bit-by-bit' during this
administration.

From the profile of social security planks

and the measures of cohesion we would have to concur with
Altmeyer that during the Eisenhower administration the Social
Security Act became a truly non-partisan feature of the
American way of life.

But, the charge by the minority

parties that this is not non-partisan but is bi-partisan must
be considered.

Because the two major parties accept and

agree on the Act as set up in 1935 and successively amended
does not rule out the possibility that these two parties are
performing in a bi-partisan manner to limit significant
changes in the Act, as charged by the more radical parties.
(The Act gets more complex each time it is amended, thus it
is difficult to see what minor changes will be interpreted
as major ones in the years to come.)
in which the Act was

One example of the way

'adapted' to the more radical pressures

was in the 1960 Amendments when Medical Aid to the Aged was
added to the Act.

The Democrats and Republicans finally

worked out a way to amend Title I of old-age assistance to
provide medical benefits for aged persons who are not on
old-age assistance but have a low enough income to qualify
for medical services.

As a result of many years of recom

mendations from the other parties in the U. S., outside
groups, as well as Social Security administrators and others,
this program was finally worked out for old-agers willing to
go through a means test.4

we will see several changes which

Ill
might be considered more significant in the discussion of
the New Frontier and Great Society Years.
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FOOTNOTES
CHAPTER V
■^Arthur Altmeyer, The Formative Years of Social
Security (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1968),
pp. 209-25.
^Ibid., p. 239.
^Unemployment compensation is considered a part of
the Social Security Act of 1935. HR 12065 providing for
temporary additional unemployment compensation is a separate
act from the Social Security Act— but is for the relief of
those who have exhausted their benefit entitlement as pro
vided under the Social Security Act and State laws.
4The means test idea refers to qualifications neces
sary to get income or service from a social agency. An
applicant must legally prove that he is 'poor' enough to get
such income or service.
The test criteria for means varies
from place to place and from time to time. The Federal MAA
category was a small step toward some uniformity in helping
with the costs of being ill as old-age approaches.
A
significant step was to come in the Great Society years which
will be considered below.

CHAPTER VI
THE NEW FRONTIER YEARS
Introductory
In the close election in 1960, the Democrats managed
to seat their candidate John F. Kennedy.

True to Democratic

Party style a slogan was adopted for the time.

This was the

"New Frontier.”'*' Between his election and his inauguration,
President Kennedy established a task force on health and
social security which made its recommendations to him on
January 10, 1961.^

in his inaugural address on January 20,

1961, he said "For man holds in his mortal hands the power
to abolish all forms of human poverty and all forms of human
3
life.”
And for one of the first times we find a comment on
"poverty" instead of "security" as in previous years.
The New Frontier was short because of the assassination
of President Kennedy and can be said to blend into the Great
Society of his successor Lyndon B. Johnson.

Despite this

blending, it can be considered as a separate period by which
to consider social security legislation because of the style
and tone of the years and the consequences of these years
for the Great Society legislation which followed them.
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Political Considerations
Party makeup during the New Frontier Years is seen in
Table XIX below.

TABLE XIX
PARTY REPRESENTATION IN THE
NEW FRONTIER YEARS
Democrats--- — Increments
House Senate House Senate

Republicans
House Senate

Other
House Senate

1960

263

64

-20

- 2

174

36

1*

1962

258

68

- 4

+4

176

32

Vacancy*

*See Appendix B.

Even though the Democrats lost twenty years in the House in
the 1960 election they still possessed a majority.

They

also have a clear majority in the Senate picking up an addi
tional four seats in the election of 1962.

These conditions

of a Democratic administration and a Democratic legislature
were last seen in 1950 under Truman.

With these conditions,

there was a possibility that the Democratic Party would amend
the Social Security Act of 1935 in a somewhat more dramatic
manner than was seen during the Eisenhower administration.
Before considering the amendments of the period we turn to
the political party platform planks on social security.
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Social Security Platform Planks
The planks pertaining to social security for 1960
continued to contain lengthy statements on social security.
The Socialists, offering a platform but no candidate for
1960, once again anticipate or predate what the Democratic
Party will do in the years to come by having a heading in
their platform "War on Poverty."

In this particular instance

they were referring to the international poverty situation.
(See Appendix G.)

Focusing on the domestic scene they

stated:
Since the 19301s the two old parties have produced
virtually no progressive social legislation. As
productivity has grown, so have slums; as medical
research has advanced, the ability of ordinary
people to pay for medical care has regressed; as
our standard of living has risen, fifty million
Americans have continued to dwell in poverty.4
Attempting to expose legislative impasse, they go on:
Our society is deadlocked and frustration is our
predominant feeling in every area of life; and the
predominant source of our political frustration is
a party alignment that cannot reflect the will of
the people. A coalition of Northern Republicans
and Southern Democrats thwart the wishes of the
majority, and will continue to do so until there
is a political realignment in this c o u n t r y . 5
The Democratic Party rests on Jefferson's principle
of rights of man and reaffirm Roosevelt's Bill of Rights.
Employment is the paramount objective of national policy.
The social security plank is very detailed and includes a
lengthy health plank, old-age plank and 'welfare' plank.

A

statement of things to come is made on both health and wel
fare.

On the health matter:
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Illness is expensive. Many Americans have neither
incomes nor insurance protection to enable them to
pay for modern medical care.
The problem is p a r 
ticularly acute with the older citizens, among whom
serious illness strikes most often.
We shall provide medical care benefits for the
aged as part of the time-tested Social Security
insurance system. We reject any proposal which
would require such citizens to submit to the
indignity of a means test— a 'pauper's oath.'6
This latter point about a pauper's oath is directed at the
Republican administration of Eisenhower which was forced, so
the Democrats say, to propose a cynical sham in the Social
Security Amendments of 1960 in the form of the Medical
Assistance to the Aged.

In addition to this extended health

plank, they say under their welfare plank that public
assistance takes up where social insurance leaves off and
the Federal government should establish minimum standards
without regard to residence.

The Child Welfare Program

should be expanded to prevent and control juvenile delin
quency

(see Appendix G ) .

The Republicans have labor, older

citizens, and health aid planks.

The labor plank calls for

the strengthening and extension of the unemployment insurance
system.

The older citizens’ plank would expand and liberal

ize 'selected' social security benefits which would maintain
the fiscal integrity of the system.^

The plank on health aid

reiterates the Medical Aid to the Aged theme as incorporated
in the 1960 amendments plus a statement on the option of
beneficiaries to purchase private health insurance— which
they consider to distinguish them from the Democratic Party.
Concluding their platform they say:
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We have no wish to exaggerate differences between
ourselves and the Democratic Party? nor can we, in
conscience, obscure the differences that do exist.
We believe that a Republican program is based upon
a sounder understanding of the action and scope of
government.
There are many things a free government
cannot do for its people as well as they can do them
for themselves.8
Even the Republicans have something to say about their lack
of difference'with the Democratic Party in 1960.

The Pro

hibition Party continues to make the same statement about
social security as in previous platforms.

A plank profile

for these parties is seen in Figure 8.
Social Security Roll Calls
The short New Frontier of Kennedy produced pieces of
social security legislation:

HR 4806 concerning the tempo

rary extension of unemployment compensation; the Social
Security Amendments of 1961? and the Amendments of 1962, H R
6027 and HR 10606, respectively.

This amounted to seven

roll calls or public decisions in the House and eleven in
the Senate.
XXI.

These roll calls are listed in Tables XX and

The legislation dealing with temporary unemployment

compensation and its extension became a repetitive matter
for the Congress after the Temporary Unemployment Compensa
tion Act of 1958 was instituted to extend this type of
coverage beyond that provided under the Social Security Act.
This extension provided for the payment by the Federal
government to the States for additional benefits to their
workers who had exhausted their benefit rights under State
law.

The Social Security Amendments of 1961 liberalized

1960*
Old-Age Insurance
National

Soc., DEM.,
REP.

Lower age
Medical care
Unemployment Insurance
State
Federal-State
National
Assistance Relief
State
Federal-State
National (allowances)
Health Insurance
Private
Private-Public
National

DEM., REP.

DEM.

REP.
REP.
Soc., DEM.

*See Appendix G.
Key:

Soc.
DEM.
REP.
Proh.

=
=
=
=

Socialists
Democrats
Republicans
Prohibition

FIGURE 8
POLITICAL PARTY "SOCIAL SECURITY" PLANKS
OF THE NEW FRONTIER YEARS

TABLE XX
HOUSE SOCIAL SECURITY ROLL CALLS OF THE NEW FRONTIER YEARS

87

Roll
Call
25

HR

4806

3- 1-61

Passage Temporary Unemployment Compensa
tion (1961)

87

26

HR

4806

3-22-61

Conference Report:
Temporary Unemploy
ment Compensation (1961)

87

27

HR

6027

4-20-61

Passage:

87

28

HR 10606

3-15-62

Byrnes Motion.
1962

87

29

HR 10606

3-15-62

Passage:

87

30

HR 10606

7-19-62

Conference Report

88

31

HR

Congress

Bill

8821

Date

10-22-63

Description

Amendments 1961
Welfare Amendments of

Welfare Amendments of 1962

Title XII Temporary Unemployment Compen
sation
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TABLE XXI
SENATE SOCIAL SECURITY ROLL CALLS OF THE NEW FRONTIER YEARS

87

Roll
Call
42

HR

4806

3-16-61

87

43

HR

4806

3-16-61

87

44

HR

4806

3-16-61

87

45

HR

4806

3-16-61

87
87
87
87

46
47
48
49

HR 6027
HR 6027
HR 6027
HR 10606

6-26-61
6-26-61
6-26-61
7-12-62

87

50

HR 10606

7-13-62

87

51

HR 10606

7-17-62

87

52

HR 10117

10- 5-62

Congress

Bill

Date

Description
Finance Committee Amendment: Temporary
Unemployment Compensation
Finance Committee Amendment: Temporary
Unemployment Compensation
Williams Amendment: Temporary Unemploy
ment Compensation
Passage: Temporary Unemployment Compen
sation
Hartke Substitution: Amendments of 1961
Cotton Amendment:
Amendments of 1961
Passage:
Amendments of 1961
Saltenstall Substitution: Public Wel
fare Amendments of 1962
Push Substitution: Public Welfare
Amendments of 1962
Kerr Tabling: Public Welfare Amendments
of 1962
McCarthy Amendment: Unemployment Compen
sation
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benefit payments, the retirement test, and eligibility
requirements.

On the matter of retirement age, this par

ticular amendment permitted a male worker to elect a reduced
retirement benefit at age 62— thus coming closer to the more
radical proposals of the 30's, 4 0 's, and 5 0 's of the major
minority parties.

The Welfare Amendments of 1962 were on

the public assistance titles of the Social Security Act and
may be considered the first major amendments to these titles
since the original Act of 1935.

More will be said about

this in the discussion on performance below.
Tables XXII and XXIII give party percentages for and
against social security plus the computed Rice index of
party cohesion.

Table XXII yields almost unanimous cohesion

for the Democrats in the House for the measures voted on.
This unanimity is for social security.

The House Republicans,

in contrast, are less cohesive on the legislation to get to
the floor showing the greatest split in the passage vote
dealing with the Welfare Amendments of 1962.

In the Senate,

where amendments are allowed on the floor, the Democrats are
not only more split in terms of party cohesion but some
members also vote against social security.

Average and

weighted cohesion are given for both parties in both chambers
for this voting period.
A regional breakdown can be seen in Table XXIV.

These

data reveal tendencies consistent with previous periods for
the South where for both Democrats and Republicans the lowest
cohesion is registered in the House.

The very high average
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TABLE XXII
PARTY VOTING PERCENTAGES AND RICE INDICES IN THE
HOUSE FOR THE NEW FRONTIER YEARS
Democrat
Roll
Call

Republican

%

%

For

Against

Rice
Index

%

%

For

Against

Rice
Index

25

99.2

0.8

98.4

83.7

16.3

67.4

26

98.3

1.7

96.6

82.4

17.6

64.8

27

100.0

0.0

100.0

89.9

10.1

79.9

28

94.9

5.1

89.7

10.7

89.3

78.6

29

98.3

1.7

96.5

59.3

40.7

18.5

30

99.6

0.4

99.2

78.5

21.5

57.0

31

99.5

0.5

99.0

100.0

0.0

100.0

Average

97.1

Average

66.6

Weighted

97.1*

Weighted

42.9

*See Appendix H.
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TABLE XXIII
PARTY VOTING PERCENTAGES AND RICE INDICES IN THE
SENATE FOR THE N E W FRONTIER YEARS
Democrat______
Roll
Call

%

For

%

Against

Republican____
Rice
Index

%

For

%

Against

Rice
Index

42

26.6

73.4

46.9

84.8

15.2

69.7

43

54.1

45.9

8.2

15.2

84.8

69.7

44

73.4

26.6

46.9

0.0

100.0

100.0

45

96.9

3.1

93.8

93.9

6.1

87.9

46

100.0

0.0

100.0

8.6

91.4

82.9

47

100.0

0.0

100.0

100.0

0.0

100.0

48

100.0

0.0

100.0

100.0

0.0

100.0

49

12.3

87.7

75.4

84.8

15.2

69.7

50

3.1

96.9

93.8

9.1

90.9

81.8

51

67.2

32.8

34.4

14.3

85.7

71.4

52

77.2

22.8

54.4

72.2

27.8

44.4

Average

68.5

Average

79.8

29.9*

Weighted

4.2

Weighted
*See Appendix H.
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cohesiveness among the House Democrats for the New Frontier
period is in contrast to previous periods.

TABLE XXIV
HOUSE AND SENATE AVERAGE COHESION BY PARTY AND
REGION FOR THE NEW FRONTIER YEARS
Region
New England

Democrat
Senate
House

Republican
House
Senate

100.0

89.9

91.8

82.1

Mid-Atlantic

99.3

100.0

75.6

63.6

East-North-Central

99.0

79.2

65.7

100.0

West-North-Central

100.0

100.0

48.8

93.9

South

92.1

69.7

51.5

45.5

Border

99.0

69.7

82.9

90.9

Mountain

100.0

90.5

71.5

86.4

Pacific

100.0

100.0

68.5

100.0

Other

100.0

100.0

0.0

0.0

97.1

68.5

66.6

79.8

The Nation

Social Security Performance
The 1960 political party platform planks on social
security pointed up the likenesses and differences between
the parties that were to follow in the legislative procedures
dealing with social security matters.

This is particularly
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so for the welfare issue.

The Democratic Party sought to

push health and welfare measures associated with the Social
Security Act and did so in the Amendments of 1951 and 1962.
Health insurance was stalled in these two major amendments
to the Act of 1935; but the so-called 'welfare' or assistance
titles were revised or liberalized in the 1962 amendments.9
The 1961 amendments were to be considered a change in
degree; whereas, the 1962 welfare amendments were closer to
a change in kind.

On February 1, 1962, President Kennedy

sent to Congress the first message devoted exclusively to
public welfare.

At the same time the Administration's pro

posals were sent to Congress.

After hearings, the Chairman

of the House Ways and Means Committee, Wilbur D. Mills,
introduced a 'clean bill':
319 to 69.

HR 10606.

The measure was passed

This Act was considered to be the most far-

reaching decision on the assistance part of the Social
Security of 1935 by President Kennedy because he claimed
that it embodies a new approach, stressing services instead
of support, rehabilitation instead of relief, and work
instead of dependency.'*'0
The Democratic Party plank on welfare, it will be
recalled, called for the abolition of residency requirements
on assistance categories and that the child welfare program
should be expanded to prevent and control delinquency.

The

platform also said that public assistance takes up where
social insurance leaves off.
requirements did not occur.

The abolition of residency
What requires some comment is
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the platform statement that assistance takes up where
insurance leaves off in the American Social Security scheme.
Gilbert Y. Steiner discusses this philosophy of
I 1

assistance as based on the "withering-away fallacy.1

He

concludes that social insurance has definitely not replaced
assistance in the United States; rather the program has
grown tremendously.

The giant reexamination of these welfare

or assistance categories ordered by President Kennedy dis
pelled the withering-away assertion made back in the 1930's.
The notion advanced in the 1960 Democratic Party platform
that assistance picks up where insurance leaves off repre
sents a shift in emphasis on social welfare.

Kennedy's New

Frontiersmen recognized that public assistance was not
residual.-^

Steiner says,

If the curtain had to be lowered on the extend-socialinsurance-so-that-the-public-assistance-load-will-fallaway performance, it also had to be lowered on the
status quo (on public assistance).13
But the net result of the Welfare Amendments Act of 1962 was
to merely provide rehabilitative services and did not bring
about much of a change in either direction or philosophy
beyond dispelling the withering away philosophy.

Steiner

concludes with a sweeping evaluation of this New Frontier
performance:
The dominant philosophy up to 1962 had been a states'
rights philosophy, a policy of providing federal
support for categorical programs drawn by and tailored
to the interests of the individual states with an
absolute minimum of insistence upon uniformity. The
1962 amendments change neither the tendency to provide
generous federal support to state programs nor the
willingness of Congress to let the states write their
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own programs within the limits of the original
Social Security Act. The great thrust on behalf
of prevention and rehabilitation seems more
gimmicky than substantive.14
This is so because, according to Steiner, rehabilitation
remains undefined and the goal of reasonable subsistence to
the people has yet to be a c h i e v e d . i f

this criticism is

valid, then the earlier assertions by the third parties
(closer to the 'left') to the effect that the old parties
are not doing much seems to be sustained.

The roll call

performance that has been considered so far shows consider
able inter-party agreement on social security amending.
Summary
The New Frontier Years were years when

'poverty' was

discovered in the midst of plenty in the United States.

This

discovery or rediscovery by the Kennedy Administration led
to the rethinking of the welfare or assistance aspects of
the Social Security Act of 1935.

Perhaps it must be said

that there was more rethinking than action during this period,
as the New Frontier was cut short by the assassination of the
President.

The Democratic majority in both Houses of the

Congress facilitated the Democratic Administration's social
security accomplishment of two amendments to the original
act.

Their platform promises were not 'grounded' during

this period, however.

Health insurance for old-agers or

others was not enacted— despite the fact that the movement
toward such a measure was afoot.

It was welfare measures

that got the spotlight during the New Frontier in the form
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of an unemployed parent attachment to the Aid to Dependent
Child assistance category in the 1961 Amendments and the
'rehabilitation' thrust of the 1962 Amendments.

The House

Democrats were much more cohesive as a party on social
security matters than their fellow party members in the
Senate and their opponents in both Houses.

If one analyzes

the roll call voting internally however, it is to be noted
that the Democratic Senators were 100 percent cohesive for
the Social Security Amendments of 1961 in contrast to the
unemployment compensation measures put before them.

A.

closer scrutiny of the Welfare Amendments of 1962 reveals
that both parties seem to be in agreement on continuing to
leave the job of public assistance up to the individual
states.

The medical care and health insurance issue was

left up to the Great Society period to which we can now turn.
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FOOTNOTES
CHAPTER VI
The source of
get.
It it said that
Rostow, The St acres of
Manifesto (Cambridge,

political slogans is sometimes hard to
the "New Frontier’1 came from Walt
Economic Growth: A Non-Communist
England: University Press, 1960).

2Wilbur J. Cohen and William L. Mitchell, ’’Social
Security Amendments of 1961: Summary and Legislative His
tory," Social Security Bulletin (September, 1961) Social
Security Administration, pp. 8-9. Also, Wilbur J. Cohen and
Robert M. Ball, "Public Welfare Amendments of 1962,” Social
Security Bulletin (October, 1962), Social Security Adminis
tration, pp. 3-5.
3john F. Kennedy, Presidential inaugural address of
January 20, 1961, as reprinted in The Uneasy World: New
Deal to New Frontier, Paul M. Angle, ed. (Greenwich, Conn.:
Fawcett Publishers, 1964), p. 219.
^Kirk H. Porter and Donald B. Johnson, National Party
Platforms: 1940-1964 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press,
1966), p. 621.
5Ibid., p. 621; see also Appendix G.
6Ibid.. pp. 557-58.
^Ibid.. p. 616.
8Ibid., p. 620.
9Cohen and Ball, op. cit., p . 5.
10Ibid.. p. 10.
^-Gilbert Y. Steiner, Social Insecurity: The Politics
of Welfare (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1966), pp. 18-47.
12ibid., p. 35.
^8Ibid., p. 36.
•^ I b i d ., p . 46.
•^Ibid., p. 260.

CHAPTER VII
THE GREAT SOCIETY YEARS
Introductory
Quite in contrast to the close election of 1960, the
Democratic Party in 1964, led by Lyndon Baines Johnson,
polled over 61 percent of the vote which was the largest
plurality in American history.^

While President Kennedy was

considered to be young and idealistic as far as American
political life is concerned, President Johnson was old and
realistic.

Kennedy's attempt to emulate and even surpass

the twentieth-century standard bearer of the Democratic
Party, Franklin D. Roosevelt, was continued by Johnson.
Johnson's slogan became the Great Society.2
As the Social Security Act of 1935 was the linch-pin
for the New Deal; it might be said that the War on Poverty
was that pin for the Great Society.
for this

The strategy and tactics

'War' were formulated by Kennedy's New Frontiersmen;

but it was Johnson who worked out the logistics and the
O

'delivery system.'

The War on Poverty and the War in

Vietnam seemed to eclipse the several amendments to the
Social Security Act.

Even though social security legislation

may not have been considered a part of the War on Poverty,
it was definitely a part of Johnson's Great Society vision.
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He was able to deliver a limited 'national' medical care
program— thirty years after health insurance was recommended
to the United States Executive branch of the government.
Political Considerations
Even with a majority, President Kennedy did not have
the numbers in the Congress to get his New Frontier going.
The loss in the House of twenty seats in 1960 and two seats
in 1962 is said to have hurt the President's intentions.
President Johnson inherited this liability as he took over
the Office.

Table XXV shows the Democratic and Republican

Party membership as well as the gain/loss increments for the
Democrats.

TABLE XXV
PARTY REPRESENTATION IN THE
GREAT SOCIETY YEARS*
Democrats------- — Increments
House
Senate
Senate
House

Republicans
House
Senate

1962

258

68

- 4

+4

176

32

1964

295

67

+38

+2

140

33

1966

248

64

-47

-3

187

36

1968

243

58

- 4

-5

192

42

*See Appendix B.
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The 1964 election changed things however when Johnson was
given somewhat of a mandate from the people as well as
picking up seats in both the House and the Senate.

The off-

election year of 1966 and the election year of 1968 showed
losses for the Democrats.

From these statistics one would

expect that a major piece of social security legislation
would be put before the Congress.
occurred.

This is exactly what

Before getting into this legislation we can look

at the political party platforms for the period.
Social Security Platform Planks
The Socialist-Labor Party still makes no mention of
the Social Security program in its platform, but reacts to
the anti-poverty 'war.'

To them this war is phony.

They

repudiate the Republican and Democratic parties and the plat
forms which consist of measures to reform and patch-up the
poverty-breeding capitalist system.

The Socialist-Workers

on the other hand continue to call for more adequate social
security:
Provide the millions of aged people with full disa
bility benefits, free medical care and hospitaliza
tion, and adequate pensions. Nationalize the entire
medical system. As an immediate measure, pass the
King-Anderson Medicare Bill now bottled up in
Congress.4
Their platform is directed to the one-fifth of the Nation
now in poverty according to the State of the Union Message
of 1964 by President Johnson.

The Democrats calling them

selves the Party of Jefferson discuss social security within
the framework of their Democracy of Opportunity plank.
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(See Appendix G.)

The platform is of considerable import

because it accounts in a point-by-point manner their per 
formance of the last three and one-half years against their
platform promises of 1960.

For example, they proposed

medical care benefits for the aged in 1960 and claim to have
enacted more health legislation since then than during any
other period in American history (although medical care to
the aged was stalled).

They continue to detail their

accomplishments with the Amendments of 1961 and 1962 to the
Social Security Act as well as the related Temporary Extended
Unemployment Compensation Act of 1961.
The Social Security Act Amendments of 1961 broadened
benefits to 5.3 million people, including minimum
benefits for retired workers from $33 to $40 per
month, permitting men as well as women to begin col
lecting reduced benefits at age 62.
The Social Security program now provides 1.3
billion in benefits each month to 19.5 million
people. One out of every ten Americans receives
a social security check every month.5
The Republican Party calling themselves the Party of Lincoln
build a platform "For the People."

On the attack, they say

the Democrats have failed the poor as the proposed war on
poverty overlaps and contradicts the 42 existing poverty
programs.

Their counter-proposal on social security goes as

follows:
Tax credits and other methods of assistance to help
needy senior citizens meet the costs of medical and
hospital insurance; a strong sound system of Social
Security, with improved benefits to all of our people;
. . . revision of the Social Security laws to allow
higher earnings, without loss of benefits, by our
elderly people; full coverage of all medical and

1964*
Old-Age Insurance
National
Federal-State

(medical)

Unemployment Insurance
State
Federal-State
National
Assistance-Relief
State
Federal-State
National

S-W, , DEM.
REP, , Proh
REP,

DEM,

DEM,

Health Insurance
Private
Private-Public
National

S-W

*See Appendix G.
Key:

S-W
DEM.
REP.
Proh.

=
=
=
=

Socialist Workers
Democrats
Republicans
Prohibition

FIGURE 9
POLITICAL PARTY "SOCIAL SECURITY" PLANKS
OF THE GREAT SOCIETY YEARS
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hospital costs for the needy elderly people, financed
by general revenues through broader implementation of
Federal-State plans, rather than the compulsory Demo
cratic scheme covering only a small percentage of the
costs, for everyone regardless of need.6
This counter-proposal on social security makes clear the
Republican position to keep the idea of 'needy' people
intact.

The Prohibitionists continue with the same social

security rhetoric to the word.

As noted above, Lyndon B.

Johnson won the presidency for the Democrats over Republican
Barry Goldwater who made the mistake of speaking against
social security.^
Social Security Roll Calls
President Johnson's Great Society blends into Kennedy's
New Frontier much like Truman's Fair Deal blended into Roose
velt 's New Deal.

Legislative roll calls in both Houses dealt

with three amendments to the Social Security Act

(1964,

1965, and 1967), and another temporary extension of unemploy
ment compensation benefits in 1966.

As we shall see, the

matter of unemployment compensation and social security goes
through many more
House.

'public' votes in the Senate than in the

There are eight roll calls on these four measures in

the House but fifty-five roll calls in the Senate.

This

difference is a function of the difference in the Rules of
the House and Senate.8
XXVI and XXVII.

These roll calls are listed in Tables

Tables XXVIII and XXIX give party percent

ages for and against the final measure as well as the index
related to these percentages concerning cohesiveness.

TABLE XXVI
HOUSE SOCIAL SECURITY ROLL CALLS OF THE GREAT SOCIETY YEARS

Congress

Roll
Call

Bill

88

32

HR 11865

88

33

HR 11865

7-29-64

Passage:

89

34

HR

6675

4- 8-65

Byrnes Motion:

89

35

HR

6675

4- 8-65

Passage:

89

36

HR

6675

89

37

HR 15119

6-22-66

Passage Extension of Unemployment
Compensation (1966)

90

38

HR 12080

8-17-67

Passage:

90

39

HR 12080

12-13-67

Description

Date

Closed Rule Amendments of 1964
Amendments of 1964
Amendments of 1965

Amendments of 1965

Conference Report:

Amendments of 1965

Amendments of 1967

Conference Report:

Amendments of 1967
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TABLE XXVII
SENATE SOCIAL SECURITY ROLL CALLS OF THE GREAT SOCIETY YEARS

Bill

88

Date

89
89
89
89
89
89
89
89
89
89
89
89
89
89

53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69

HR
HR
HR
HR
HR
HR
HR
HR
HR
HR
HR
HR
HR
HR
HR
HR
HR

11865
11865
11865
6675
6675
6675
6675
6675
6675
6675
6675
6675
6675
6675
6675
6675
15119

9- ,2-64
9- '3-64
9- 3-64
7- 7-65
7- 8-65
7- 8-65
7- 8-65
7- 9-65
7- 9-65
7- 9-65
7- 9-65
7- 9-65
7- 9-65
7- 9-65
7- 9-65
7- 28-65
8- 5-66

89

70

HR 15119

8- 5-66

89

71

HR 15119

8- 5-66

89

72

HR 15119

8- 5-66

89

73

HR 15119

8- 5-66

88

88

Description
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Gore Amendment.
Amendments of 1964
Prouty Amendment.
Amendments of 1964
Passage:
Amendments of 1964
Ribicoff Amendment Amendments of 1965
Miller Amendment.
Amendments of 1965
Prouty Amendment.
Amendments of 1965
Curtis Amendment.
Amendments of 1965
Pastore Motion.
Amendments of 1965
Curtis Amendment.
Amendments of 1965
Morton Amendment.
Amendments of 1965
Smathers Motion.
Amendments of 1965
Hartke Amendment.
Amendments of 1965
Curtis Amendment.
Amendments of 1965
Curtis Motion.
Amendments of 1965
Passage:
Amendments of 1965
Conference Report. Amendments of 1965
Finance Committee Amendment.
'Unemployment Compensation of 1966
Finance Committee Amendment,
iUnemployment Compensation of 1966
Finance Committee Amendment,
iCJnemployment Compensation of 1966
Long Amendment.
Unemployment Compensa
tion of 1966
Long Motion. Unemployment Compensation
1966

TABLE XXVII
Bill

Date

89

74

HR 15119

8- 8-66

89

75

HR 15119

8- 8-66

89

76

HR 15119

8- 8-66

89

77

HR 15119

8- 8-66

89

78

HR 15119

8- 8-66

89

79

HR 15119

8- 8-66

89

80

HR 15119

8- 8-66

89

81

HR 15119

8- 8-66

89

82

HR 15119

8- 8-66

90
90
90

83
84
85

HR 12080
HR 12080
HR 12080

11- 16-67
11- 16-67
11- 17-67

90

86

HR 12080

11-■17-67

90
90
90
90

87
88
89
90

HR
HR
HR
HR

11-■17-67
11-■20-67
11-■20-67
11-■20-67

12080
12080
12080
12080

(CONTINUED)
Description
Curtis Motion.
Unemployment Compensation
1966
Finance Committee Amendment. Unemployment
Compensation of 1966
Finance Committee Amendment. Unemployment
Compensation of 1966
Finance Committee Amendment. Unemployment
Compensation of 1966
Morton Amendment. Unemployment Compen
sation of 1966
Long Amendment. Unemployment Compensation
of 1966
McCarthy Amendment.
Unemployment Com
pensation of 1966
Long Amendment. Unemployment Compensa
tion of 1966
Passage: Unemployment Compensation of
1966
Dirksen Amendment.
Amendments of 1967
Hartke Motion.
Amendments of 1967
Prouty-Cotton Amendment. Amendments of
1967
Prouty-Cotton Amendment. Amendments of
1967
Metcalf Amendment.
Amendments of 1967
Kuchel Amendment.
Amendments of 1967
Javits Amendment.
Amendments of 1967
Williams Amendment.
Amendments of 1967 m
-faj

co

TABLE XXVII

90
90
90

91
92
93

90
90
90
90
90
90
90
90
90
90
90
90
90
90

94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107

Bill

Date

HR 12080
HR 12080
HR 12080

11-20-67
11-21-67
11-21-67

HR
HR
HR
HR
HR
HR
HR
HR
HR
HR
HR
HR
HR
HR

11-21-67
11-21-67
11-21-67
11-21-67
11-21-67
11-21-67
11-21-67
11-21-67
11-21-67
11-21-67
11-21-67
11-21-67
11-22-67
12-15-67

12080
12080
12080
12080
12080
12080
12080
12080
12080
12080
12080
12080
12080
12080

(CONTINUED)
Description
Harris Amendment.
Amendments of 1967
Williams Amendment.
Amendments of 1967
Curtis-Williams Amendment. Amendments
of 1967
Amendments of 1967
Ervin Amendment.
Hartke Motion.
Amendments of 1967
Amendments of 1967
Long Amendment.
Kennedy Amendment.
Amendments of 1967
Hartke-Bayh Amendment.Amendments of 1967
Williams Amendment.
Amendments of 1967
Kennedy Amendment.
Amendments of 1967
Prouty Amendment.
Amendments of 1967
Miller Amendment.
Amendments of 1967
Miller Amendment.
Amendments of 1967
Prouty Amendment.
Amendments of 1967
Bayh Amendment.
Amendments of 1967
Passage:
Amendments of 1967
Conference Report.
Amendments of 1967
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TABLE XXVIII
PARTY VOTING PERCENTAGES AND RICE INDICES IN THE
HOUSE FOR THE GREAT SOCIETY YEARS
Republican

Democrat
Roll
Call

%

%

For

Against

Rice
Index

%

For

%

Against

Rice
Index

32

96.3

3.7

92.7

86.5

13.5

73.0

33

98.7

1.3

97.4

97.0

3.0

94.0

34

20.0

77.0

54.0

92.6

7.4

85.3

35

84.8

15.2

69.6

47.4

52.6

5.2

36

82.2

17.8

64.5

50.7

49.3

1.5

37

97.3

2.7

94.6

97.5

2.5

95.0

38

99.1

0.9

98.3

99.5

0.5

98.9

39

99.1

0.9

98.2

99.4

0.6

98.8

Average

83.7

Average

70.2

Weighted

42.1*

Weighted

51.2

*See Appendix H.

TABLE XXIX
PARTY VOTING PERCENTAGES AND RICE INDICES IN THE
SENATE FOR THE GREAT SOCIETY YEARS
Democrat______
%

53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79

%

For

Against

71.2
0.0
82.8
45.2
9.7
96.8
27.4
12.5
84.1
68.3
26.2
20.6
74.6
13.1
87.7
88.9
77.0
55.0
56.7
69.0
71.7
40.0
61.0
72.4
36.5
30.2
73.0

28.8
100.0
17.2
54.8
90.3
3.2
72.6
87.5
15.9
31.7
73.8
79.4
25.4
86.9
12.3
11.1
23.0
45.0
43.3
31.0
28.3
60.0
39.0
27.6
63.5
69.8
27.0

Republican_____
Rice
Index
42.4
100.0
65.6
9.7
80.6
93.7
45.2
75.0
68.3
36.5
47.5
58.7
49.2
73.8
75.4
77.8
54.1
10.0
13.3
37.9
43.3
20.0
22.0
44.8
27.0
39.7
46.0

%

For
15.2
74.2
38.7
55.2
62.1
64.5
83.9
96.9
40.6
25.0
3.2
3.1
15.6
62.5
45.5
45.5
75.8
69.7
78.8
20.6
18.2
82.4
17.6
12.1
81.3
81.8
21.2

%

Against
84.8
25.8
61.3
44.8
37.9
35.5
16.1
3.1
59.4
75.0
96.8
96.9
84.4
37.5
54.5
54.5
24.2
30.3
21.2
79.4
81.8
17.6
82.4
87.9
18.8
18.2
78.8
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TABLE XXIX (CONTINUED)
Republican

Democrat

Roll
Call

For

80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107

73.0
27.0
73.0
72.0
28.6
16.0
10.4
83.3
64.0
9.8
58.0
62.0
87.5
89.5
94.7
70.9
71.4
66.0
41.8
75.0
54.9
7.8
5.9
90.0
20.0
74.0
96.7
76.7

%

%
Against

Rice
Index

%

For

Against

Rice
Index

78.8
21.2
69.7
85.3
14.7
84.8
75.8
68.8
28.1
84.4
6.2
67.7
81.3
67.6
15.2
81.8
81.8
72.7
81.8
69.7
80.6
68.8
9.4
73.3
40.6
43.8
14.3
8.6

57.6
57.6
39.4
70.6
70.6
69.7
51.5
37.5
43.8
68.8
87.5
35.5
62.5
35.3
69.5
63.6
63.6
45.5
63.6
39.4
61.3
37.5
81.3
46.7
18.8
12.5
71.4
82.9

52.9

Average

53.4

11.4*

Weighted

27.0
73.0
27.0
28.0
71.4
84.0
89.6
16.7
36.0
90.2
42.0
38.0
12.5
10.5
5.3
29.1
28.6
34.0
58.2
25.0
45.1
92.2
94.1
10.0
80.0
26.0
3.3
23.3

46.0
46.0
46.0
44.0
42.9
68.0
79.2
66.7
28.0
80.4
16.0
24.0
75.0
78.9
89.5
41.8
42.9
32.1
16.4
50.0
9.8
84.3
88.2
80.0
60.0
48.0
93.3
53.3

Average
Weighted
*See Appendix H.

%

21.2
78.8
30.3
14.7
85.3
15.2
24.2
31.3
71.9
15.6
93.8
32.3
18.8
32.4
84.8
18.2
18.2
27.3
18.2
30.3
19.4
31.3
90.6
26.7
59.4
56.3
85.7
91.4

- 8.3
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Roll Calls 32 and 33 in the House and 53, 54, and 55
in the Senate are those on the Social Security Amendments of
1964 passed by the eighty-eighth Congress.

Both parties in

the House almost unanimously approve the measure.

The Senate

in the two amendments and passage vote has different party
voting.

On passage, for example, 82.8 percent of the Demo

crats and only 38.7 percent of the Republicans were for the
measure.

These Amendments of 1964 included a medical care

title which died in conference.

The Amendments of 1965 go

through two roll calls in the House and thirteen votes in
the Senate.

These amendments continued the trend of

'liberalizing' benefits and Federal matching ratios to the
States.

They differed from previous amendments in that p r o 

tection against medical costs for those over 65 were finally
provided in part.

On the passage vote

(House roll call

number 35 and Senate number 67), it is seen that Republicans
were badly split in both Chambers on the measure with a Rice
Index of Cohesion in the House at 5.2 and 9.1 in the Senate,
showing that they were not unified as a party on this measure
dealing with medical care
many years).

(something they had b e e n .fighting

The extension of unemployment compensation in

1966 saw no trouble in the House but was a very controversial
measure in the Senate, as there were thirteen votes to amend
the measure.

As the Amendments of 1964, it too died in the

conference committee.
The lowest average cohesion was registered for the
Southern Democrats in the House on social security roll
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calls in the Great Society period.

Senate Democrats from

the West-North-Central part of the country were the least
cohesive.

House Republicans showed the least average cohe

siveness in Alaska and Hawaii

("Other" in Table 30).

House

Republicans being least cohesive in the Mid-Atlantic States
on amendments during these years.

TABLE XXX
HOUSE AND SENATE AVERAGE COHESION BY PARTY AND
REGION FOR THE GREAT SOCIETY YEARS

Region
New England

Democrat
House
Senate

Republican
Senate
House

98.1

83.4

94.1

44.2

100.0

87.9

92.1

39.2

East-North-Central

98.4

62.6

74.5

70.3

West-North-Central

94.2

50.2

85.2

64.2

South

62.7

60.5

74.4

94.5

Border

92.0

70.8

84.4

75.8

Mountain

90.9

72.3

95.8

71.6

Pacific

99.2

94.8

74.5

72.7

100.0

85.5

25.0

65.5

83.7

52.9

70.2

53.4

Mid-Atlantic

Other
The Nation
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Social Security Performance
Inheriting a style and a tempo from the New Frontier
period, the Great Society continued to attempt to legislate
on behalf of certain ideals.

These ideals included civil

rights and opportunity for all.

The politics of the cold war

was replaced in part by the politics of a poverty war.

As

Herbert Hoover had invoked the war metaphor vowing that
poverty would be wiped from the land, Lyndon B. Johnson once
again used war as part of his program slogan.

But the con

ditions were different in that Hoover was in the midst of
depression and Johnson was in the midst of 'prosperity.'
The statistics and action that led to the Economic Oppor
tunity Act of 1964 convinced the nation that it had not yet
achieved affluence— for some maybe, but not for all.9
The Socialist Laborites in their platform attacked
the War on Poverty as announced in Johnson's State of the
Union message in early 1964.
less

The Socialist-Workers in a

'radical' platform sound much like the Socialist Party

of previous y e a r s .

Democrats said little about future plans

in 1964 so there is little to compare.

One could imagine that

they would continue with the program begun with the Kennedy
New Frontier in style.

The three legislative roll calls

considered above show this to be the case.

Republicans

resort to part-techniques in their platform such as taxincentives to help needy old-agers to meet the costs of
medical care.

Seemingly there is a contradiction because

they also call for full coverage of all medical and hospital
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costs for needy elderly people in addition to tax incentives.
Tax incentives versus full coverage for the needy and their
medical coverage puts a burden on the definition of 'needy'
and results in a needs test— something which the Democrats
would like to do away with, at least in the old-age category
of social security.
The discovery or rediscovery of poverty by intellec
tuals, politicians and scholars in the New Frontier-Great
Society Period might be considered to be a concrete criticism
of the nation's social security program.

Even though it is

a different approach it is the same problem:

individuals,

aggregates, or groups of people unable to get enough income
or public services

(education included) to keep up with the

ever-rising American standard of living.

For example, in

the area of old-age and survivor's insurance and old-age
assistance one would find that the income received under
these programs puts these pensioners and recipients under
the

'poverty-line.

'

Whereas, in the New Deal one-third of

the nation was ill-fed, ill-clothed, and ill-housed— in
poverty— in the New Deal-Great Society one-fifth of the
nation was said to be in the same state of affairs.

It is a

moot point whether or not the Social Security Act has been
able to keep up with providing security and reducing poverty
in its thirty-three year history.
In any case, approximately one year after the Office
of Economic Opportunity was created by law, the Social
Security Administration was called upon to administer the
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Social Security Amendments of 1965.

These amendments had,

at last, a medical care program— something the liberal wing
of the Democratic Party had been advocating vociferously
since the end of World War II.

This is not to say that it

was an omnibus package of medical care for all the American
people; rather it was limited to those covered under the
Social Security Act provisions and over 65 and it entailed
complex provisos and requirements for the aged.

This first

national health insurance program for the American had two
basic components:

(1) a basic plan affording protection

against the costs of hospital and related care, and

(2) a

voluntary supplementary plan covering payments for physician's
services and other medical and health services.

In addition

to these health provisions these Amendments liberalized
benefits in many of the Social Security Act titles and at
the same time increasing the contribution rate s c h e dule. ^
The issue of unemployment compensation in 1966

(HR

15119) considered in roll calls 37 in the House and roll
calls 69 to 82 was to be one of the most heavily lobbied in
1966.

It died in the conference committee after both Houses

passed the measure.-*-^

The issue was over Federal-State

relationship— Federal standards for State uneirployment bene
fits.

The next and last important performance on the issue

of social security by the government during the Great Society
Period was the Amendments of 1967.
The passage of the Amendments of 1967 by over ninetynine percent of each party in the House and some ninety-six
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percent of the Senate Democrats and some eighty-five percent
of the Senate Republicans is an indication of the inter
party agreement on the provisions of these Amendments.

When

President Johnson signed this bill into law on January 2,
1968, he said that the bill brought more dollars of insurance
benefits to Americans than all previous bills since social
security was launched in 1935.-^
amended in a more

Most of the titles were

'liberal' direction with increased benefits

and new eligibility standards; but, at the same time there
was an increase in the contribution and benefit base for
financing these provisions.

Changes in the welfare and child

health provisions were varied in that some are 'forward' but
others are restrictive and controversial.^
Johnson1s Administrative proposals were

President

'trimmed' by the

House Ways and Means Committee and he was not altogether
pleased with the bill as it stood.
of a quid pro quo in the bill:

One almost sees evidence

on the one hand benefits

under the old-age insurance title are the greatest in thirtythree years; but on the other hand, the child welfare pro
visions were restrictive.

When signing the bill he stated:

The welfare system today pleases no one.
It is
criticized by liberals and conservatives, by the
poor and the wealthy, by social workers and poli
ticians, by whites and by Negroes in every area of
the nation. My recommendations to the Congress
this year sought to make basic changes in the system.
Some of these recommendations were not adopted by
the Congress.
In their place, the Congress substi
tuted severe restrictions.15
He concludes this statement with what were his last
on any Social Security Law amendment:
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Over the last third of a century in America we
have proved that people who earn their living can
make their lives better and more secure if they
divert part of their incomes to protect them
selves from the twists of fortune that face all
men. Our challenge for the coming years is to
see if we can extend that same human insurance
and human dignity to persons who are not able to
buy their own protection.
Our challenge is to
save children. ^-6
So we come back to the remarks made by President
Roosevelt's Committee on Economic Security in 1934 which
stated that the core of any social plan must be for the
child

(pages 45-46 above).

These Amendments of 1967 which

expand social insurance for the aging and restrict welfare
provisions for the young, do so with near to unanimous
voting in both Houses by both parties.

We will address our

selves to this observation in the last chapter.
Summary
Part of President Johnson's program for the Great
Society was the War on Poverty and the Social Security Amend
ments during his tenure.

In a concrete sense they were a

continuation of John F . Kennedy's intentions according to
the Democratic Party tradition as set forth by President
Roosevelt's New Deal back in 1933.

These aspects of

Johnson's Great Society were the result of long debate over
many years.

The Social Security Act underwent continuous

modification with amendments in 1964, 1965, and 1967.

The

omnibus Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 was Johnson's
counter-part to Roosevelt's Social Security Act.

Just as

the Social Security Act of 1935 was in danger of surviving
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before the Second World War, Johnson's Economic Opportunity
Act of 1964 is in danger of being dismantled.

We may con

sider the Economic Opportunity Act to be a criticism of the
social security provisions of this nation.
Census of 1960 showed two things:

(The Federal

the first was that many

people still do not have the jobs, income, and standard,

of

living ingredient in an affluent society; and second that
many of these people are not covered by the provisions of
the Social Security Act; furthermore, those that are covered
17

are still in poverty.)x/

Even though this Act focused

explicitly and specifically on the lack of opportunity among
those in 'poverty,' the reasoning behind the provisions were
explicitly grounded on the lack of income by these people.
The Social Security Act is primarily concerned with pro
viding income to the people.

The political party platforms

recognized this poverty in the midst of plenty and the roll
calls and performance show the party accomplishments on the
ma t t e r.
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FOOTNOTES
CHAPTER VII
^Kirk H. Porter and Donald B. Johnson, National Party
Platforms: 1840-1964 (Urbana:
University of Illinois Press,
1966), p. 641.
A Presidential speech at the University of Michigan
in Ann Arbor on May 22, 1964.
■^This war was formally declared in President Johnson's
first State of the Union message.
The issue of whether
Preside*n±—Johnson or President Kennedy started the war is
discussed in John C. Donovan, The Politics of Poverty (New
York: Pegasus, 1967), pp. 17-26.
^Porter and Johnson, op,, c i t ., p. 698.
^Ibid., p. 662.
^Ibid.. p. 683.
^The Republican candidate in 1964, Barry Goldwater,
crusaded for an end to compulsory social security as an
invasion of personal freedom. The reaction to his remarks
revealed once and for all that it is a mistake for a politican to talk against a program which has become a part of the
American way of life.
^We have not commented on the so-called "closed” rule
of the House of Representatives which does not allow amend
ments by Congressmen from the floor on bills coming under
this rule.
This gives tremendous power to the Committee on
Ways and Means which controls social security legislation.
With this particular rule the Committee can act as a 'gate
keeper ' on the hundreds of bills it takes into consideration
each year on social security.
It becomes the sole judge of
what it calls a 'clean' bill. According to Charles Hawkins
in the Office of Legislative Affairs for the newly-created
Social and Rehabilitation Service of the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare:
"The Committee will not bring a bill
out t h a t 's going to leave footprints on the walls of Con
gress. . . . Committee prestige is at stake."
(In a private
interview with the writer.)
^The documentation— both expository and critical— on
the War on Poverty and the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964
is extensive.
One account is in Robert M. Kloss, "The War
on Poverty in the United States:
The War to End All Wars,"
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The Concept of 'Poverty' in Sociology: A Profile of Poverty
in East Baton Rouge Parish, Louisiana (unpublished Master's
thesis, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, 1967),
pp. 34-57.
•^The writer has never been able to find statistics
which show the number of people considered to be in a state
of 'poverty' and receive benefits under the Social Security
Act.
-^Wilbur J. Cohen and Robert M. Ball, "Social Security
Amendments of 1965:
Summary and Legislative History,” Social
Security Bulletin (September, 1965), pp. 3-21.
12Concrressional Quarterly Almanac, Vol. XXII (1966),
published by the Congressional Quarterly Service, Inc.,
Washington, D. C., pp. 831, 966-68, 1294.
13Wilbur J. Cohen and Robert M. Ball, "Social Security
Amendments of 1967:
Summary and Legislative History,"
Social Security Bulletin (February, 1968), pp. 3-19.
^ C h a r l e s e . Hawkins, "The Social Security Amendments
of 1967: Legislative History and Summary of Welfare and
Child Health Provisions," Welfare in Review (May-June, 1968),
p. 1.
l^Ibid., p. 20.
l^Ibid., p. 21.
1 ^Poverty was hidden to the extent to which the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare and the Social
Security Administration had no contact or statistics on many
people with low incomes.

CHAPTER VIII
SUMMARY
Considerations
We have considered five periods in the history of the
Social Security Act of 1935 according to party platforms,
proposals and roll call performance.

These five periods,

conforming to the tenure of five Presidents and seventeen
Congressional sessions cover over thirty-three years of
legislative history on one Act.

It is difficult or even

impossible to detail all the aspects— philosophical,
theoretical,

and humanitarian; financial, administrative,

social, economic, and political; statistical, actuarial,
medical, and legal— because it is a controversial and dynamic
issue with frequent changes at both Federal and State legis
lative levels.
The role of political parties in the framing and
amending of this Act has been the general indicator of polit
ical tendencies.

The platform planks and legislative roll

calls were considered as the more specific indicators of
party behavior.

A longitudinal analysis of their promises

and performance was attempted.

All the platform planks on

the issue of social security and all the roll calls on the
Social Security Act constitute the sample.
153

Planks were
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subjected to a content analysis and roll calls were indi
vidually analyzed according to the number of legislators for
and against social security.

To see the degree to which the

parties were unified on these votes, the Rice Index of
Cohesion was computed on each roll call and on the total
number of roll calls for each period.

In addition a regional

breakdown of cohesiveness was attempted.
Conclusions
Assuming that political parties are the more organized
component of the less-organized social movement, it was found
upon the analysis of political party planks in the United
States that this issue constituted a major party concern
over the whole thirty-three-year time period of the study.
Whereas, all parties accept the idea of social security,
when they get down to specific proposals upon which to get
votes they differentiate themselves.

True to the American

two-party tradition, Democrats and Republicans competed for
power while the several

'third' parties stood in the wings,

as it were, out of the competition except for a small brief
success in the thirties.
The Democratic Party, at a height of power in terms
of numbers in Congress, instrumentalized or effectuated an
omnibus social security law which purportedly brought a
comprehensive social security program to the United States.
Down through the thirty-three-year history, they have claimed
the program as their own party accomplishment.

Republicans
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and in some ,}cases Southern Democrats reluctantly accepted
L

the idea of social security for the parliamentary right to
structure and limit that idea according to the institutional
history of the United States.
Figure 10, dealing with party percentages for passage
on social security in the House for the period of our study,
reveals that over eighty percent of both Democrats and
Republicans are for the social security bill in question from
the 1935 Act to the 1961 Amendments.

The Democrats continue

with over eighty percent of their party supporting these
bills all the way through the Great Society; but, House
Republicans drop to less than sixty percent support on
the 1962 Amendments
ments .

forty-seven percent for the 1965 Amend

Figure 11 shows party percentages for the Senate.

The Democratic

'line of support' is consistent throughout

the thirty-three years with the Republicans diverging in
1935, 1939, 1964, and 1965.

The lowest degree of support

registered in the Amendments of 1964 and 1965 must be related
to the medical care components of these bills— an issue
which seems to divide the parties more than any other.

The

high degree of Senators and Congressmen of both parties for
these social security measures can be accounted for by the
nature of the bills presented to the two Chambers for final
voting.

Said another way, the content is set up for passage

without problems.

The consequence of such high agreement is

a Social Security Act that started out narrow in scope and
that has only been expanded incrementally— in some measure,

FIGURE 10
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even tokenly— over the last thirty-three years.
Figures 12 and 13 summarize the average party cohe
sion.

Figures 14 and 15 summarize the party cohesion by

weighting the differing number of legislators present in each
of the roll calls of each period.

These figures reveal a

different profile than that of the percentages for social
security considered in Figures 10 and 11.
Average Index of Cohesion,

Focusing on the

it is observed that the average

Democratic Party cohesion is higher in the House than in the
Senate for the roll call votes considered

(with the excep

tion of the Fair Deal where there is a difference of onetenth of a point).

The highest degree of party cohesiveness

on social security for the House Democrats was during the
New Frontier years

(97.1) with a somewhat lower degree for

the New Deal and Great Society

(86.6 and 83.7, respectively).

The Republicans of the House exhibited their highest degree
of cohesiveness during the Cold War period as might be
expected, but showed almost as much party solidarity, as
measured by the Index, in the New Deal.

Lower cohesiveness

is seen for the Fair Deal, New Frontier, and Great Society
periods for the House Republicans.

In the Senate there is

some reversal of average cohesiveness.

The lowest degree of

average cohesiveness is registered for the New Deal and
Great Society periods for the Republicans, whereas higher
cohesiveness prevails in the Fair Deal and New Frontier
years for this party.

The Democratic Senators show a rela

tively stable average cohesiveness through all the periods
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with the exception of the Great Society where they go down
to 52.9.
Focusing on the Weighted Index of Cohesiveness for
each period, different results appear in Figures 14 and 15
(see Appendix H ) .

In the House, Figure 14, Democrats regis

ter the highest weighted cohesiveness in the New Deal and
New Frontier periods with a low in the Great Society years.
House Republicans are considerably lower on weighted cohe
siveness in the New Deal, Fair Deal, and New Frontier, even
registering a negative weighting in the Fair Deal, meaning
that they were more against than for the measures during
this period.

The greatest differences in party cohesiveness

between the parties is seen to be in the New Deal and New
Frontier periods.

In the Senate, Figure 15, Democrats show

much less weighted cohesiveness than they did as a party in
the House.

Party cohesiveness is highest in the New Deal

and Cold War and lowest in the Fair Deal and Great Society.
Republican Senators show a dramatic shift in their weighted
cohesiveness on these social security measures between the
New Deal and Fair Deal periods.

These Senators go from a

weighted cohesiveness of 58.5 for social security to 57.0
against social security.

Then they are almost split in half

in the three following periods on the social security roll
calls considered.

Said another way, weighted Republican

party cohesion is relatively high in the first two periods
and almost non-existent in the three latter periods.
A comparison of the Average Rice Index with the
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Weighted Rice index shows the results to be different under
each manipulation; i.e., they reveal differences in party
tendencies.

Roughly the same profile is evident for both

Democrats and Republicans in the House for the five periods
except that Republicans show somewhat less cohesiveness on
the Weighted index than on the Average index.

For example,

New Deal Democrats and Republicans have about the same party
cohesiveness according to the Average index but are widely
apart according to the Weighted index.

The difference may

be accounted by the fact that the Weighted Index accounts
for both the differences in the numbers of Congressmen voting
and the direction of the vote; whereas, the Average index
does not.

The Weighted index brings out the negative

reaction of House Republicans of the Fair Deal to the social
security measures of the New Deal and Democratic Party
negative weighted average shown in Figure 14).

(the

It also yields

a lower degree of cohesiveness in general when compared to
the Average Index.

In the Senate, the comparison of these

two ways of averaging roll calls for the five periods of the
study results in a wider difference than in the House.

On

the whole the Weighted index registers lower party cohesion
in the Senate for both parties.

The two profiles in Figures

13 and 15 are at considerable variance, however.

Weighted

cohesiveness against social security by the Republicans is
revealed by the negative numbers for the Fair Deal, Cold War
and Great Society years.

Democratic Senators according to

the Average Party Cohesion profile show stable cohesiveness

164
as a party; but, according to the Weighted Index Fair Deal
Democratic Senators are split.

This result more closely

approximates the split of the Democrats and Dixiecrats
during the Fair Deal.

Finally, Cold War weighted cohesive

ness on social security legislation in the Senate returns to
the New Deal level and then begins a tendency downward.
One observation is necessary before listing the polit
ical tendencies observed in this limited study.
varies somewhat with administrations

Cohesiveness

(and major social issues

in historical setting) in both parties and in both chambers.
What this cohesiveness, variance, and difference means then
is subject to a proviso in making inferences from 'party
cohesiveness1 on any legislation.

This proviso is the

acceptance of a legislator's party as a significant categori
cal determinant of his voting behavior.

This study has

accepted the idea that party is an important indicator of
legislative behavior, albeit, not the only indicator.

This

acceptance permitted the use of legislative roll calls and
party platforms as indicators of political tendencies in the
general social movement framework suggested in Chapter I.
The following political tendencies have been observed
in this study:
1.

Ideas on social security begin in the more

'radi

cal ' party platform planks; then appear in the Democratic
platform; then are partially integrated into the Republican
platform.
2.

Both major parties accept the narrow scope of the
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original Social Security Act and both seek to widen this
scope incrementally through a process of 'liberalization.'
3.

There is agreement between what the major parties

promise in their planks and what they deliver, although they
do not promise much.
4.

Both major parties give more than majority support

for the final 'clean' bills put before them by Congressional
Committees.
5.

Average party cohesion by presidential periods is

higher for House Democrats than for Senate Democrats; Repub
lican average cohesiveness varies inversely— when high in
the House is low in the Senate.
6.

Weighted party cohesion by presidential periods

reveals House Democrats to be more cohesive than Senate
Democrats.
7.

Weighted Republican cohesiveness is generally

lower than for the Democrats on social security legislation.
8.

Weighted Republican cohesiveness against social

security is registered in the Fair Deal years for both
chambers and in the Cold War and Great Society years for the
Senate chamber.
9.

Regional analysis of cohesiveness revealed no

observable tendencies.
After all the rhetorical sound and parliamentary fury,
it must be concluded that the Social Security Act contains a
minimum amount of 'reform.'

The two major parties accepted

the international idea of social security in turn for the
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parliamentary right to structure and limit that idea accord
ing to their perception of the institutional history of the
United States.

The resulting program has been a bi-partisan

coalition for the least common denominator of change.
nificant social security proposals of the

Sig

'third' parties

are an important source of both ideas and criticism but have
been restructured in a 'conservative' way resulting in com
plex tokenism and postponement of needed social security
legislation.
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FOOTNOTES
CHAPTER VIII
^William Haber and Wilbur J. Cohen, Social Security:
Programs, Problems. and Policies (Homewood, Illinois:
Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1960), p. v.
- 2In terms of Rudolf Heberle's tripartite division
between social movement, political party, and social class,
we have limited the discussion to party and its relationship
to movement.
See Rudolf Heberle, Social Movements: An
Introduction to Political Sociology (New York: AppletonCentury-Crofts, Inc., 1951), pp. 143-91.
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APPENDIX A
SUMMARY OF SHIFTS IN SOCIAL THOUGHT CONCERNING THE
"POOR" IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY*

Social
Relations

Prevailing
Attitudes

The Past:
PreFrench and
Industrial
Revolutions
Status
Gemeinschaft
Particularistic

The Present:
Post French and
Industrial
Revolutions
Contract
Gessellschaft
Universalistic

Subjective
Non-problematic
Legitimate
Sacred
Unrecognized
"Paupers"
Inegalitarian
Order

Objective (subj.)
Problematic
Illegitimate
Secular
Recognized
"Poverty"
Egalitarian
Tendencies

Individual

Individual and
Social
Society (group)
Functional

Causes
Fate
Natural
Responsibility

Local
Community

State

Cures

Partial
Private
Charity
Doles
Institutional
—

Total
Public (priv.)
Relief
Assistance
Noninstitutional
Compensation,
Pension, In
surance
Services
Guaranteed income

“ “ *■"

—
—

*It should be noted that this table is designed simply
to indicate which concepts function descriptively in these
periods of time; i.e., meanings are not precise.
Source: Robert Marsh Kloss, "The Concept of 'Poverty'
in Sociology: A Profile of Poverty in East Baton Rouge
Parish, Louisiana." Unpublished Master's Thesis, Louisiana
State University, January, 1967, p. 20.

APPENDIX B
CONGRESS AND PARTY:

Election
Year
1928
1930

Congress
Elected
71st
72nd

House
Members Elected
Rep.
Misc.
Dem.
1
163
267
218
1
216

1928 TO 1968a

Gains/Losses
Rep.
Dem.
-32
+30
+53
-49

Senate
Members Elected
Rep.
Dem.
Misc.
39
1
56
47
48
1

Gains/Losses
Rep.
Dem.
- 8
+ 8
+ 8
- 8

1932
1934

73rd
74th

313
322

117
103

5
10

+97
+ 9

-101
-14

59
69

36
25

1
2

+12
+10

-12
-11

1936
1938

75 th
76 th

333
262

89
169

13
4

+11
-71

-14
+80

75
69

17
23

4
4

+ 6
- 6

- 8
+ 6

1940
1942

77 th
78 th

267
222

162
209

6
4

+ 5
-45

- 7
+47

66
57

28
38

2
1

- 3
- 9

+ 5
+10

1944
1946

79th
80th

243
188

190
246

2
1

+21
-55

-19
+56

57
45

38
51

1

0
-12

0
+13

1948
1950

81st
82nd

263
234

171
199

1
2

+75
-29

-75
+28

54
48

42
47

1

+ 9
- 6

- 9
+ 5

1952
1954

83rd
84th

213
232

221
203

1

-21
+19

+22
-18

47
48

48
47

1
1

- 1
+ 1

+ 1
- 1

1956
1958

85 th
86th

234
283

201
154

+ 2
+49

- 2
-47

49
66

47
34

+ 1
+17

0
-13

1960
1962

87th
88th

263
258

174
176

-20
- 4

+20
+ 2

64
68

36
32

- 2
+ 4

+ 2
- 4

1964
1966

89 th
90th

295
248

140
187

+38
-47

-38
+47

67
64

33
36

+ 2
- 3

- 2
+ 3

1968

91st

243

192

- 4

+ 4

58

42

- 5

+ 5

^Vacancy.

Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, No. 30, Part I, July 26, 1968,
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aSource:
p. 1856.
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APPENDIX C
SELECTED PROVISIONS OF OTHER LAWS RELATING TO
THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACTa
Date and Description
Act of April 9, 1912
Trading With the Enemy
Act of 1917
Wagner-Peyser Act of
June 6, 1933
Railroad Retirement Act
of 1935
Railroad Retirement Act
of 1937
Railroad Unemployment
Insurance Act of June 25,
1938
Act of August 11, 1939
Act of August 13, 1940
Act of March 24, 1943
Reorganization Plan #2
1946
Act of May 26, 1948
Reorganization Plan #2
1949
Internal Securities Act
1950
Act of April 19, 1950
Reorganization Plan #19
1950
Act of October 30, 1951
Reorganization Plan #1
1953
Act of September 1, 1954
Vocational Rehabilitation
Amendments of 1954
Compensation Act of 1958
Peace Corps Act, September
22, 1961
Manpower Development and
Training Act of 1962
Trade Expansion Act of
1962

Content
Established Children's Bureau
Amended, relating to business
employment status
Established u. S. Employment
service

Relating to hurricane work
Relating to coal mining
Relating to employment for War
shipping Administration
Amended, Civil Air Patrol
employment
Selected provisions
State plans for public assis
tance to Indians
Relating to railroad retirement
As amended, to prohibit pay
ments to convicted persons
Amendments, selected provisions
Selected provisions

Selected provisions

aSource: Compilation of the Social Security Laws,
House of Representatives, Document No. 266, Government
Printing Office, 1968, Vol. II, pp. 705-971.
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Date and Description______
Farm Labor Contract Registra
tion Act of 1963
Civil Rights Act of 1964
Economic Opportunity Act
of 1964
Act of October 3, 1965
Automotive Products Trade
Act of 1965
Public Works and Economic
Development Act of 1965
Title 5: U. S. Code, 1966
Title 18:

U. S. Code

Title 38: U. S. Code
Immigration and Nation
ality Act
International Organizations
Immunities Act

(CONTINUED)
Content

Title V I , nondiscrimination
in Federally assisted
programs

Retirement and unemployment
compensation in the
government
Crime and criminal pro
cedure
Veteran 1s benefits
As amended, selected pro
visions
Selected provisions
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PUBLIC LAWS AMENDING THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACTa
Public
Law
Number

Congress

722

75th

6-25-38

36
141
379
17
235
285
410
458

76th
76th
76th
78th
78th
78 th
78th
78 th

4-19-39
6-20-39
8-10-39
3-24-43
2-25-43
4- 4-44
7- 1-44
10- 3-44

201
291

79 th
79 th

10-23-45
12-29-45

719
239
379
492
642
174
734
814
78
420
590
269
279
567

79th
80th
80th
80th
80th
81st
81st
81st
82nd
82nd
82nd
83rd
83rd
83rd

8-10-46
7-25-47
8- 6-47
4-20-48
6-14-48
7-16-49
8-28-50
9-23-50
7-12-51
6-28-52
7-18-52
8-14-53
8-15-53
8- 5-54

761
767
325
880
881

83rd
83rd
84th
84th
84th

99888-

26
109
110

85th
85th
85th

4-25-57
7-15-57
7-15-57

Date
Approved

1-54
1-54
9-55
1-56
1-56

Short Title
Railroad Unemployment Insurance
Act
Soc. Sec. Act Am. of 1939
Passed over veto
Public Health Service Act
War Mobilization & Reconversion
Act
International Organizations
Immunities Act
Soc. Sec. Act Am. of 1946
Soc. Sec. Act Am. of 1947
Passed over veto
Passed over veto
Soc. Sec. Act Am. of 1950
Revenue Act of 1950
Soc. Sec. Act Am. of 1952
Employment Security Administra
tive Financing Act of 1954
Soc. Sec. Act Am. of 1954
Soc. Sec. Act Am. of 1956
Servicemen1s & Veterans' Survivers Benefits Act

aSource: Compilation of the Social Security Laws ,
House of Representatives, Document No. 266, Government Print
ing Office, 1968, Vol. I, pp. 479-80.
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Congress
226
227
229
238
239
441

85th
85 th
85th
85th
85th
85th

Date
Approved
8-30-57
8-30-57
8-30-57
8-30-57
8-30-57
6- 4-58

785
786
787
798
840
848

85th
85th
85th
85th
85th
85th

8-27-58
8-27-58
8-27-58
8-28-58
8-28-58
8-28-58

857
927
7
70
168
284
346
415

85th
85th
86th
86th
86th
86th
86th
86th

9- 2-58
9- 6-58
3-31-59
6-25-59
8-18-59
9-16-59
9-22-59
4- 8-60

442
507
624
778

6

86th
86 th
86th
86th
87th

4-22-60
6-11-60
7-12-60
9-13-60
3-24-61

31
64
256

87th
87th
87th

5- 8-61
6-30-61
9-21-61

262
293
543
878
31
48
156

87th
87th
87th
87th
88 th
88th
88 th

9-21-61
9-22-61
7-25-62
10-24-62
5-29-63
6-49-63
10-24-63

272
345
347
350
382

88th
88th
88th
88th
88th

2-26-64
6-30-64
6-30-64
7- 2-64
7-23-64

(CONTINUED)

Short Title

Temporary Unemployment Compensa
tion Act of 1958

Soc. Sec. Act Am. of 1958
Ex-Servicemen's Unemployment
Compensation Act of 1958

Alaska Omnibus Act
Farm Credit Act of 1959
Public Health Service Commission
Corps Personnel Act of 1960
Hawaii Omnibus Act
Soc. Sec. Act Am. of 1960
Temporary Extended Unemployment
Compensation Act of 1961
Soc. Sec. Act Am. of 1961
Mutual Educational & Cultural
Exchange Act of 1961
Peace Corps Act
Public Welfare Am. of 1962

Maternal & Child Health & Mental
Retardation Planning Am. of 1963
Revenue Act of 1964
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452
641
650
97
236
253
368
384
713
36
97
248

(CONTINUED)

Congress
Date
Short Title
_________Approved__________
8-20-64 Economic Opportunity Act of
88th
1964
88th
10-13-64
88th
10-13-64
7-30-65
Soc. Sec. Act Am. of 1965
89 th
10- 3-65
89 th
10- 9-65 Economic Opportunity Am. of
89th
1965
89 th
3-15-66 Tax Adjustment Act of 1966
89 th
4- 8-66
89 th
11- 2-66
90th
6-29-67
9-30-67
90th
1- 2-68 Soc. Sec. Act Am. of 1967
90th

APPENDIX E
SOCIAL SECURITY ROLL CALLS IN THE HOUSE:

1

Yeas
Against
X

2
3
4

X

5

X

Bill
Number
HR7260
HR7260
HR6635
HJ 296

Vote
Date
4-19-35
4-19-35
6-10-39
2-27-48
6-14-48
10- .4-49
10- 4-49
10- 5-49
10- 5-49
8-16-50
8-16-50
10- 4-51

11
12

HJ 296
HRes372
HRes372
HR6000
HR6000
HR6000
HR6000
HR5118

13

HR7800

5-19-52

14
15
16
17
18
19
20

HR7800
HRes568
HR9366
HR9709
HR9709
HR7225
HR12065

6-17-52
6- 1-54
6- 1-54
7- 8-54
7- 8-54
7-18-55
6- 1-58

6
7

8

X

9
10

X

X
X

1935-1968

Description
Treadway Motion Social Security Act of 1935
Passage
Passage. Amendments of 1939
Passage of Status Quo posture on Social
Security
Passage over Veto for Status Quo
Resolution on HR6000: Amendments of 1950
Resolution Agreement: Amendments of 1950
Mason Motion. Amendments of 1950
Passage. Amendments of 1950
Byrnes Recommital. Amendments of 1950
Conference Report. Amendments of 1950
Unemployment Compensation Amendments to
Social Security
Title II Amendment Motion Amendments to
Social Security
Passage of Title II Amendments
Resolution for Social Security Amendments
Passage Social Security Amendments
Forand Motion.
Unemployment Compensation
Passage Unemployment Compensation
Passage Amendments of 1956
Herlong Amendment.
Unemployment Compensation
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21
22
23
24
25

Bill
Number
HR12065
HR13549
HR12580
HR12580
HR 4806

Vote
Date
6- 1-58
7-31-58
6-23-60
6-23-60
3- 1-61

26

HR 4806

3-22-61

HR 6027
HR10606
HR10606
HR10606
HR 8821
HR11865
HR11865
HR 6675
HR 6675
HR 6675
HR15119
HR12080
HR12080

4-20-61
3-15-62
3-15-62
7-19-62
10-22-63
7-29-64
7-29-64
4- 8-65
4- 8-65
7-26-65
6-22-66
8-17-67
12-13-67

Yeas
Against

27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39

X

X

(CONTINUED)
Description

Passage Unemployment Compensation
Passage Amendments of 1958
Passage Amendments of 1960
Conference Report Amendments of 1960
Passage Temporary Unemployment Compensation:
1961
Conference Report Unemployment Compensation:
1961
Passage Amendments of 1961
Byrnes Motion. Welfare Amendments of 1962
Passage Welfare Amendments of 1962
Conference Report Welfare Amendments of 1962
Title XII Temporary Unemployment Compensation
Closed Rule Amendments of 1964
Passage Amendments of 1964
Byrnes Motion. Amendments of 1965
Passage Amendments of 1965
Conference Report Amendments of 1965
Passage Extension of Unemployment Compensation
Passage Amendments of 1967
Conference Report Amendments of 1967
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SOCIAL SECURITY ROLL CALLS IN THE SENATE:
Roll
Call

1
2
3
4
5

Yeas
Against
X
X
X

6
7
8
9
10
11

12
13

X

14
15
16
17
18
19
20

X
X

21

Bill
Vote
Number______Date____________________ Description
HR7260
Clark Amendment Social Security Act of 1935
6-19-35
HR7260
Borah Amendment Social Security Act of 1935
6-19-35
HR7260
Hastings Amendment Social Security Act of 1935
6-19-35
Passage
Social Security Act of 1935
HR7260
6-19-35
7-11-39
Civil Service Amendment :
HR6635
Amendments of 1939
7-11-39
Appropriations
HR6635
Amendments of 1939
7-11-39
Appropriations
Amendments of 1939
HR6635
Connelly Amendment
HR6635
7-12-39
Amendments of 1939
Lee Amendment
HR6635
7-12-39
Amendments of 1939
Downey Motion
HR6635
7-13-39
Amendments of 1939
HR6635
7-13-39
Johnson (Colo.) Amendment Amendments of 1939
Passage
HR6635
7-13-39
Amendments of 1939
McFarland Amendment Status Quo on Social
HJ 296
6- 4-48
Security
Passage
6- 4-48
HJ 296
Passage over Veto
HJ 296
6-14-48
HR6000
6-20-50
Meyers Amendment
Amendments of 1950
Knowland Amendment
HR6000
6-20-50
Amendments of 1950
HR6000
Long Amendment
Amendments of 1950
6-20-50
Passage
HR6000
6-20-50
Amendments of 1950
Long Amendment
HR7225
Amendments of 1956
7-16-56
HR7225
George Amendment
Amendments of 1956
7-17-56
Pastore Amendment
HR7225
7-17-56
Amendments of 1956
HR7225
Kerr
Amendment
Amendments of 1956
7-17-56
HR7225
Douglas Amendment
7-17-56
Amendments of 1956
Passage
HR7225
7-17-56
Amendments of 1956
HR12065
Kennedy Amendment Temp . Unemp. Conpensation
5-27-58
HR12065
5-28-58
Kennedy Amendment Temp . Unemp. Compensation
HR12065
Kennedy Amendment Temp . Unemp. Compensation
5-28-58
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22
23
24
25
26
27
28

X

1935-1968

APPENDIX F
Roll
Call
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42

Yeas
Against
X

Bill
Number
HR12065
HR12065
HR12065
HR12065
HR13549
HR13549
HR 5640
HR 5640
HR12580
HR12580
HR12580
HR12580
HR12580
HR 4806

Vote
Date
5-28-58
5-28-58
6-28-58
6-28-58
8-16-58
8-16-58
3-25-59
3-25-59

8-23-60
3-16-61

43

X

HR 4806

3-16-61

44
45
46
47
48
49

X

HR 4806
HR 4806
HR 6027
HR 6027
HR 6027
HR10606

3-16-61
3-16-61
6-26-61
6-26-61
6-26-61
7-12-62

HR10606

7-13-62

HR10606
HR10117

7-17-62
10- 5-62

50
51
52

X

(CONTINUED)
Description

Long Amendment
Temp. Unemp. Compensation
Knowland Amendment Temp. Unemp. Compensation
Cooper Amendment
Temp. Unemp. Compensation
Passage
Temp. Unemp. Compensation
Yarborough Amendment
Amendments of 1958
Passage
Amendments of 1958
Extension (1960) Temp. Unemp. Compensation
Extension (1959) Temp. Unemp. Compensation
Javits Substitution
Amendments of 1960
Anderson Amendment
Amendments of 1960
Long Amendment
Amendments of 1960
Passage
Amendments of 1960
Conference Report
Amendments of 1960
Financial Committee Amendment Temporary
Unemployment Compensation
Financial Committee Amendment Temporary
Unemployment Compensation
Williams Amendment Temp. Unemp. Compensation
Passage
Temp. Unemp. Compensation
Hartke Substitution
Amendments of 1961
Cotton Amendment
Amendments of 1961
Passage
Amendments of 1961
Saltenstall Substitution Public Welfare
Amendments of 1962
Push Substitution Public Welfare Amendments
of 1962
Kerr Tabling Public Welfare Amendments of 1962
McCarthy Amendment Extend Unemployment Com
pensation
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APPENDIX F
Vote
Date
9- 2-64
9- 3-64
9- 3-64
7- 7-65
7- 8-65
7- 8-65
7- 8-65
7- 9-65
7- 9-65
7- 9-65
7- 9-65
7- 9-65
7- 9-65
7- 9-65
7- 9-65
7-28-65
8- 5-66

70

HR15119

8- 5-66

71

HR15119

8- 5-66

72

HR15119

8- 5-66

HR15119
HR15119

8- 5-66

8

-

8-66

75

HR15119

8

-

8-66

76

HR15119

8

-

8-66

66

73
74

Yeas
Against

X
X
X
X
X
X

X

Description
Gore Amendment
Amendments of 1964
Prouty Amendment
Amendments of 1964
Passage
Amendments of 1964
Ribicoff Amendment
Amendments of 1965
Miller Amendment
Amendments of 1965
Prouty Amendment
Amendments of 1965
Curtis Amendment
Amendments of 1965
Pastore Motion
Amendments of 1965
Curtis Amendment
Amendments of 1965
Morton Amendment
Amendments of 1965
Smathers Motion
Amendments of 1965
Hartke Amendment
Amendments of 1965
Curtis Amendment
Amendments of 1965
Curtis Motion
Amendments of 1965
Passage
Amendments of 1965
Conference Report
Amendments of 1965
Finance Committee Amendment Unemployment
Compensation of 1966
Finance Committee Amendment Unemployment
Compensation of 1966
Finance Committee Amendment Unemployment
Compensation of 1966
Long Amendment Unemployment Compensation of
1966
Long Motion Unemployment Compensation of 1966
Curtis Motion Unemployment Compensation of
1966
Finance Committee Amendment Unemployment
Compensation of 1966
Finance Committee Amendment Unemployment
Compensation of 1966_________________________
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67
68
69

Bill
Number
HR11865
HR11865
HR11865
HR 6675
HR 6675
HR 6675
HR 6675
HR 6675
HR 6675
HR 6675
HR 6675
HR 6675
HR 6675
HR 6675
HR 6675
HR 6675
HR15119

Roll
Call
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

(CONTINUED)

APPENDIX F
Roll
Call
77

Bill
Number
HR15119

Vote
Date
8- 8-66

HR15119

8- 8-66

79

HR15119

8- 8-66

80

HR15119

8- 8-66

81

HR15119

8- 8-66

HR15119
HR12080
HR12080
HR12080
HR12080
HR12080
HR12080

8- 8-66
11-16-67
11-16-67
11-17-67
11-17-67
11-17-67
11-20-67

78

82
83
84
85
86
87
88

Yeas
Against

X

X

X

(CONTINUED)
Description

Finance Committee Amendment Unemployment
Compensation of 1966
Morton Amendment Unemployment Compensation of
1966
Long Amendment Unemployment Compensation of
1966
McCarthy Amendment Unemployment Compensation
of 1966
Long Amendment Unemployment Compensation of
1966
Passage Unemployment Compensation of 1966
Dirksen Amendment
Amendments of 1967
Hartke Motion
Amendments of 1967
Prouty/Cotton Amendment
Amendments of 1967
Prouty/Cotton Amendment
Amendments of 1967
Metcalf Amendment
Amendments of 1967
Kuchel Amendment
Amendments of 1967

APPENDIX F
Yeas
Against
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107

X
X
X

X

Bill
Number
HR12080
HR12080
HR12080
HR12080
HR12080
HR12080
HR12080
HR12080
HR12080
HR12080
HR12080
HR12080
HR12080
HR12080
HR12080
HR12080
HR12080
HR12080
HR12080

(CONTINUED)

Vote
...
Date_____________________ Description
11-20-67
11-20-67
11-20-67
11-21-67
11-21-67
11-21-67
11-21-67
11-21-67
11-21-67
11-21-67
11-21-67
11-21-67
11-21-67
11-21-67
11-21-67
11-21-67
11-21-67
11-22-67

Javits Amendment
Williams Amendment
Harris Amendment
Williams Amendment
Curtis/Williams Amendment
Ervin Amendment
Hartke Motion
Long Amendment
Kennedy Amendment
Hartke/Bayh Amendment
Williams Amendment
Kennedy Amendment
Prouty Amendment
Miller Amendment
Miller Amendment
Prouty Amendment
Rayh Amendment
Passage
Conference Report

Amendments
Amendments
Amendments
Amendments
Amendments
Amendments
Amendments
Amendments
Amendments
Amendments
Amendments
Amendments
Amendments
Amendments
Amendments
Amendments
Amendments
Amendments
Amendments

of
of
of
of
of
of
of
of
of
of
of
of
of
of
of
of
of
of
of

1967
1967
1967
1967
1967
1967
1967
1967
1967
1967
1967
1967
1967
1967
1967
1967
1967
1967
1967
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APPENDIX G
POLITICAL PARTY PLATFORM PLANKS ON
SOCIAL SECURITY:
1932-1964a
1932
There were seven presidential candidates and platforms
in the 1932 election.

The Communist platform, although

making no specific reference to social security, per se,
called for unemployment and social insurance at the expense
of the State and employers

(p. 328); and in general claimed

that the Republican, Democratic, and Socialist parties all
served the capitalist cause

(p. 329).

The Democratic plat

form had a short statement advocating unemployment and old
age insurance under state laws
their platform with:
to none"

(underlining added) ending

"Equal rights to all; special privileges

(pp. 331, 333).

The Farmer Labor platform plank on

the domestic security called for unemployment insurance to
be provided by the funds from Federal and state governments
as well as from employers and employees; old age pensions
for the needy by the Federal and state system (pp. 334, 335).

aSource: Kirk H. Porter and Donald B. Johnson,
National Party Platforms: 1840-1964 (Urbana: University of
Illinois Press, 1966). Page numbers in parentheses refer to
this source.
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The Republican Party stated in its platform that the supreme
problem is to break the back of the Depression and to restore
the economic life of the nation

(p. 339).

The plank on

unemployment and relief said:
True to American traditions and principles of
government, the administration has regarded the
relief problem as one of State and local respon
sibility (p. 341) .
The Socialist platform stated that the poverty, insecurity,
unemployment, waste, and economic collapse was the fault of
the Capitalist order
security"

(p. 351).

Their plank on "social

(although not called this yet by anyone) came under

the title of unemployment and labor legislation.

It called

for increased Federal appropriation for relief; a compulsory
system of unemployment compensation with adequate benefits
based on government and employer contributions; old age
pensions for men and women 60 and over; and, health and
maternity insurance

(p. 352).

The Socialist-Labor Party

wanted to make clear that the economic and social bonds of
capitalism were snapping— ruling class interests eagerly
offer palliatives and reforms to stave off the doom.

Every

reform granted by capitalism is a concealed measure of
reaction.

This party offered no programs in the area of

domestic security

(p. 355) .
1936

In the 1936 campaign platforms centered around what
the Democratic party had done in the last four years in
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office.

The Communist platform said that the New Deal

failed to protect and restore living standards.

Their

social security plank sought to provide unemployment insur
ance, old-age pensions and social security for all.

(It

seems that the term "social security" was accepted once and
for all.)

This platform makes specific mention for all to

support the Frazier-Lundeen Bill which provides compensation
to all unemployed? pensions for the aged at 60 with rates
equal to former earnings? and, also a Federal system of
maternity and health insurance

(p. 357).

The Democratic

Party platform of 1936 in its "old-age and social security"
plank stated:
We have built foundations for the security of those
who are faced with the hazards of unemployment and
old-age? for the orphaned, the crippled and the
blind.
On the foundation of the Social Security Act
we are determined to erect a structure of economic
security for all our people, making sure that the
benefit shall keep step with the ever-increasing
capacity of America to provide a high standard of
living for all its citizens (p. 360).
The Republican platform, in contrast to the Democratic,
spelled out the social security issue in some detail.

In

the platform Preamble:
Our party was the first party to declare for old-age
pensions. We acknowledge the responsibility of
government to adequately care for those handicapped by
advanced age or other disabilities . . . we must con
tinue to accept responsibility for taking care of the
unemployed until such time as industry is able to
reemploy them (p. 364).
In detailing the Preamble, they go into "security" at length
claiming the New Deal has endangered social security.

Their

plank stated principles which have been battled over since:
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(1) a pay-as-you-go policy for each generation to support
the aged justly and adequately;

(2) all over 65 should get

supplementary payment to provide minimum income protection
against want;

(3) States and Territories complying with

minimum standards should get Federal contributions; and

(4)

call for a direct tax widely distributed on the problem of
unemployment and social security annuities
in the Act does not exist)

(the reserve fund

(p. 366-67).

The Socialist platform began by showing the Old Deal
failings of 1928 and the New Deal failings of 1932.

Claiming

that under the latter 12 millions are still jobless while big
business was given almost unheard of powers.

It stated that

insecurity is logically related to capitalism (militarism
increases under a declining capitalism)

(p. 370).

As in

their platform of 1932, the Socialists called for more
Federal appropriations for the unemployed; also:
A Federal system of unemployment insurance and of oldage pensions for persons 60 years of age and over, with
contributions for such social insurance systems to be
raised from taxes on incomes and inheritances, as pro
vided in the Frazier-Lundeen Bill; and adequate medical
care of the sick and injured as a social duty, not as
a private or public charity (p. 372).
Socialist-Labor platform rhetoric continued to call for a
new order by saying that every reform granted by capitalists
is a concealed measure of reaction, exemplified by the NRA,
AAA, TVA, CCC, WPA, etc.

The Union Party platform

(receiving nearly 900,000 votes) had a social security plank
seeking to assure reasonable and decent security for the aged
who have been exploited by an unjust economic system

(p. 375).
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1940
The Communist Platform of 1940 began by charging Wall
Street wants war— citing it as the chief supplier of war
materials and that "all domestic policies defended or pr o 
posed are subordinated to the war issue perpetrated by the
economic royalists"

(p. 377).

They point out that the New

Deal gains of the last seven years are being used by Roose
velt Democrats to retain support (the progressive labor and
social legislation)— these gains are now under attack, h o w 
ever (p. 378).
called for:

In the social security plank, the Communists

(1) an extension of unemployment compensation

to cover all workers by increasing benefits and maximum
payments?

(2) establish old-age pensions for all over 60

with 60 dollars a month.
The Democratic Platform of 1940 begins by saying the
world is undergoing violent change

(p. 381) .

The impending

war and how to handle it makes up the major planks.

The

social security plank continues to pledge the extension of
the Social Security Act by making it more effective and
covering more millions of people? by more adequate and uni
form benefits in the unemployment compensation system through
the Federal equalization fund principles? and, by extending
and increasing OASI benefits.

A health plank pledges to

expand Federal coordination of health efforts

(p. 387).

The

Prohibition Party said that legislation alone— whether Old
Deal or New Deal— is insufficient.

The solution of all
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problems depends on character

(p. 389).

The Republicans in

this year go back to the preamble of the Constitution to
criticize the Roosevelt Administration— asserting that
nothing has been gained except debt and Federal power.
Regarding the social security plank, the Republicans favor
the extension of necessary old-age benefits on an ear-marked
pay-as-you-go basis

(same as in 1936); extension of Unemploy

ment Compensation provisions in the Social Security Act as
well as installing experience-rating provisions— the adminis
tration of which should be left with the States with a
minimum of Federal control

(p. 391).

Of note is the

insurance plank:
We condemn the New Deal attempt to destroy the con
fidence of our people in private insurance institu
tions.
We favor continuance of regulation of
insurance by the several States (p. 394).
The Socialist Party platform of 1940 points out that the best
of what goes by the New Deal name— social insurance, minimum
wage, etc.— was first demanded by the Socialist Party (p. 394) .
They go on to say that the Democrats as a party never
accepted the New Deal and now the New Deal Administration is
abandoning it for war economics.

(It might be noted that

this platform is strikingly prophetic in raising four issues
that concern the U. S. in the next 28 years.)

The unemploy

ment and social security plank of this platform proposes
Federal old-age pensions to be supplemented by an annuity
system; extend unemployment benefits to all; and desire a
complete health and disability insurance program for the
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people

(p. 395).

As in previous election years, the Social

ist-Labor Party makes no specific reference to constructive
programs in their platform— rather they continue to believe
and call for the downfall of capitalism.
1944
During this war year there were five parties who
offered candidates for election.

Of note is the fact that

the Communist Party dissolved and was replaced by a Com
munist Political Association— thus no platform.

The Demo

cratic Platform lauded its success in saving the American
system of free enterprise both after depression and during
war.

As could be expected from the platform of the party in

power, most of the planks deal with the war and what comes
next.

There is no mention of social security except for the

general statement:

"The enactment of such additional

humanitarian, labor, social and farm legislation as time and
experience may require,"

...

(p. 403).

The Prohibition

Party had a very specific social security plank:
We will extend the Social Security Act so as not to
exclude any groups from its provisions, and will
include a system of insurance for all aged persons,
and administer it so as to preserve the incentives
of initiative and thrift (p. 405).
The Republican Party platform of this war year, as the
Democratic one, pledged prosecution of the war— stressing
post-war relations and preparedness.

Along the way they

criticize the Democratic Party saying that four more years
of Democratic rule would centralize all power in the

president.

There is a lengthy "security" plank in the plat

form (quite in contrast to the Democratic plank) which calls
for:

an extension of old-age and unemployment insurance

systems; returning the U. S. Employment Service to the
States as soon as possible; a careful study of Federal-State
programs for maternal and child health, dependent children
and assistance to the blind, with a view to strengthening
programs; the continuation and stimulation of Federal aid to
State plans to make medical and hospital service available
to those in need without disturbing doctor-patient relation
ships

or socializing medicine; and finally, a stimulation of

State

and local plans for low-cost housing

(p. 409). The

Socialist platform is almost prophetic in its discussion of
the four issues facing the American people in the ensuing
years

after 1944.

issue

which is on the provision of economic security with

liberty

Of relevance to this study is the second

(the first time that the notion of liberty has come

up in any of the social security planks covered in this
study).

In general they call for democracy and not bureau

cracy in regards to the preservation and increase of liberty:
Planning for plenty is wholly incompatible with a
return of the control over great productive machinery
to private owners— very largely absentee owners—
while the government commits itself to overcome the
periodic crisis of a scarcity economy by maintaining
the unemployed at subsistence levels. This has been
and is the economic program of the New Deal (p. 415).
Socialist-Labor Party comments in 1944 criticized the New
Deal by saying that what the New Deal failed to do, war did.
(This is vague but typical of the platform.)

Now, they say,
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the problem is post-war markets:
Anticipating unprecedented postwar unemployment and
social unrest, the Capitalist class and its reformer
henchmen advance numerous schemes to appease the
workers.
Foremost among these are a vast postwar
public works program and the extension of "social
security"— a patent misnomer under a system which,
by its very nature, dictates insecurity for useful
producers (p. 417).
1948
In 1948 Democrats and Republicans received only 92%
of the electoral votes due to a "bolt" from the Democratic
National Convention of the delegates from several Southern
States who protested the strong civil rights plank in the
platform resulting in the States' Rights Party or "Dixiecrats."
votes.

The new Progressive Party polled over one million
The Communist Party issued a platform but did not

nominate a candidate

(p. 419).

The Christian Nationalist Party platform of 1948
claimed that Communist forces have infiltrated "old" politi
cal parties and government offices thus weakening the U. S.
government by instituting a program of State socialism
(p. 420).

Others who came under attack in the platform were

Jews, aliens and Negroes.

Their social security plank

titled "The Aged and the Infirm" referred to the fact that
the improvement of labor-saving devices has led to earlier
retirements:
Our senior citizens must be made the benefactors of
this progress, not the victims.
A sin.ple but effective
system must be provided whereby the children of our
generation can provide well for those of the passing

198
generation. We favor a pension that will guarantee a
self-respecting and independent standard of living
for all regardless of their economic standing, just
as veterans compensations are paid to all regardless
of economic standing (p. 424).
The Communist Party still reacting to the war points out
that instead of security and abundance there is sky-rocketing
prices, lowered living standards and the shadow of impending
economic crash with mass unemployment

(pp. 425-26).

Wall

Street seeks to plunge the nation into Fascism and World War
III- (p. 426).

This platform defends the labor movement,

calling for an extension of the Federal minimum wage and
social security laws to agricultural workers, including
seasonal and migratory labor (p. 427).

In this platform they

threw their support behind the Progressive Party

(see below).

The Democratic Party platform for this election year asserted
a similar statement made in the platform of 1932:
To serve the interests of all and not the few; to
assure a world in which peace and justice can pre
vail; to achieve security, full-production and fullemployment— this is our platform (pp. 430-31).
This platform attacked the Republican 80th Congress specific
ally for perpetrating inflation and policies imposing hard
ships and suffering on large numbers of the people.

In

regards the social security plank in the platform there was
considerable detail of their program:
We favor the extension of the Social Security program
established under Democratic leadership, to provide
additional protection against the hazards of old-age,
disability, disease or death. We believe the program
should include:
increases in OASI benefits by at least
50% and reduction - of the eligibility age for women from
65 to 60 years; extension of Old-age and Survivors' and
Unemployment insurance to all workers now not covered;
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insurance against loss of earnings on account of
illness or disability; improved public assistance
for the needy.
(Also favoring the enactment of a
national health program for expanded medical
research, medical education, and hospitals and
clinics.)
(p. 433.)
The Progressive Party platform of 1948 demands some detail
ing because of their polling over one million of the popular
votes.

This party criticizes the "after-the-war" but busi

ness control of the economy, government, Democratic and
Republican parties:

"Never before have so few owned so much

at the expense of so many"

(p. 436).

This new party pledged

to safeguard the principles in the Declaration of Independence
and Constitution— being the political heirs of Jefferson,
Jackson and Lincoln— of Frederick Douglass, Altgeld and
Debs— of "Fighting Bob" La Follette, George Norris, and
Franklin Roosevelt

(p. 436).

Regarding social security, the

Progressives say that the "old" parties refuse social
security protection to millions and allow meagre benefits to
the rest.

They block national health legislation while

millions are without medical care

(pp. 437-38).

They call

for the public ownership and control of the main levers of
our economic system on the basis of their reading of Roose
velt's Economic Bill of Rights.

They have a long Security

and Health plank which covers almost all the titles in the
Social Security Act:
The Progressive Party demands the extension of social
security protection to every man, woman and child in
the United States. We recognize the service which the
Townsend Plan has performed in bringing to national
attention the tragic plight of the senior citizens of
America, and we condemn the bi-partisan conspiracy in
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Congress over the past ten years against providing
adequate old-age pensions. We pledge our active sup
port for a national old-age pension of 100 dollars a
month to all persons at 60 years of age, based on
right and not on a pauperized need basis. We call
for a Federal program of adequate disability and sick
ness benefits and increased unemployment benefits,
protecting all workers and their standards of living.
We call for maternity benefits for working mothers for
13 weeks, including the period before and after child
birth, and the granting of children's allowances to
families with children under 18. We favor adequate
public assistance for all persons in need, with Federal
grants-in-aid proportionate to the needs and financial
ability of the State, pending the enactment of a compprehensive Federal Social Security program. We support
the right of every American to good health through a
national system of health insurance, giving freedom of
choice to patient and practitioner, and providing
adequate medical and dental care for all (pp. 445-46).
The Prohibition Party also had a social security and old-age
pension plank:
We will extend the Social Security Act so as to include
all employed persons in its provisions. We will also
develop a system of annuity insurance for aged persons
and so administer it as to preserve the incentives of
initiative and thrift (p. 449).
Republican Party members declared that it was general
principles based on liberty, opportunity and justice for all
that they ran on.

They pointed with pride to the Republican

Congress and its recent accomplishments
executive).

(in spite of the

Their social security plank for this election

year went:
Consistent with the vigorous existence of our competi
tive economy, we urge: extension of the Federal OASI
program and increase of the benefits to a more
realistic level; strengthening of Federal-State pro
grams designed to provide more adequate hospital
facilities, too [sic] improve methods of treatment for
the mentally ill, to advance maternal and child
health and generally to foster a healthy America
(p. 452) .
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Mankind is haunted by new fears according to the Socialist
Party platform.

People ask themselves if depression can be

avoided, poverty vanquished and war uprooted.
forms past, Socialist demands are many.
plank titled:

As in plat

Under the detailed

"Expand Social Legislation" they advocate the

expansion of unemployment insurance and social security in
the following way:
. . . millions of workers are as yet uncovered by
the unemployment and social security provisions.
The present law discriminates against farm labor,
domestic servants and other working groups despite
the constitutional guarantee of the "equal pro
tection of the laws." Even so, the DemocraticRepublican coalition in Congress has been whittling
down the number of workers protected by the
existing law at a time when extension of coverage
should be the order of the day.
The age at which workers become eligible for oldage pensions should be promptly reduced to 60 and
the system should be financed by net progressive
income taxation rather than by the regressive payroll
tax. The benefits— now drastically cut by the cur
rent inflation— should be raised.
The Social Security law should be amended to
include family incomes. The proper care of children
is at least as important as the care of the aged.
In addition to the above, Socialists called for legislation
for comprehensive medical and hospital care, financed by a
national contribution system of health insurance, which has
been blocked by the Democratic-Republic coalition.

On the

matter of health insurance they said:
Neither a fee-for-service system nor voluntary pre
payment plans can bring the benefits of modern
medical science to all the people, regardless of
race, color, creed, geography or economic condition
(p. 456) .
The Socialist-Labor platform of 1948 continued to
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criticize the American plutocracy which is leading the
United States toward war— asserting there can be no lasting
peace without socialism; war,

fascism, and "poverty amidst

plenty" are the evil brood of capitalism.

As in previous

platform statements, the Socialist-Laborites feel that
Capitalist reforms amount to reaction.
security plank

There is no social

(p. 462).

Socialist-Workers platform of 1948 said that even
though the Americans have the essential elements for
abolishing poverty and creating a rational and harmonious
society, they view the future with much uncertainty and fear
because war and depression are in their memory.

Their plank

on labor has a social security position and therefore needs
to be noted.

Discussing labor's standard of living, they

demand an escalator clause

(sliding scale of wages or auto

matic cost-of-living bonus) to be in all union contracts as
well as in all government employees' wages, veterans' allot
ments, old-age allowances, and pensions and social security.
Finally, unemployment insurance should be equal to trade
union wages

(p. 465).

As we have noted above, the Democratic party split at
the Party convention over the civil rights plank in the plat
form (thus incidently bolstering the hypothesis that platforms
and planks take on political meaning worthy of study).
Several Southern States decided to take a stand on States'
Rights.

These "Dixiecrats," as they were called, maintained:

"a platform of principles is a solemn covenant with the
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people and with the members of the party . .

(p. 466).

They felt that they were on solid ground by splitting off
on the issue of civil rights.

They pointed out that their

wishes should be complied with on the basis of past loyalty
to the party

(saying that the South had furnished approxi

mately 50% of the votes necessary to nominate a president
every four years for nearly a century)

(p. 467).

1952
The Republican and Democratic parties received the
highest popular vote for both winner and loser thus far in
the history of presidential elections.

The States' Rights

Party dissolved shortly after the 1948 elections and the
Progressive Party loses much of its support

(p. 469).

The Christian Nationalist Party in 1952 kept up the
same arguments advanced back in 1948.

They were still

seeking a religious base for the government— suggesting that
government in the United States now differs substantially
from the design laid down in the Constitution (p. 470).

The

discussion on domestic policy, although there is nothing
therein on social security, as such, assails government
expenditure and taxation by saying:

"In all areas of private

welfare, the Socialist planners seek to inject the Federal
hand to produce a progressive weakening of the structure of
individual character"

(p. 470).

Democratic Party positioning pointed with pride to
the past 20 years of Democratic leadership by reaffirming
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that it was their policies and programs which rescued
American business from total collapse while rescuing wageearners from mass unemployment and encouraging unionization
(claiming unemployment now being 3% of the labor force, com
pared with almost 25% in 1932; trade union membership
reaching 15 million— more than five times that in 1932).

In

short, the welfare of all economic and social groups has been
promoted

(p. 474).

Their social security plank for this year

suggested, among other things, that the national system of
Social Security, conceived and developed by the Democratic
Party, needs to be extended and improved by:

(1) benefit

increases, more coverage, and lower retirement age for women
in OASI;

(2) stronger system of unemployment insurance with

broader coverage and benefits to include a dependent
allowance as well as improvements in the public assistance
program; and (3) encourage private endeavors designed to
complement our present social security program (p. 484).
The Progressive Party in this year considered the cease fire
in Korea to be the major issue claiming that the old parties
offer war and the war economy as the only way to have pros
perity and stave off depression.

Despite the war boom,

these Progressives point out that five and one-half millions
are on relief.

This party still seeks, as in 1948, to make

Roosevelt's Economic Bill of Rights a reality.

In the area

of social security they call for:
A comprehensive Federal system of old-age, unemploy
ment and disability insurance, guaranteed to every
American, without discrimination, benefits equal to
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a minimum decent standard of living. For the aged,
not less than $150 monthly; for the unemployed and
disabled, not less that $40 weekly, with additional
dependency allowances. Extend the Social Security
Act to all workers and all who are self-employed,
including the farmer.
Provide family allowance of $3 weekly per child.
Virtually every industrial nation, except ours, pays
a weekly or monthly grant to the parent of every
child, to assure a basic minimum standard of living
for children.
A system of national health insurance, guaran
teeing to all Americans as a matter of right and
not as charity, and without discrimination, ade
quate dental and medical care . . . provide
dependency benefits to working mothers equal to the
unemployment compensation. We are now the only
industrial nation in the world without a system of
health insurance (p. 492).
The Prohibition Party continues to be strongly opposed to
aetheistic Communism, government extravagance, and alcohol—
deploring, generally, the current United States trend toward
the Socialist State.

But in their social security plank they

say:
We endorse the general principle of social security,
including all employed groups. We deplore, however,
the widespread current abuses of its privileges and
maladministration of its provisions for political
ends, and pledge ourselves to correct these evils
(pp. 495-95).
This Republican Platform, like previous ones, begins with
governmental principles.

In 1952 they began by stating that

man was not born to be ruled, but that he consented to be
governed; but, under the successive Democratic Administra
tions of the last 20 years this idea has been destroyed.
the area of social security measures they observe:
Inflation has already cut in half the purchasing power
of the retirement and other benefits under the Federal

In
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OASI system.
Sixty million persons are covered under
the system and four and one-half million are now
receiving benefits.
The best assurance of preserving the benefits for
which the worker has paid is to stop the inflation
which causes the tragic loss of purchasing power,
and that we propose to do.
We favor the amendment of the OASI system to pro
vide coverage for those justly entitled to it but
who are now excluded.
We shall work to achieve a simple, more effective
and more economical method of administration.
We shall make a thorough study of universal payas-we-go pension plans.
. . . we are opposed to Federal compulsory health
insurance with its crushing cost, wasteful inef
ficiency, bureaucratic dead weight, and debased
standards of medical care (pp. 503-504).
Socialist Party platform of 1952:

this party felt it was

under global attack to such an extent that socialism has
become a major political issue in the country

(p. 506).

It

is evident that militarism is their major target in this
platform:
American capitalism never recovered from the great
collapse of the 3 0 1s when millions went hungry and
homeless although the basic wealth of the country
was great and unavailable for their use only because
of the despotism of the private profit system.
There was no recovery in the sense of the devotion
of the economy to human needs.
Superficial pros
perity returned with a war economy and the brutal and
wanton destructiveness of war (p. 510).
The Socialist Party offered an internal development program
as a substitute for war.

For example, the social security

plank calls for benefit increases to catch up with inflation,*
coverage should be expanded to end discrimination against
any group of workers? the age limit for old-age pension
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should be reduced to 60; finally, family allowances must be
added

(p. 512).

This is a much milder plank than in previous

platforms we have examined above.
Socialist-Labor Party platform:

the Capitalist system

rose on the ruins of Feudalism and has fulfilled its mission
of establishing mass production, according to the framers of
this platform.

Now this system's downfall is certain because

it is now based on an arms economy:
One and all (Republicans, Democrats, etc.) preach
reforms and promise improvements of conditions that
are past improving. To propose reform when a
fundamental social change is called for is to help
prolong the Capitalist cause of war, Fascism and
working-class exploitation.
"To reform is to
preserve" (p. 516).
Socialist Workers Party platforms statements, like
the others under the Socialist banner, are against the mili
tary machine which devours American wealth and resources.
Generally:
The Second World War pulled us out of the depression.
Now preparations for World War III are keeping us out
of a depression.
Big Business likes this war profifeteering.
It prefers to have the nation's wealth
invested in the means of destruction instead of in a
system of social security to provide medical care and
security for everyone (p. 517) .
The security and welfare plank goes:
The so-called 'Fair Deal' welfare program promised by
Truman in 1948 has been put in moth balls.
It was
only a campaign promise. Now it is being taken out
of storage for the 1952 campaign.
The Republicans and
Democrats will never enact a genuine public welfare
program (p. 521).
Their specific proposals call for building 20 million lowcost housing units; a free national health service for all;
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and an adequate old-age pension and a college education for
all youth

(p. 521).
1956

There were six parties who put up candidates during
this election:

Republicans, Democrats, Prohibitionists,

Socialists, Socialist-Labor, and Socialist-Workers.

(In mid-

September 317 delegates from several splinter groups repre
senting voters in approximately one-half of the States,
formed a National Conservative Movement and published a
declaration of principles

(p. 523).

There was no progres

sive candidate.
The Democratic Party platform of 1956 was a long and
detailed one.

A major point made was that the people

returned control of the legislative machinery of the Federal
government to the 84th Congress in 1954 on the wake of two
years of Republican misrule.

Legislative history was made

by this Congress say the Democrats.

For example in the

social security plank:
By lowering the retirement age for women and disabled
persons, the Democratic 84th Congress pioneered two
great advances in social security, over the bitter
opposition of the Eisenhower administration. We shall
continue our efforts to broaden and strengthen this
program by increasing benefits to keep pace with
improving standards of living; by raising the wage
base upon which benefits depend; and by increasing
benefits for each year of covered employment (p. 534).
In addition, the Party called for broader coverage and
increased benefits as well as the establishment of a floor
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to assure minimum level and duration of benefits and fair
eligibility rules; calling also for an improved public
assistance program even beyond those improvements made by
the 84th Congress

(p. 534).

The Prohibition Party platform had the same general
tone as the one of four years previous.

The social security

plank had exactly the same wording.
The Republican Party platform for 1956 celebrating
its centennial as a party, cites Lincoln and Eisenhower as
being the preservers of the Nation.

The major issue for

this party is whether government shall be the servant or
master of men

(p. 547).

They pointed with pride to the

accomplishments in social security:
Social security has been extended to an additional
10 million workers and the benefits raised for 6^
million.
The protection of unemployment insurance
has brought to 4 million additional workers (p. 549).
The Socialist Party restated basic socialist princi
ples.

They point out that the American people have already

adopted many socialist measures to serve their needs when
Capitalism, with its profit motive, failed them:
Capitalism fails to guarantee basic security to the
people.
We would establish social insurance with
adequate provision for unemployment compensation,
old-age pensions and death benefits, and provide for
medical care, family allotments and sickness
insurance (p. 563).
Socialist Labor platforms statements reaffirm that
Capitalism is doomed and that Socialism is_ the answer to all
social problems.

This party continues to make appeals to

the working class of America.
security.

No mention is made of social
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The Socialist Workers continue to oppose the American
"imperialistic" war program.

They also focus on the danger

of economic crisis as corporations record profit and con
sumers record debt— suggesting that an economic crisis is the
only alternative to war under Capitalism (p. 568).

They

leveled a specific attack on the Democratic Party:
Its New Deal reputation was forced upon it in the
first place out of necessity to ward off the mass
radicalization following the 1929 crash.
Since the
New Deal became transformed into the War Deal during
the latter part of the thirties not one major social
reform has been introduced (p. 571).
Their economic security and welfare plank called for adequate
old-age pensions; free medical care and hospitalization;
full disability benefits; and an escalator clause on all
wages, compensation and pensions, with taxes to be included
in computing living costs

(p. 572).
1960

The Democratic Party in 1960 began their platform by
drawing on some history.
election

As in America's first contested

(1796), we look to Jefferson's principle on "The

Rights of Man" as being the basic concern of our party.
They go on to say that with the possibility of nuclear holo
caust, our national strength— military, political, economic,
and moral— must be restored

(p. 574).

On the domestic scene,

they reaffirm Roosevelt's Bill of Rights

(p. 583) by sup

porting full employment as the paramount objective of
national policy.

In specific pledges, they wish to bring
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migrant labor under many protections, including social
security provisions

(p. 585).

Before considering specific

social security promises they, in the platform, have a
Health plank:
Illness is expensive. Many Americans have neither
incomes nor insurance protection to enable them to
pay for modern medical care. The problem is par
ticularly acute with the older citizens, among whom
serious illness strikes most often.
We shall provide medical care benefits for the
aged as part of the time-tested Social Security
insurance system. We reject any proposal which
would require such citizens to submit to the
indignity of a means test— a “pauper's oath11 (pp. 55758) .
Criticizing the Republican Administration, they say:
The Republican Administration refused to acknowledge
any national responsibility for health care for
elder citizens until forced to do so by an increas
ingly outraged demand.
Then, its belated proposal
was a cynical sham built around a degrading test
based on means or income— a “pauper's oath" (p. 588).
Then they discuss a comprehensive program for the aged
(later enacted as the Older Americans Act of 1964 plus the
Medicare Provisions in the Social Security Act emphasizing
services to aged rather than income):
We will amend the Social Security Act to increase the
retirement benefit for each additional year of work
after 65, thus encouraging workers to continue on the
job full-time.
To encourage part-time work by others, we favor
raising the $1200 a year ceiling on what a worker
may earn while still drawing Social security
benefits.
Retirement benefits must be increased generally,
and minimum benefits raised from $33 to $50 (p. 589).
Under selected parts of the “Welfare" plank:
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Public Assistance.— Persons in need who are inade
quately protected by social insurance are cared for
by the States and local communities under public
assistance programs.
The Federal government which now shares the cost
of aid to some of these, should share in all, and
benefits should be made available without regard to
residence (refers to the "General” aid category).
Unemployment Benefits.— We will establish uniform
minimum standards throughout the Nation for coverage,
duration, and amount of unemployment insurance
benefits.
Child Welfare.— The Child Welfare Program and other
services already established under the Social
Security Act should be expanded. Federal leadership
is required in the nation wide campaign to prevent
and control juvenile delinquency (p. 589).
The Prohibition Party platform of 1960 stressed
loyalty to the Constitution, opposition to Communism, and
economy as well as the liquor problem.

This party makes the

same statement about social security as in previous plat
forms

(pp. 600-604).
Republican Party platform of 1960:

the Republicans

offer their program by looking to "The changeless principles
of our free Constitution" for strength and confidence in an
age of revolutionary turbulance

(p. 605) .

In the Labor

plank they continue to call for the strengthening of the
unemployment insurance system and the extension of its
benefits

(p. 610).

In the "Older Citizens" plank:

Expansion of coverage and liberalization of selected
social security benefits on a basis which would main
tain the fiscal integrity of the system (p. 616).
(Amazing how fiscal integrity of this part of the U. S.
system has been emphasized for so many years— while the
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whole system of government spending has been fiscally dis
integrating in other areas such as farm and public transpor
tation and utility subsidies, etc.)

The plank on "Health

Aid" is worth quoting so as to contrast it with the Demo
cratic Party statement above:
Development of a health program that will provide
the aged needing it, on a sound fiscal basis and
through a contributory system, protection against
burdensome costs of health care.
Such a program
should:
Provide the beneficiaries with the option of
purchasing private health insurance— a vital distinc
tion between our approach and Democratic proposals
in that it would encourage commercial carriers and
voluntary insurance organizations to continue their
efforts to develop sound coverage plans for the
senior population (p. 616).
In addition to this type of health program, they pledge to
protect the personal relationship of patient and physician;
include State participation in health aid; remove the 50
year old age requirement for disability insurance and amend
the law to provide incentives; set up a single, Federal
assistance grant to each State for aid to needy persons
rather than dividing such grants into specific categories;
and a strengthening of the Federal-State program of rehabil
itation

(p. 617).

The platform Conclusion sheds light on

the discussion:
We have no wish to exaggerate differences between
ourselves and the Democratic Party; nor can we, in
conscience, obscure the differences that do exist.
We believe that a Republican program is based upon a
sounder understanding of the action and scope of
government. There are many things a free government
cannot do for its people as well as they can do them
for themselves.
There are some things government
should promise or attempt to do. The functions of
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government are so great as to bear no needless
enlargement.
We limit our proposals and our
pledges to those areas for which the government
of a great republic can reasonably be made
responsible (p. 620).
The Socialist Party offered a platform for 1960 but
no candidate.

According to this document:

the most funda

mental Socialist goal is that man must master society
instead of being mastered by it.

This was amplified by

statements as follows:
Since the 1930's the two old parties have produced
virtually no progressive social legislation. As
productivity has grown, so have slums; as medical
research has advanced, the ability of ordinary people
to pay for medical care has regressed; as our
standard of living has risen, fifty million Americans
have continued to dwell in poverty (p. 621).
Our society is deadlocked and frustration is our
predominant feeling in every area of life; and the
predominant source of our political frustration is
a party alignment that cannot reflect the will of
the people.
A coalition of Northern Republicans
and Southern Democrats thwart the wishes of the
majority, and will continue to do so until there is
a political realignment in this country (p. 621).
It is interesting and revealing to note that in this Social
ist platform they had a heading the War on Poverty which was
picked up later by the Johnson Administration.

In this

particular instance, the Socialists were referring to the
international poverty situation (e.g., 70% of the world's
population is in a state of poverty).
1964
The Democratic Party, led by Lyndon B. Johnson,
polled 61.4%

(60 millions) of the vote— the largest plurality
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in American history.

Republicans took Alabama, Georgia,

Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Arizona.

(Minor

platforms not included in the analysis— National States
Rights, Universal, American, Poor Mans', and Theocratic
parties.)

Minor parties received fewer than 150,000 votes

in 1964.
The Democrats. calling themselves the Party of
Jefferson, rested on the ONE NATION, ONE PEOPLE idea.
said that the welfare, progress, security,

They

and survival of

each of us reside in the common good.

They offer their plat

form as a covenant of unity (p. 641).

The task is to make

the national purpose serve the human, individual purpose
(p. 644).

Within the framework of the Democracy of Oppor

tunity plank, they discuss social security:
The Social Security program, initiated and developed
under the iiational leadership of the Democratic Party
and in the face of ceaseless party opposition, con
tributes greatly to the strength of the nation. We
must insure that those who have contributed to the
system shall share in the steady increase in our
standard of living by adjusting benefit levels (p. 645).
This platform has considerable detail because the Democrats
feel that their accomplishments are many.
ings:

"Accounting of Stewardship:

Under two head

1961-1953" and "The

Record" they measure the last three and one-half years of
performance against their 1960 platform point for point
(pp. 649-72) which reinforces the notion that, at least the
Democratic Party takes its rhetoric serious in these yea r s .
For example, in the health area in 1960 they proposed to
provide medical care benefits for the aged under social
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security:

"More health legislation has been enacted during

the past 3% years than during any other period in American
history"

(p. 661) .

In 1960 they proposed to end the neglect

of older citizens— their performance on the program for the
aged:
The Social Security Act Amendments of 1961 broadened
benefits to 5.3 million people, including minimum
benefits for retired workers from $33 to $40 per month,
permitting men as well as women to begin collecting
reduced benefits at age 62.
The Social Security program now provides 1.3 billion
in benefits each month to 19.5 million persons.
One
out of every ten Americans receives a Social Security
check every month (p. 662).
They further proposed back in 1960:
tations for disabled people;
the needy;

(2) to increase benefits for

(3) to bring more uniform standards in unemploy

ment insurance benefits; and
program.

(1) to remove age limi

(4) to expand the child welfare

Their performance:

The 1961 Public Assistance Amendments, extending aid
for the first time to families with dependent children
in which the parent is unemployed . . . the 1962 Public
Welfare amendments provide the authority and financial
resources for a new approach to the problems of pro
longed dependency and some of the special needs of
children . . . (p. 663) the Temporary Extended Unemploy
ment Compensation Act of 1961 provided 13 additional
weeks of benefits to the long-term unemployed.
2.8
million jobless workers received 800 million dollars in
assistance (p. 664).
The Prohibition Party platform for 1964 was similar
to past ones in content, including the social security plank
which is worded the same as in years past.
The Republican Party, calling themselves the Party of
Lincoln— much like the Democrats called themselves the Party
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of Jefferson— offered a platform "For the People."

They

decry the Federal extremists who are impulsive in the use of
national power— the Democratic Party stands accused of weak
ening the Republic both at home and abroad

(pp. 677-68).

the attack, Republicans say the Democrats have failed the
poor:
This Administration has refused to take practical
free enterprise measures to help the poor. Under
the last Republican Administration, the percentage
of poor in the country dropped encouragingly from
28% to 21%.
By contrast, the present Administration,
despite a massive increase in the Federal bureaucracy,
has managed a mere 2 percentage point reduction.
This Administration proposed a so-called war on
poverty which characteristically overlaps, and often
contradicts, the 42 existing Federal poverty pro
grams.
It would dangerously centralize Federal
control and bypass effective State, local, and p r i 
vate programs (p. 680).
In the area of fiscal responsibility the Democrats are
further criticized:
This Administration has continued to endanger retire
ment under Social Security for millions of citizens;
it has attempted to overload the System with costly,
unrelated programs which ignore the dangers of overly
regressive taxation and the unfairness of forcing the
poor to finance such programs for the rich (p. 681).
Claiming that they offer no extravagent proposals like the
Democrats, they offer the following counter-proposals on
social security:
Tax credits and other methods of assistance to help
needy senior citizens meet the costs of medical and
hospital insurance; a strong sound system of Social
Security, with improved benefits to all of our
people; . . . revision of the Social Security laws to
allow higher earnings, without loss of benefits, by
our elderly people; full coverage of all medical and
hospital costs for the needy elderly people, financed
by general revenue through broader implementation of

On
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Federal-State plans, rather than the compulsory
Democratic scheme covering only a small percentage
of such costs, for everyone regardless of need
(p. 683).
Socialist Labor Party platform of 1964.— Humanity is
still standing on the threshold of a new social order—
Capitalism is doomed because it is charged with fatal contra
dictions.

Against this bleak background, say the Socialist-

Laborites, politicians of both major parties are declaring
phony antipoverty "wars"

(p. 690).

In this platform they

want to:
Repudiate the Republican and Democratic parties,
the political Siamese twins of capitalism— and
reject also the self-styled "radicals'1 and
"liberals" whose platforms consist of measures
to reform and patchup the poverty-breeding
capitalist system, which is past reforming and
patching (p. 692).
There is no mention of social security programs.
Socialist Workers.— This platform directs itself to
the one-fifth of the American population in poverty which
President Johnson refers to in his State of the Union message
(1964); that is, those millions who live in depression
pockets

(p. 692).

In the area of social security:

Provide the millions of aged people with full dis
ability benefits, free medical care and hospitaliza
tion, and adequate pensions. Nationalize the entire
medical system. As an immediate measure, pass the
King-Anderson Medicare Bill now bottled up in
Congress (p. 698).
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APPENDIX H
THE AVERAGE AND WEIGHTED RICE INDEX OF COHESION*
Given the context of rigor surrounding the indicators
used in this study, analysis was limited to the most basic
of quantitative methods.

The computation of the Average Rice

Index of Cohesion in this study was done according to the
source cited below.

That is, the Rice Indices of the

individual roll calls were averaged without weighting the
different
call.
call

number of legislators participating in each roll

What follows

are

the results of weighting each roll

(computationally, this weighted Rice index for the five

periods of the study is derived by getting a grand total
number of

votes for the

period as well as the grand total

number of

votes for and

against, for the period,and computing

the Rice index on these totals rather than averaging the
individual Rice Indices).
These comparative data reveal vastly different results
between the weighted and non-weighted index except for the
House Democrats in the New Deal-War Deal, Fair Deal and New
Frontier historical periods.

This is so because not all

*Source: Lee F. Anderson, Meredith W. Watts, Jr.,
and Allen R. Wilcox, Legislative Roll-call Analysis (Evanston:
Northwestern University Press, 1966), pp. 29-58.

TABLE XXXI
COMPARISON OF THE WEIGHTED RICE INDEX WITH THE AVERAGE RICE INDEX
IN THE HOUSE AND SENATE BY PARTY
House
Democrats
Republicans
Average Weighted
Average Weighted

Senate
Democrats
Republicans
Average Weighted
Average Weighted

New Deal
War Deal

86.6

85.5

84.6

33.5

65.5

52.1

58.5

1.3

Fair Deal

63.9

64.7

72.9

-30.4

64.0

7.0

79.9

-57.0

Cold War

60.1

68.6

88.0

69.9

59.8

48,0

68.6

-11.0

New Frontier

97.1

97.1

66.6

42.9

68.5

29.9

79.8

4.2

Great
Society

83.7

42.1

70.2

51.2

52.9

11.4

53.4

- 8.3

220

221
members vote on all the bills presented to them, thus there
are different proportions of legislators voting in each roll
call.

The Weighted index accounts for this as well as

revealing the direction of cohesion

(in this case, the

negative cohesion of the House and Senate Fair Deal Repub
licans and the Cold War and Great Society Republican Senators).
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